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November 2012 
 
Dear Readers, 
Last year saw the redesign of Korea’s Economy exterior and the introduction of a series of short 
commentaries by leading scholars and government officials. With this year’s edition, we hope to 
build on last year’s improvements to Korea’s Economy with a new interior look and the introduction 
of abstracts to allow our readers to quickly get a feel for what each article is about. 
The 2012 edition of Korea’s Economy may be one of our most ambitious yet. With the uncertain 
future of the euro as the background, we take a series of looks at how Asian economic integra-
tion is proceeding and what the region can learn from the experience of Europe. 
On the trade front, we look at the future of trade policy in Korea now that the KORUS FTA is 
implemented. One significant new announcement covered in this section is the Korea-China 
FTA, which is now under negotiation. At the same time, with Korea now negotiating or having 
completed FTAs with most of its major trading partners, we look at the question of whether it is 
best for Korea to continue to pursue free trade agreements or if it is time for Korea to return its 
focus to the multilateral trading system.
Additionally, we look at Korea’s role in development. Korea’s own economic development was 
one of the great success stories of the 20th century and it became the first former aid recipient 
nation to join the OECD’s Development Assistance Council. While Korea is a relatively new player 
on the development stage, that also provides it with a unique opportunity to blaze its own path 
on this issue and to find ways to bring lessons from its own experience to this important issue.
Of course, given the changes in North Korea over the last half year, we would be remiss to not 
consider what the transition to Kim Jong-un might mean for the future of the Korean economy 
north of the DMZ. 
We hope that you enjoy the changes that we have introduced in this edition of Korea’s Economy 
and the articles in this year’s edition. We look forward to continuing to enhance this publication 
in the years ahead to provide the best possible insights into Korea’s economic relations.
Dr. Abraham Kim    Troy Stangarone 
President (Interim)    Senior Director of Congressional Affairs and Trade  
      Editor – Korea’s Economy 
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KOREA’S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES1
By Thomas Rumbaugh
oVErVIEW and MaCroEConoMIC IssUEs
Abstract
Following a strong rebound in 2010, growth in Korea slowed down in 2011 to 3½ percent due to domestic factors and weakness 
in the global economy. While recent data suggest that the economy will bottom out in mid-year and strengthen during the course 
of 2012, on-going weakness in the global economy represent downside risks to this scenario. Additionally, even if the global 
economy were to deteriorate further, Korea still has ample fiscal space to respond with a fiscal stimulus package similar to what 
was done in 2008-09, if necessary. At the same time, headline inflation has decelerated in large part due to government measures 
and favorable base effects and the external vulnerability of the Korean financial system has significantly diminished since 2010. 
However, households’ high indebtedness has been flagged as another important vulnerability for the financial system, with the 
household debt-to-disposable income ratio now at 135 percent and Korea is still one of the economies in Asia most exposed 
to foreign bank funding risks. One of the key medium-term policy challenges is to respond to the public’s call for more social 
spending and inclusive growth. Given the medium-term fiscal consolidation plan, the government should carefully calibrate the 
scope for raising social spending.
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Despite Global Headwinds, Korea’s 
Growth Outlook Remains Positive
Despite some uncertainties in the outlook for global activity, 
economic growth in Asia seems to be maintaining momentum. 
In the last quarter of 2011, activity slowed markedly across 
the region, but in the first months of 2012, leading indicators 
of activity have strengthened. Meanwhile inflation has picked 
up in some countries, and capital flows to Emerging Asia 
have rebounded. As reported in the IMF’s latest Regional 
Economic Outlook for Asia and the Pacific (REO) (http://www.
imf.org), Asia is projected to grow at 6 percent in 2012 before 
rising to about 6½ percent in 2013. Korea’s economy is 
projected to follow a similar trend. Growth momentum was 
accelerating in 2010 and into 2011 before a deterioration in the 
global economy led to a slowing of growth in the second half 
of the year. This somewhat slower growth is continuing in the 
first half of 2012 but momentum is expected to be restored in 
the second half of the year.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The first 
section focuses on economic developments in 2011 and the 
outlook for 2012-13. The second section discusses Korea’s 
progress in strengthening financial resilience in the face of 
global volatility. The third section elaborates on the medium-
term challenge of increasing social spending and creating a 
more inclusive growth model.
Balancing Growth and Inflation
Following a strong rebound in 2010, growth slowed down 
in 2011 to 3½ percent because of a housing supply overhang, 
sluggish investment, the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus, the 
impact of high household indebtedness on private consumption, 
and weakness in the global economy. Growth surprised on the 
upside in the first quarter of 2012, with broad-based recovery 
in domestic demand, but may be slowing again in the second 
quarter in line with weakness in the global economy. Recent 
data, and our projections, suggest that the economy will bottom 
out and strengthen during the course of 2012. Korea’s diversi-
fied export base will help cushion the impact of weakness in 
the advanced economies. The recently ratified free-trade agree-
ment with the United States, and Korean exporters’ expansion 
into the growing markets of developing countries, will also 
help. On the domestic demand side, staff expects investment to 
recover, and private consumption to return to its trend growth. 
Accordingly, we have forecast Korea’s economy to grow at 3 
to 3¼ percent in 2012 before rising to about 4 percent in 2013.
Elevated inflation was a key policy challenge confronting 
the Bank of Korea in 2011. Headline inflation remained 
stubbornly high and above the Bank of Korea’s (BOK) 2-4 
percent target band for most of 2011, despite weak activity 
in the last quarter of the year. Food price inflation peaked in 
the middle of the year and fell sharply in the second half, 
but this decline was not able to offset the inflationary pressures 
from increasing prices of housing and transportation. A sharp 
exchange rate depreciation in the third quarter also contributed 
to elevated inflation.
More recently, headline inflation has decelerated in large 
part due to government measures and favorable base effects. 
Headline inflation has come off to 2¼ percent in June 2012, 
below the midpoint of the target band. However, this reflects 
temporary measures as the decline was largely driven by 
government subsidies on childcare and free school meals, as 
well as base effects. Around one-half of a percentage point of 
the decline in headline inflation can be attributed to these 
government measures. Food price disinflation, which con-
tributed to declining inflation earlier, appears to have run its 
course. Core inflation also fell to 2 percent in March from 2½ 
percent during the previous month.
Figure 1 Contributions to GDP Growth (as a %)Figure 1 Contributions to GDP Growth (as a %)
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Despite the recent moderation in inflation, inflation pressures are 
projected to resurface in 2013. We expect inflation to be about 
3 percent for 2012, slightly above the mid-point of the BOK’s 
target band. Downward movements in headline inflation 
are unlikely to continue as there are no plans to implement 
additional administrative measures. Despite the drop in 
headline inflation, certain components of the Consumer Price 
Index basket with large weights (such as housing, transport 
and clothing) continue to see strong increases. Food price-
led declines have troughed, implying that food prices will not 
contribute to a further drop in headline inflation. And despite 
declining headline inflation, inflation expectations remain close 
to 4 percent. Furthermore, there are upside risks to the inflation 
outlook from the need for utility price hikes going forward. 
Guarding against risks to growth, while shepherding a soft 
landing for inflation, requires a delicate mix of policies. 
The current macro policy mix combines an accommodative 
monetary policy and a broadly neutral fiscal stance. On the 
fiscal policy side, the objective is to support growth—including 
by fully allowing automatic stabilizers to work—while not 
derailing medium-term efforts to restore fiscal space. The 
government appropriately chose to front-load 60 percent of its 
2012 budget in the first half of the year given the weaknesses 
in the global economy. Even if the global economy were to 
deteriorate further, Korea still has ample fiscal space to respond 
with a fiscal package similar to what was done in 2008-09, if 
necessary. On the monetary policy side, we continue to believe 
it will be necessary to resume a normalization of monetary 
policy through interest rate increases in 2013 based on a forecast 
closing of the output gap (the difference between actual and 
potential economic output), continued risks to inflation, and to 
further build policy space and enhance credibility. 
Safeguarding Financial Stability
Korean banks’ large external short-term borrowing and their 
exposure to foreign exchange volatility were key vulnerabili-
ties prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Korea’s expo-
sure to European banks on the funding side is among the high-
est in Asia. However, since 2008, the external vulnerability of 
the Korean financial system has significantly diminished, 
reflecting higher reserves to short-term debt cover, lower 
reliance on wholesale funding, reduced foreign exchange 
liquidity mismatches, diversification of the foreign investor 
base in domestic bond and onshore dollar funding markets, 
and the adoption of a series of macroprudential measures 
since 2010. These measures include: a 100 percent cap on the 
won-denominated loan-to-deposit ratio; ceilings on banks’ 
foreign exchange derivative positions; tighter foreign exchange 
liquidity standards complemented by more frequent stress 
tests; stricter regulation of domestic foreign currency lending; 
a macroprudential levy on the foreign currency-denominated 
non-core bank liabilities; and a withholding tax on foreign 
investors’ interest income on government bonds.
The initial set of post-GFC measures targeted banks’ active 
use of short-term foreign-exchange liquidity and the resulting 
increase in the maturity and currency mismatches on banks’ 
balance sheets. The underlying concerns reflected banks’ 
strong reliance on non-core liabilities. The introduced 
measures included: (i) an increase in the ratio of long-term 
foreign exchange funding to foreign exchange lending, 
enacted in November 2009 and set at 90 percent; (ii) a cap on 
the value of forward foreign exchange contracts between banks 
and domestic exporters, introduced in November 2009 and 
set at 125 percent of export revenues; and (iii) a maximum 
loan-deposit ratio of 100 percent for domestic banks, 
introduced as a guideline in December 2009, and expected to 
be implemented by end-2013. During this initial phase, the 
Korean authorities also introduced more stringent capital 
requirements on bank holding companies to ensure sufficient 
absorption of potential losses.
In a second phase, in 2010, the authorities expanded the set of 
measures to contain banks’ short-term foreign currency debt. 
In October 2010, they established a ceiling on banks’ foreign 
currency derivative positions, including those from foreign 
exchange forward contracts bought from domestic exporters 
and asset management companies for currency hedging. The 
derivatives ceiling was set relative to banks’ capital, with 
domestic banks facing a ceiling of 50 percent of capital and 
foreign branches 250 percent of capital. The ceilings were 
subsequently tightened even further in July 2011 to 40 percent 
for domestic banks and 200 percent for foreign banks. The 
ratio of forward contracts to underlying export revenues was 
also reduced to 100 percent. Measures on foreign currency 
borrowing were bolstered as well. New measures on banks’ 
foreign currency loans were meant to prevent excessive 
foreign currency leverage in the corporate sector. Taken 
together, this set of macroprudential measures was meant to 
reduce the channeling of bank funding to foreign currency 
forward positions in the domestic market and guard against 
an abrupt withdrawal of capital. The Korean authorities also 
re-introduced a withholding tax on foreign purchases of 
treasury and monetary stabilization bonds in January 2011. 
In essence, this aligned the tax with the equivalent for resident 
bond purchases. The only explicit exemption was provided 
for official investors.
Households’ high indebtedness has been flagged as another 
important vulnerability for the financial system, with the 
household debt-to-disposable income ratio now at 135 percent, 
similar to levels in advanced economies such as the U.K. and 
the U.S. Household exposure to interest rate and rollover risks, 
therefore, present vulnerabilities despite relatively stable house 
prices, favorable net asset positions, and low loan-to-value 
ratios. However, one unique feature of Korea’s housing 
market could lead to inflated levels of household debt. The 
Jeonse system requires tenants to place a refundable deposit 
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of 50-70 percent of the price of a rented house to landlords 
at no interest. This arrangement pushes up both household li-
abilities and assets but has no impact on the net-asset position 
which remains relatively strong.
The banking system’s exposure to foreign exchange liquidity 
risks has also decreased sharply. This decrease reflects both 
strengthened regulation of foreign currency liquidity risks 
and reduction in banks’ external short-term borrowing, which 
had been partly driven by the demand for hedging by Korean 
shipbuilders and other exporters. Moreover, the foreign 
investor base in domestic bonds (who also supply dollar 
liquidity in the onshore swap markets) has broadened to include 
official investors (notably some regional central banks). 
The diversification has reduced the risk of market herding 
behavior, given the low correlation between liquidity risks faced 
by large global banks (which still dominate the base) and those 
faced by the regional central banks. Because of these changes, 
Korea’s exchange rate volatility, which tended to surge during 
the past crises, has become less sensitive to global risk factors: 
the sensitivity of the exchange rate volatility to changes 
in indicators of global volatility is estimated to have declined 
by more than a half since the GFC.
Even though the banking system vulnerabilities have 
diminished since 2008, it is important to remain vigilant. The 
negative impact of euro-area bank deleveraging has so far 
been limited. However, Korea is still one of the economies 
in Asia most exposed to foreign bank funding risks. In the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis, massive capital outflows caused 
the claims by the Bank of International Settlements report-
ing banks on Korea to fall by more than 70 billion dollars. 
As banks were unable to rollover their short-term debt, the 
Bank of Korea had to intervene with about 65 billion dol-
lars of reserves to cushion the liquidity squeeze on the econ-
omy. Even so, the won exchange rate fell by 32 percent, from 
the pre-crisis peak to trough, while stock prices declined 
by 35 percent. The financial stress also affected the real 
economy through slower credit growth. Looking ahead, 
the possibility of rollover difficulties resulting from an 
intensification of the euro-zone crisis cannot be ruled out. 
In the third quarter of 2011, there was a sudden surge in 
capital outflows (including from the banking sector). This 
led to some funding pressures causing depreciation of the 
exchange rate by 10 percent. Since the beginning of 2012, 
capital inflows have resumed led by both equity and fixed 
income flows, although banking capital flows remain sub-
dued. Going forward, the downside risks from intensifica-
tion of the euro-zone crisis appear to be balanced by the high 
upside risk for capital flows, particularly portfolio flows, 
if risk appetite recovers. Given the improved financial 
resilience and macroprudential policies in place, Korea is 
well positioned to manage any future bouts of capital flow 
volatility. Flexibility in macroeconomic policy will also 
remain an important part of dealing with economic shocks 
as the extensive macroprudential policies put in place are 
an important complement but cannot be a substitute for 
appropriate macroeconomic policy settings.
Social Spending and Inclusive Growth
One of the key medium-term policy challenges is to respond, 
in a careful yet effective way, to the public’s call for more 
social spending and inclusive growth—a particular challenge 
in this dual election year. Given the medium-term consoli-
dation plan, the government should carefully calibrate the 
scope for raising social spending; making sure that the bulk of 
the increase is matched by either additional revenues or cuts 
in other expenditures. To support this, more work also needs 
to be done in integrating long-term issues into the fiscal 
framework. Labor market reforms and raising the productiv-
ity of the service sector are key areas of reform to strengthen 
growth potential.
While Korea has one of the youngest populations in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), it is projected to shift to among the oldest by mid 
century, given its low fertility rate and rapid gains in longev-
ity. Although pressures will not show in the near term, given 
the current age profile of the population, age-related spending 
will begin to appear in the medium term and accelerate from 
2020 with the rapid aging of the population.2 Meanwhile, 
during the most recent decade, income inequality has rapidly 
risen to the OECD average level. 
Korea is among five OECD countries singled out for a high 
degree of inequality originating from the labor market. The 
Figure 3 Capital Adequacy, Nonperforming Loans, and Loan-to-Deposit RatioFigure 3 Capital Adequacy, Nonperforming Loans, and Loan-to-Deposit Ratio
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degree and cost of employment protection for regular 
workers has gradually risen to a point where companies have 
begun to shift most new jobs to nonregular workers. As a 
result, the share of nonregular workers is significantly 
higher than the OECD average, and they are paid about 40 
percent less. The female labor market participation rate (55 
percent) is also much lower than the OECD average (62 
percent). The government’s National Employment Strategy 
2010 aims at boosting Korea’s employment rate from 63 
percent of the working age population in 2010 to 70 percent, 
including by raising the participation rate of women, the el-
derly, and youth. 
Labor productivity growth is also being held down by 
rigidities in the service sector. Productivity growth in the 
service sector has been about 1 percent a year on average 
since 2001 compared to 6 percent in the manufacturing 
sector. The government can address this issue by enhancing 
competition, including in the education and health sectors; 
expediting bank-led restructuring of small- and medium- 
enterprises, the bulk of which are in the service sector; and 
eliminating preferential tax treatment of the export sector. 
The Korean government is targeting a balanced central gov-
ernment budget (excluding social security funds) by 2013-14, 
as part of its fiscal consolidation plan, which is already well 
advanced. Within this framework, the 2012 budget envis-
ages a 20 percent nominal increase in social welfare spend-
ing. The Direction for the Preparation of the 2013 Budget, 
which was recently approved, also maintains workfare and 
sustainable growth as core themes. The government’s Na-
tional Fiscal Management Plan for 2011-15 lays out several 
areas to increase revenues. Going forward, better clarifying 
medium-term fiscal targets and linking them more directly to 
future liabilities, including those related to aging, would help 
ensure that the fiscal objectives are consistent with long-term 
sustainability. This would also help make them more bind-
ing and guide prioritization among fiscal measures. The key 
policy tools to address these medium-term fiscal challenges 
include pension and healthcare reform, broadening of the tax 
base, improved tax administration and some reallocation of 
public expenditures. 
Conclusions
The global economy still remains fragile. Given its high 
global interconnectedness, Korea must remain vigilant. 
The main short-term risks to the outlook are the potential 
re-escalation of the euro crisis and possible increases in en-
ergy prices from geopolitical risks in the Middle East. 
A re-escalation of pressures in heavily indebted economies 
in Europe could lead to further deleveraging by European 
banks, which if disorderly and large scale, could have serious 
implications for Korea. However, since 2008, the external 
vulnerability of the Korean financial system has diminished, 
reflecting higher international reserves, lower reliance on 
wholesale funding, reduced foreign exchange liquidity 
mismatches, the entry of new foreign investors in domestic 
bond and onshore dollar funding markets, and the introduc-
tion of macroprudential instruments. The Korean economy is 
also susceptible to energy price shocks, which could boost 
inflation and further weaken private consumption.
Korea continues to be one of the most dynamic economies in 
the most dynamic region of the world. It is, therefore, well 
placed to take up the challenges that could arise from a volatile 
global economy. Unlike many other countries, including the 
most advanced ones, Korea has ample policy space to deal with 
global shocks, thanks mainly to its low public debt, exchange 
rate flexibility, comfortable international reserve buffers, and 
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use of macroprudential measures. Overall growth prospects 
remain favorable, and with the right policy settings, Korea can 
successfully navigate the still dangerous waters to a path of 
sustainable growth. 
Thomas Rumbaugh is a Division Chief for the Asia and Pacific 
Department of the International Monetary Fund.
1 Prepared by Thomas Rumbaugh, Division Chief, Asia and Pacific Department,  
International Monetary Fund. The views expressed are those of the author and  
not necessarily those of the IMF.
2 A previous IMF study shows that government gross debt will begin to grow from 
around 2020 as the initial asset accumulation phase of Korea’s still young pension 
system (which is fully funded) matures. See Feyzioglu, Skaarup, and Murtaza (2008), 
“Addressing Korea’s Long-Term Fiscal Challenges,” IMF Working Paper 08/27  
(Washington: International Monetary Fund) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/
longres.aspx?sk=21595.0).
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH KOREA UNDER 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
By Pyo Hak-kil
Abstract
The political economy in South Korea changed immensely through a series of internal and external events in 2011 and 2012. 
At the same time, actual economic performance was disappointing and far less than the 7 percent that President Lee Myung-bak 
had envisioned. The economic picture also worsened for households and businesses as households saw consumer prices rise by 
4 percent, while businesses faced increasingly higher prices for oil. At the same time, household debt surpassed 900 trillion won 
and all of the indicators of income inequality worsened. The National Assembly elections saw both political parties push for 
increased welfare spending. However, the proposals put forward by both parties may not be feasible due to constraints on the 
government’s total budget. With the global economic condition, continued fiscal troubles in Europe, and a slowdown of economic 
growth in China, Korea also faces reduced expectations for economic growth in the year ahead.
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Introduction
In 2011, the landscape of the political economy in South 
Korea changed immensely through a series of internal and 
external events. The earthquake and its aftermath in Japan 
and the fiscal crisis in Europe were two external events, 
while the new political syndrome after the election of a new 
progressive mayor in Seoul and the sudden death of Kim 
Jong-il were two remarkable events within the Korean pen-
insula. In early 2012, U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks were 
initiated by President Obama and North Korea’s new leader 
Kim Jong-un, with an accord made on February 29 to limit 
North Korea’s nuclear activities. But on April 14, less than 
six weeks after the accord was signed, the new North Korean 
regime launched a long-range missile equipped with a satellite 
without regard for a U.N. resolution and paying no heed to 
the United States and even to its biggest patron, China. 
The timing of the missile launch was deliberately chosen 
to inaugurate Kim Il Sung’s 100th birthday on April 15; 
to celebrate the appointment of Kim Jong-un as the First 
Secretary of the ruling Workers’ Party, the de facto leader 
of the regime at a special conference on April 11; and to 
disturb general elections in South Korea on the same day. 
But the missile launch failed in the early morning of April 
14, and there is wide-spread speculation this failure would 
increase the likelihood of a follow-up nuclear detonation as a 
face-saving effort. South Korea must face the new realities of 
this international political order. Instability in the North 
Korea regime as demonstrated by the failed missile-launch 
may signal violent confrontation ahead.
In South Korea, the governing New Frontier Party has won the 
general election with a narrow margin (152 seats) against the 
opposition coalition of Democratic United Party (127 seats) 
and United Progressive Party (13 seats). When independent 
winners are included, the number of conservatives (158 seats) 
is slightly larger than the number of progressives (142 seats). 
The opposition coalition gained many more seats in this 
general election than the previous one in 2008 which was held 
just after the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak. The 
Lee government lost popularity, particularly among younger 
generations and voters in the Seoul metropolitan area. While 
the government has claimed that South Korea has escaped 
from the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 with relatively 
better recovery than most other nations, public sentiment has 
been against the claim. 
Macroeconomic Performance During  
2008-2011
The actual economic performance (3.1 percent average growth 
of real GDP and 0.45 percent average growth of real investment) 
during 2008-2011 has been disappointing and far less than 
the campaign vision of 7 percent real GDP growth. The only 
bright side of the economic performance was a strong export 
performance. The f.o.b.-based export amount increased at the 
average annual rate of 11.7 percent while the c.i.f.-based import 
amount increased by 12.8 percent. It was largely due to the 
depreciation of won from 938.2 won per dollar at the end of 
1997 to 1,257 won per dollar at the end of 2008 after the 
global financial crisis and to 1,153 won per dollar at the 
end of 2011. The OECD Economic Surveys (2010)1 state 
that the sharp depreciation of the won helped to trigger 
Korea’s rebound by significantly improving its international 
competitiveness, and thus raising Korea from the world’s 
12th largest exporter in 2008 to ninth in 2009. In summary, 
the average GDP growth rate of 3.1 percent during the last four 
years of the Lee government was maintained by export 
performance through the depreciation of won against the 
dollar and yen. But the extra export earnings were not fully 
channeled to the non-exporting sectors and therefore, the growth 
of GNI after being adjusted by unfavorable terms of trade 
effects through increased oil prices remained stagnant. One 
of the reasons is the concentration of high export performance 
in a few IT-related products. During the period of 2000- 
2009, higher IT-intensity manufactures’ real exports have 
increased at the annual rate of 10.06 percent while lower 
IT-intensity manufactures’ real exports increased at the 
annual rate of 4.09 percent. During the same period, the 
annual growth rates of real GDP in two sectors were 5.10 percent 
and 3.78 percent respectively, which implies that export-output 
ratio was much larger in higher IT-intensity sectors than in 
lower IT-intensity sectors. 
According to 2011 National Accounts (preliminary) released on 
March 30, 2012 by the Bank of Korea, 2011 was a disappointing 
year for both businesses and households. The per capita Gross 
National Income (GNI) in 2011 was estimated to be $22,489, 
which is only a 1.5 percent increase due to the worsening 
terms of trade by increased oil prices and CPI (4.0 percent) and 
reduced semiconductor prices. The net savings rate by house-
holds continued to decline from 4.1 percent in 2009 to 3.9 
percent in 2010 and 2.7 percent in 2011. Gross fixed capital 
formation declined by 1.1 percent from 2010 with construction 
investment (-5.0 percent) and equipment investment (3.7 
percent), which recorded a drastic decline from 2010 (25.7 
percent). The growth rate of real GDP in 2011 was 3.6 percent 
with manufacturing (7.2 percent), construction (-4.6 percent) 
and services (2.6 percent).
While the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by 4.0 
percent last year, the price of agriculture, fishery and cattle 
increased by 9.2 percent. As a consequence, the Engel 
coefficient which measures the proportion of household 
expenditure on food and non-alcoholic beverages in total 
household expenditure, increased from 13.8 percent in 2010 
to 14.6 percent in 2011 according to the National Statistical 
Office of Korea. The Engel coefficient of the first docile 
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(the lowest 10 percent income group) increased from 22.5 
percent to 23.5 percent which is a record high and ten 
percentage points above the average Engel coefficient for the 
entire household.
Household Debt Overhang and Growth 
with Inequality
The Bank of Korea announced that total household debt had 
surpassed 900 trillion won by the end of 2011, which reached 
beyond 70 percent of nominal GDP and 160 percent of total 
wages and salaries. The switch of commercial loans from the 
indebted corporate sector to the mortgage-backed household 
sector by both the primary and secondary banking sectors 
after the financial crisis of 1997-1998 has been the main 
cause of the households’ debt overhang. Fueled by the low 
interest rate policy by the government, the real estate market 
had a boom and a bust during the last decade. The government 
introduced a set of regulations on real estate loans in order to 
curb housing inflation and many households are squeezed 
by inactive real estate transactions and mortgage-backed 
household loans. According to a report by the Seoul Policy 
Development Institute, the household debt of Seoul residents 
is estimated at about 204 trillion won and about 60 percent of 
Seoul households are currently indebted. The ratio of household 
debt was lower (58.0 percent) when annual household income 
was above 60 million won, compared to household income of 
20-30 million won (65.4 percent).
According to the National Statistical Office’s report on House-
hold Expenditure Survey in 2011, all of the indicators of 
income inequality have worsened. The relative poverty ratio, 
which is defined as the ratio of households including one-man 
households and farm households whose income is less than 
50 percent of the median household income, has increased 
from 14.9 percent in 2010 to 15.2 percent in 2011. The decile 
distribution ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the top 20 
percent income to lowest 20 percent income, has increased 
from 5.66 to 5.73. In terms of market income, the ratio reached 
its highest level of 7.86 since this statistic first was complied 
in 2006. The Gini coefficient has also slightly deteriorated 
from 0.310 to 0.311. However, the report points out some mixed 
evidence on income inequality by non-farm households with 
two-persons and above. The monthly household income 
in 2011 reached 3,842,000 won which increased by 5.8 
percent from 2010. But because of a high inflation rate (4.1 
percent), the real average monthly income only increased by 
1.7 percent. On the other hand, the average monthly 
consumption expenditure was 2,393,000 won, an increase of 
4.6 percent from 2010 but only by 0.5 percent in real terms 
which indicates very little incremental real consumption. 
A recent study by OECD (2011) reveals that income inequality 
among elderly citizens (age 65 and older) in South Korea is the 
third highest among major economies and that the country’s 
pension system remains relatively insufficient to support 
retirees. The Gini coefficient for those aged 65 and older in 
Korea is 0.409: lower than Mexico (0.524) and Chile (0.474) 
but higher than the U.S. (0.386), Japan (0.348), France (0.291), 
Germany (0.284) and the Czech Republic (0.188). The Gini 
coefficient for the age group 18 to 65 in Korea is estimated to 
be 0.300 lower than most of countries: Chile (0.496), Mexico 
(0.469), Turkey (0.403), U.S. (0.370), Israel (0.359), Portugal 
(0.347), Australia (0.324) and Japan (0.323). The large gap in 
the Gini coefficients between Korea’s working generation and 
senior citizens indicates that there is lack of post-retirement 
pension fund and therefore, there is a major welfare problem. 
It reflects that parents of the baby boom generation spent too 
much money on their children’s education, and saved too little 
money for their own retirement.
Welfare Expenditure Spree and Vision
The welfare expenditure level in 2007, just prior to the Lee 
government, was about 61.4 trillion won which accounted 
for 25.9 percent of total government expenditure. However, 
welfare expenditure in 2012 will increase to 92.6 trillion won—
28.5 percent of total government expenditures. The govern-
ment’s third Welfare Task Force forecasts a total minimum of 
268 trillion won (53.6 trillion won per year) will be required 
to fulfill welfare visions made by both the ruling party and the 
opposition party before the general election. Since the total 
government budget in 2012 is 325.4 trillion won and the wel-
fare budget in 2012 is 92.6 trillion won, the next government 
would need about 82.4 percent of the total budget in 2012 over 
the next five-year period. It also implies that the total govern-
ment budget and the welfare budget need to be increased 
by 16.5 percent and 57.9 percent respectively, which makes 
the welfare vision simply unfeasible. The Korea Institute of 
Public Finance’s report on the impact of aging and population 
reduction on public finance forecasts that the government debt 
would reach 102 percent of GDP by 2050 even without such 
a welfare budget increase. The only options available to the 
incoming government would be to increase welfare taxes or 
to issue government bonds but both of these options would 
undermine the economy’s long-term potential and increase the 
likelihood of a euro zone type fiscal crisis in the future.
In a recent report published by the National Pension Research 
Institute (Pyo, Kim and Lee 2012)2, we analyzed the national 
pension system in Korea which was introduced in 1998 and 
now has over 18 million subscribers. South Korea has become 
one of the fastest aging nations among OECD countries. The 
proportion of population age 65 and above was 11.0 percent in 
2010, but is estimated to reach 38.2 percent by 2050. During the 
same period, the elderly dependency ratio which is defined by 
the age 65 and above population divided by the age 15 to 64 
population, is estimated to increase from 15 percent to 72 per-
cent by almost five times. The revised National Pension Act 
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of 2007 stipulates a target to reduce the income substitution 
ratio by half a percentage point from 50 percent in 2008 to reach 
40 percent by 2028. We have recommended three policy options 
to make the national pension plan self-sustainable: (1) reduce 
income substitution ratio even after 2028; (2) increase the 
national pension tax rate and; (3) the government subsidy. 
Since other social safety net programs are strong—childcare, 
education and poverty reduction—none of these three op-
tions seems politically feasible. However, the only way of 
ensuring feasible welfare programs in a fast aging society is 
to increase welfare-related taxes or reduce the coverage and 
benefits of diverse welfare measures. Another consideration 
in many discussions is the contingency welfare plan when 
unification with North Korea occurs. Even though the current 
welfare standard (welfare expenditure/GDP ratio) of South 
Korea is relatively low among OECD nations, the speed 
of aging in South Korea and the potential burden of the con-
tingent unification require more prudent welfare policies in 
the times ahead. Marcus Noland stated that “standard models of 
the costs of unification suggest that the amount of invest-
ment needed to raise North Korean per capita incomes to 
60 percent of the South Korean level, are in excess of $1 trillion, 
or roughly equal to South Korea’s annual national income.”3 
Regardless of the estimates, no doubt the cost of reunification 
will be huge, and South Korea will be unable to absorb the 
economic cost itself.4
Saving Rates and Motives in Korea
I have examined the motives of household savings from the 
data of Korea Labor Income Panel Study (KLIPS) (1998-2008) 
in a recent paper (Pyo, 2012).5 I have found that retirement, 
education and medical concerns due to illness, are the most 
significant motives for savings throughout all age groups (See 
Table 1 and Figure 1). The concern for illness and therefore 
savings motivation for medical expenses are the largest for 
those in their 40s and 50s and reflects a precautionary motive. 
Saving for education was strong during the 30s and 40s. On 
the other hand, the savings motivation for retirement came on 
strong rather late, age 60 and above, for household heads.
This survey data indicates that the high burden of education 
costs fell on those in their 30s and 40s, which in turn has 
made them less prepared for their own retirement: the over-
investment in education and under-investment in retirement. 
The high medical cost sits in the middle, inducing households 
to save little for their retirement. When I estimated returns to 
schooling and examined the savings rate and motives of house-
holds, I found that there is a likelihood of over-investment 
in education and under-investment in retirement, causing a 
welfare-related social issue. The estimated marginal returns 
to years of education using KLIPS (Korea Labor Income 
Panel Study) data is 0.07 (7 percent) in household income and 
0.08-0.09 (8-9 percent) in individual income which is lower 
table 1 The Proportion of Households Saving for Selected Motives by the Age Group of the Household Head
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-
(1) Education 0.0 2.7 11.4 16.9 21.9 19.2 9.7 2.2 1.8 3.3 3.7 10.2
(2) Housing 21.4 19.2 26.5 13.4 7.8 4.4 3.3 2.5 2.3 3.3 1.2 8.2
(3) Consumer durables 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(4) Marriage 71.4 31.5 9.0 2.5 1.0 3.9 10.8 24.3 19.8 16.0 11.1 10.2
(5) Illness 0.0 33.6 31.9 46.8 45.2 51.6 54.6 53.6 48.4 45.3 51.9 38.8
(6) Retirement 0.0 8.2 15.8 16.5 20.4 19.5 19.2 15.8 25.3 26.0 28.4 26.5
(7) Leisure 7.1 1.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 2.5 0.0
(8) Business 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.0
(9) Debt 0.0 0.7 1.2 1.9 1.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
(10) Other 0.0 2.7 2.7 1.0 1.5 0.2 1.0 0.9 1.4 2.7 1.2 6.1
Sources: KLIPS Data
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than the world average and the Asian average (0.10, 10 per-
cent). Korea’s estimated returns to schooling in earlier studies 
were 0.09-0.14 for high school graduates. It was mainly due 
to the baby boom factor, but it calls attention to the role of pri-
vate versus public education. While Korea’s educational attain-
ment is remarkable, the resulting issue of how to support the 
retirees in a fast-aging society remains as a challenging issue. 
Estimates of returns to schooling indicate the marginal 
returns to schooling have started to decline. There was a 
likelihood of over-investment in education and under-invest-
ment in retirement by baby boom parents in Korea. Since there is 
a strong motive for savings to prepare for large medical 
expenses, the private pension system needs to be combined 
with the private medical insurance system.
Trend in Savings Rates and Its  
Decomposition
I have examined the overall savings rate and its trend in Korea 
to identify simultaneous effects of education and household 
savings. As shown in Table 2 and Figure 2, the gross savings 
rate was only 9 percent in 1960, with a private savings 
rate of 5 percent and government savings rate of 4 percent. 
But both gross savings rate and private savings rate increased 
sharply to reach their peaks of 37.5 percent and 29.2 percent 
respectively in 1990. The increase in private household 
savings rate has been instrumental to educational expansion 
because the role of private education has dominated that of 
public education in Korea.
According to Horioka (1994)6, Japan reached a net national 
savings rate of 23.6 percent in 1990 ranking third among 
24 OECD countries, and a net household savings rate of 14.3 
percent in 1989 ranking fourth among 18 OECD countries. He 
concludes that Japan’s saving rate would still be higher than 
average even if all measurement problems such as the treatment 
of capital consumption allowances could be resolved. Korea 
seems to have reached Japan’s level during the 1980s, earlier 
than 1990. However, Korea’s private household savings rate 
started to fall rather rapidly after 1990 and returned in 2010 to 
the same level (5 percent) as it was in 1960. It was substituted 
by the corporate savings rate (20.2 percent) in 2010. One of the 
reasons behind Korea’s rather rapid household savings rate 
during the 1980s seems to lie in the need to save for children’s 
education. On the other hand its rather rapid decline during the 
late 1990s and 2000s seems to reflect high costs of medical 
expenses and education through the two financial crises 
of 1997-1998 and 2007-2008.
In addition, there are two other factors which have worked 
jointly to increase households’ consumption and decrease 
their savings. One is the development of financial markets 
which provided wider choices of payment methods, including 
credit cards and debit cards, so that households’ consumption 
has been rapidly increasing, including internet banking 
transactions. The other factor was the cumulative effects 
of market-opening for foreign goods since joining WTO 
and OECD in the mid-1990s. The influx of foreign goods 
through large retail chain stores have opened up consumption 
opportunities of the households and their conspicuous 
consumption. The financial crises have also induced firms to 
retain more savings crowding out household savings.
South Korea and the United States launched a ministerial 
consultation channel on implementing their bilateral free trade 
agreement by forming a joint committee on May 17, 2012. 
table 2 Trend in Saving Rates in Korea (1953-2010)
1953 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Gross saving rate 13.1 9.0 19.0 24.4 37.5 33.0 32.0
Private 11.1 5.0 11.9 19.1 29.2 21.4 25.2
 (Individual) (8.3) (16.7) (8.6) (5.0)
 (Corporations) (10.8) (12.5) (12.8) (20.2)
Government 2.0 4.0 7.1 5.2 8.3 11.6 6.8
Sources: The Bank of Korea, National Accounts (selected years)
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Figure 2  Trend in Saving Rates in Korea (1953-2010)
Sources: The Bank of Korea, National Accounts, (selected years)
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The joint committee is mandated under the KORUS FTA, 
which took effect in March 2012. The ministerial mechanism 
is tasked with supervising the operations of 19 subcommittees 
and working groups aimed at the smooth implementation of 
the accord, including solving disputes over interpretations 
of the terms. South Korea’s opposition parties claim this 
investment safeguard mechanism undermines South Korea’s 
legal independence by allowing U.S. companies to take action 
against Seoul’s policy decisions. They demand Seoul address 
the concern by altering relevant clauses that they argue un-
fairly favor American firms with long experience in legal 
battles against a foreign government. On the investor-state 
dispute clause in the KORUS FTA, Korean Trade Minister 
Bark Taeho said it will be handled in the service and invest-
ment committee. In early May, South Korea announced the 
start of FTA talks with China. At a trilateral summit meeting in 
Beijing, the leaders of South Korea, China, and Japan agreed 
to launch negotiations on a three-way FTA this year.
Prospect for Sustainable Growth 
Economic forecasts for the Korean economy in 2012 by global 
investment banks (JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank and Nomura) 
have been adjusted downward from their forecasts of real 
GDP growth of 3.0-3.6 percent at the end of 2011 to 2.7-3.3 
percent in March 2012. This is based on their projections of 
sluggish export demands due to the continuing European fis-
cal crisis, higher oil prices and reduced Chinese economic 
growth. Citigroup forecasts Korean export growth as limited 
to 6.6 percent and 7.5 percent during the first two quarters of 
2012, and Goldman Sachs forecasts a yearly export growth of 
5 percent. The most recent forecast by the Asian Develop-
ment Bank released in April 2012 is 3.3 percent, which is 
lower than the government’s target economic growth rate 
of 3.7 percent. They also point out that domestic demand 
including both household consumption and corporate 
investment will be sluggish due to household debt, as well 
as the uncertain investment environment in 2012 with 
both the assembly general election in April and the presidential 
election in December.
The public has been disappointed by the failed vision by 
the Lee Government and the net consequence of very 
minimal increase in their real earnings. It has created room 
for increasing welfare demands and a progressive agenda 
for big conglomerate (Chaebol) reforms. The result of the 
general election on April 11 will influence the presidential 
election in December 2012 and many experts are predicting a 
very tight presidential race. In addition, if North Korea attempts 
another nuclear detonation or military adventure, it will also 
affect the presidential election in South Korea. In this respect, 
the political economy of South Korea will inevitably depend 
on the prospect of the new international political order in 
Northeast Asia.
1 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2010, OECD Publishing, 2010. 
2 Pyo, Kim and Lee, “The Impacts of Changes in Economic Environments in National 
Pension System Using Social Accounting Matrices,” National Pension Fund Research 
Institute, Project Report 2011-02, 2012.
3 Marcus Noland, a commentary “Self-financing unification or fool’s gold?” for “North 
Korea: Witness to Transformation,” The Peterson Institute for International Econom-
ics, Retrieved May 25, 2012. http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=2592.
4 Coghlan David, Prospects from Korean Unification, The Strategic Studies Institute, 2008.
5 Pyo, Hak-kil, Estimates of Returns to Schooling and Retirement Motives of Private 
Savings in Korea, Discussion Paper for Center for Economic Institutions, Institute  
of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University 2012 (forthcoming).
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Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.42, No. 2 (January 1994), pp. 293-316.
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DEVELOPING A NEW GROWTH MODEL FOR KOREA
By Randall Jones
Abstract
Korea’s rapid economic development has boosted its per capita income to within two-thirds of the U.S. level. The focus on exports, 
though, has made Korea vulnerable to external shocks while reducing productivity in the service sector, increasing income 
inequality and boosting energy intensity. Consequently, Korea’s export-led strategy should be balanced by policies to ensure that 
growth is environmentally and socially sustainable. First, the service sector should be made a second engine of growth by leveling the 
playing field with the manufacturing sector, strengthening competition in services and expanding openness to foreign competition. 
Second, market instruments that put a price on carbon, primarily through a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme, complemented 
by a carbon tax on small emitters, are needed to achieve the government’s vision of “Low Carbon, Green Growth.” Third, well-
targeted increases in social spending would promote social cohesion, accompanied by reforms in the labor market and 
education system to address the fundamental causes of inequality. One urgent task is to reduce the share of non-regular workers. 
Fourth, increasing labor force participation, notably of women, youth and older workers, is essential to mitigate demographic pressures.
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The economic development of Korea since 1960 has been 
among the most rapid ever achieved, transforming it from one 
of the poorest countries in the world to a major industrial power. 
Life expectancy has increased from 52 years in 1960 to nearly 
80 years, while per capita income rose from 12 percent of the 
U.S. level in 1970 to 63 percent in 2010 and is now within 10 
percent of that of Japan (Figure 1).
Rapid economic development was led by exports, allowing 
Korea to overcome its lack of natural resources and its small 
domestic market. Exports increased from less than 5 percent 
of Korean GDP in 1960 to 32 percent by the time of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis. Reforms to develop a more market-
oriented economy and increase openness to imports promoted 
Korea’s recovery from the crisis and its further integration 
in the world economy. Exports were again the key driver of 
Korea’s strong rebound from the 2008 global financial crisis, 
aided by a sharp depreciation of the won. In sum, net exports 
(exports minus imports) directly accounted for more than one-
quarter of output growth since 1997, while Korea has main-
tained a current account surplus averaging more than 3 percent 
of GDP over the past 15 years. Korea is now one of the 
major producers of ships (first in the world), cars (fifth) and 
steel (sixth), and has two of the top ten semiconductor firms in 
the world. By 2010, Korea’s share of global exports was 
3.1 percent, the seventh largest in the world, and exports as a 
share of Korean GDP had surpassed one-half.
While exports will continue to play an important role, Korea 
must develop new growth engines to ensure that growth is 
sustainable and reduce vulnerability to external shocks. This 
article begins by exploring some of the side effects associated 
with export-led growth. It then considers the challenge of 
sustaining Korea’s convergence to the high-income countries 
and then offers strategies aimed at ensuring that growth is 
socially and environmentally sustainable.
The Negative Side Effects of Export-Led 
Growth
Some negative aspects of the focus on exports have become 
apparent in recent years:
• It has stunted the development of the service sector, 
which has relatively low productivity.
• It has contributed to the significant rise in income in-
equality and poverty since 1997.
• It has resulted in a high level of energy intensity and  
rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
A Low-Productivity Service Sector
Although the share of the service sector increased from 50 
percent of GDP in 1990 to 57 percent in 2008, it is well 
below the OECD average (Figure 2). Only four of Korea’s 
30 largest enterprises are in services. The share of employ-
ment in services in Korea is closer to the OECD average 
(Panel B), reflecting the sector’s role as a de facto safety net 
for older workers forced to retire from firms at a relatively 
young age. However, labor productivity growth in the service 
sector has consistently lagged behind that in manufacturing, 
slowing = from an annual rate of 2.6 percent during the 1980s 
to 1.2 percent between 1997 and 2007, in contrast to nearly 9 
percent growth in manufacturing. Consequently, by 2008, 
service-sector productivity was only about half of that in 
manufacturing, the largest gap in the OECD area (Panel C).
Korea’s economic structure is the legacy of a develop-
ment strategy that focused on exports and manufacturing, 
thereby siphoning capital, talent and other resources away from 
services. For example, R&D investment in services accounts 
for only 7 percent of total R&D by Korean firms, compared to 
an average of 25 percent in the G7 economies. Moreover, the 
government allocates only 3 percent of its R&D budget to 
services. Manufacturing firms also benefit from a range of 
policies, including tax benefits and lower electricity charges.
Figure 2 The Service Sector (in 2008, based on 2005 
prices for value added)Figure 2 The Service Sector (in 2008, based on 2005 prices for value added)
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Rising Income Inequality and Poverty
Income inequality has become a major concern in Korea 
as in many other OECD countries. Until the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, Korea’s income distribution stood out as 
one of the most equitable among developing countries. 
However, income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, 
increased significantly between 1997 and 2009 (Figure 3), 
when it reached the OECD average. Moreover, the ratio of 
the top quintile to the bottom is 5.7, above the OECD average 
of 5.4. Meanwhile, relative poverty – the share of the popula-
tion living on less than half of the median income – rose to 15 
percent in 2008, the seventh highest in the OECD area.
The rising trend in income inequality and relative poverty 
is explained in part by the increasing share of services in 
employment. First, wage dispersion in the service sector 
is relatively wide, ranging from business services and the 
financial sector at the high end to hotels and restaurants. 
Second, the wage gap between services and manufacturing 
is widening. The average wage in services, which was nearly 
equal to that in manufacturing in the early 1990, fell to only 
54 percent in 2009. Meanwhile, an increasingly capital and 
technology-intensive manufacturing sector reduced its share of 
employment from 28 percent to 17 percent over that period. 
In short, the employment impact of exports is decreasing, 
reducing its trickle-down effect on the rest of the economy.
The low wages and productivity in the service sector is closely 
linked to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which 
account for 80 percent of output and 90 percent of employment 
in services. The deteriorating wage performance in services 
has thus widened the gap between large and small firms. In 
1990, workers in firms with 10 to 29 workers earned 24 percent 
less than workers at companies with 300 or more workers. By 
2008, the gap had widened to 43 percent. The incidence of low 
wages (defined as less than one-half the national median) falls 
from 39 percent of women employed in firms with less than 
five workers to 4 percent for companies with more than 1,000. 
Consequently, the problem of “working poor” is concentrated 
in small companies. 
Other factors besides the problems in the service sector are 
contributing to widening inequality. First, Korea’s dualistic 
labor market results in high inequality in wage income. Non-
regular workers, who account for about one-third of employ-
ment, earn only 57 percent as much per hour of work as regu-
lar workers. Second, the large share of private spending in 
education and health increases the impact of socio-economic 
factors on educational and health outcomes. Third, social 
spending, which plays an important role in reducing inequal-
ity and poverty in most OECD countries, amounted to only 
7.6 percent of GDP in Korea in 2007, well below the OECD 
average of close to 20 percent.2  Nevertheless, public social 
spending has been increasing at a double-digit rate in real terms 
as the population ages and social insurance systems mature.
A High Level of Energy Intensity
Despite falling since 1997, Korea’s energy intensity is about 
a quarter above the OECD average and the fifth highest in the 
OECD area, reflecting its concentration in energy-intensive 
industries. High-energy intensity creates a number of problems. 
First, Korea is exceptionally dependent on imported energy; 
net imports accounted for 86 percent of total primary energy 
supply in 2009. The reliance on imported oil makes Korea 
vulnerable to external shocks and has contributed to large 
terms-of-trade losses, averaging 3 percent a year since 1994, 
thus suppressing national income growth. Second, Korea’s 
greenhouse gas emissions doubled between 1990 and 2008, far 
outstripping the 24 percent rise in global emissions. Third, the 
high level of energy consumption in Korea has contributed 
to environmental problems. The air quality in Korean cities, 
especially in Seoul, is poor compared to major cities in 
other OECD countries and absolute levels of air pollutants in 
Korea are far higher than those of other OECD countries.3 
Sustaining the Convergence to the  
High-Income Countries 
The per capita income gap with the United States, which was 
37 percent in 2010, can be divided into labor inputs (Figure 
4, the middle column) and labor productivity (the right-hand 
column). Labor inputs in Korea, relative to population, are 
by far the largest in the OECD area, reflecting long working 
hours that are one-fifth above the OECD average. However, 
working hours have been declining at a 1.5 percent annual 
rate since 2000 and are likely to continue falling in line with 
the government’s goal of reducing them to 1,800 hours per 
year by 2020, close to the OECD average. More importantly, 
Figure 3 Inequality Has Been Increasing in Korea1
Figure 3 Inequality has been Increasing in Korea1
 
1: For urban households with at least two persons. 
2: The Gini coefficient can range from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality).
3: Relative poverty is defined as the share of the population that lives on less than 
half of the median income.
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Korea is projected to experience the most rapid population 
aging among OECD countries. Korea, currently the third-
youngest country in the OECD area, is projected to be the 
second oldest by 2050,4 reflecting its fertility rate of only 
1.2, one of the lowest in the world. The ratio of the working-
age population to the elderly will thus fall from six in 2010 
to 1.3 in 2050, implying that rising public social spending 
will pose a heavy burden on a shrinking labor force.
Declining labor inputs will reduce Korea’s growth potential 
and make it harder to narrow the income gap with leading 
countries. At the same time, there is significant scope for 
productivity gains, as Korea’s labor productivity per hour of 
work is less than half of the U.S. level (Figure 4, right-hand 
column). Nevertheless, the Korea Development Institute 
estimates that the potential growth rate will fall to 1.7 percent 
during the 2030s. In per capita terms, the fall in potential will 
be more gradual – from 4.0 percent during the current decade 
to 2.2 percent in the 2030s – given the decline in population. 
In sum, increasing labor force participation to mitigate the 
impact of population aging and raising productivity are the 
keys so supporting the potential growth rate. 
A New Growth Strategy for Korea
In addition to the negative side effects of focusing on exports, 
maintaining Korea’s convergence to the highest-income 
countries based on an export-led growth model will become 
increasingly difficult in the context of expanding globaliza-
Figure 4 Explaining Differences in Income in 2010
Figure 4 Explaining Differences in Income in 2010
 
1: Using 2010 PPP exchange rates.
Source: OECD (2012), Going for Growth 2012
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tion and increasing competition from other Asian countries. 
Korea may face the same challenges as Japan, which has seen 
its share of world trade drop by half from almost 10 percent in 
1993 to around 5 percent in 2010. Meanwhile, China’s share 
rose by a factor of five, from 2 percent to 10 percent over that 
period. Moreover, the heavy reliance on exports has increased 
Korea’s vulnerability to external shocks. Consequently, 
Korea’s export-led strategy should be balanced by greater 
emphasis on four priorities:
• Making the service sector a second engine of  
growth, which would also enhance social cohesion.
• Promoting green growth to make sure that  
development is environmentally-sustainable. 
• Enhancing social cohesion through reforms  
in the labor market and the education system.
• Increasing labor force participation to mitigate  
the impact of demographic trends.
Making the Service Sector as a Second  
Engine of Growth
The service sector’s share of GDP is likely to continue 
rising toward the OECD average (Figure 2). The large and 
increasing weight of services and its impact as an input in 
other parts of the economy make it a key determinant of 
economic growth. Over the past 25 years, nearly 85 percent 
of GDP growth in high-income countries has come from 
services.5 Developing the service sector would also create 
more high-quality jobs that would better utilize Korea’s large 
supply of tertiary graduates. As noted above, low service- 
sector productivity is the legacy of an export led growth 
strategy that attracted the most productive resources into 
manufacturing. The top priority, therefore, is to level the 
playing field by removing preferences granted to manufacturing 
based on a comprehensive quantification of the various forms 
of explicit and implicit support. In addition, a stronger won 
would promote the development of non-tradable services by 
boosting domestic demand. In early 2012, the won was still 
a quarter below its 2007 level in real, trade-weighted terms. 
Policies to strengthen competition in services are particularly 
important, given that “overly strict regulations are obstructing 
investment and competition,” according to the government.6 
The keys to stronger competition include eliminating domestic 
entry barriers, accelerating regulatory reform, upgrading 
competition policy and reducing barriers to trade and inflows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI). The government has 
reduced entry barriers, as reflected in the improvement 
in Korea’s ranking in the “cost of starting a new business” 
from 126th in the world in 2008 to 24th in 2011,7 although 
there is scope for further reform. In addition, competition 
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policy should be further strengthened. First, even though 
financial penalties have risen, their deterrent effect is still 
weaker than in most other OECD countries, indicating a need 
for further increases. In addition, criminal penalties, which 
are rarely applied, should be used more frequently. Second, 
the investigative powers of the competition authority, the 
Korea Fair Trade Commission, need to be expanded. 
Third, the number of exemptions from the competition law, 
including for SMEs, should be further scaled back. 
Greater openness to the world economy is another priority 
to boost productivity in services. The stock of FDI in Korea, 
at 13 percent of GDP, was the third lowest in the OECD area 
in 2010 and the share of inward FDI in services was less than 
half. Consequently, the stock of FDI in services in Korea was 
only 6 percent of GDP, compared to an OECD average of 37 
percent. Strengthening international competition requires 
reducing barriers to FDI, including foreign ownership ceilings, 
and liberalizing product market regulations. In addition, it 
is important to foster a foreign investment-friendly environ-
ment, thereby encouraging more cross-border M&As, enhance 
the transparency of tax and regulatory policies, and reform the 
labor market. 
As noted above, the problems in services are closely linked 
to those of SMEs. While the major business groups, known 
as chaebol, were forced to restructure aggressively in the 
wake of the 1997 crisis, the government essentially bailed 
out SMEs through increased public subsidies and guarantees, 
which were not fully scaled back once the crisis had passed. 
Consequently, the SMEs have not been as aggressive in 
reforming their business model and their performance has 
lagged behind that of large firms.8 In 2009, the government 
further increased assistance to SMEs by: i) sharply raising guar-
antees by public financial institutions for lending to SMEs; ii) 
advising banks to automatically roll over loans to SMEs; 
iii) creating two initiatives to aid SMEs in distress; and iv) 
doubling government spending to assist SMEs. While expanded 
financial support to SMEs prevented some bankruptcies and 
job losses, it has also exacerbated moral hazard problems by 
increasing the reliance of SMEs and banks on public assis-
tance. Supporting non-viable SMEs poses a drag on Korea’s 
growth potential. 
Achieving the Vision of “Low Carbon,  
Green Growth”
In 2008, President Lee Myong-bak proclaimed “Low Carbon, 
Green Growth” as the vision to guide Korea’s development 
over the next 50 years. One of the goals of the Green Growth 
Strategy is to “attain energy independence,” which implies a 
fundamental transition in Korea’s economic structure, given 
the large share of imports in its energy supply. While such a 
shift would have great potential for creating new industries, it 
would also impose heavy transition costs. In addition, Korea 
set a target to reduce its GHG emissions by 30 percent relative 
to a business-as-usual baseline by 2020, which implies a 4 
percent cut from the 2005 level. Achieving the transition to a 
low carbon economy and reducing GHG emissions requires a 
policy framework that provides appropriate incentives to 
induce the necessary restructuring in a cost-effective way. 
The Five-Year Plan for Green Growth
The Five-Year Plan (2009-13) contains about 600 projects 
and a total budget of 108.7 trillion won (10 percent of 2009 
GDP), of which public R&D accounts for 13 percent. In 2009, 
private firms were involved in nearly two-thirds of the nearly 
5,000 R&D projects in the Plan, although their financial 
contributions amounted to only 8 percent of total outlays. 
Greater involvement by business enterprises is needed to 
advance green research and make it a driver of private-
sector innovation.
The government is pursuing various approaches to supply 
funds and overcome financial constraints. Bank loans to green 
industries amounted to 2 percent of their corporate lending 
during the first half of the Five-Year Plan, with state-owned 
banks accounting for three-quarters of the loans. Such lending 
was encouraged by large credit guarantees provided by public 
institutions. Meanwhile, investment in green industries through 
the venture capital market nearly doubled between 2009 and 
2011, rising to around half of total venture capital investment. 
Public funds were invested in 83 venture businesses. Such 
efforts should be pursued cautiously to limit the risks 
inherent in “picking winners,” which could lock Korea into 
inferior technologies. Korea should channel more of these 
funds through existing market-based systems and commercial 
institutions, thereby reducing the role of state-owned banks 
and public funds.9 
Introducing Market Instruments to Promote 
Green Growth
The most important tool to promote green innovation is a 
market instrument that puts a price on carbon, primarily through 
a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme (ETS), complemented 
by a carbon tax on small emitters. In May 2012, the National 
Assembly approved a bill to launch an ETS in 2015, which will 
cover about 500 firms that account for around 60 percent of total 
emissions. Less than 5 percent of the permits may be auctioned, 
with the allocation of the remainder yet to be decided. Grand-
fathering permits would be problematic as it would provide scope 
for windfall profits for existing firms, potentially resulting in un-
fair competition for new entrants. The ETS should include a time-
table for shifting to an auction system, which would generate rev-
enue that could be used inter alia to offset the impact of the ETS 
on firms and consumers, reduce more-distorting taxes or achieve 
fiscal consolidation. While the ETS will control the emissions of 
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large emitters, a carbon tax is needed to cover smaller and more 
diffuse sources of pollution, such as households and small firms. 
It is important, though, to minimize overlap and complicated 
interactions between an ETS and a carbon tax, which would raise 
costs and uncertainty about the overall outcome. 
Another priority is to reform electricity pricing, as Korea’s 
low price increases energy use and GHG emissions. Indeed, 
electricity consumption per unit of GDP in Korea in 2009 was 
1.7 times higher than the OECD average. Moreover, prices vary 
significantly between sectors, creating significant distortions. 
Electricity prices should fully reflect their production costs in 
each sector. 
Promoting Social Cohesion through  
Reforms in the Labor Market and  
Education System 
It is important to address the fundamental causes of 
inequality and poverty, notably labor market dualism. Given 
the lower wages paid to non-regular workers, more than a 
quarter of full-time workers in Korea earn less than two-thirds 
of the median wage, the highest in the OECD area, thus fueling 
inequality. In addition, only about 40 percent of non-regular 
workers are covered by the social insurance system, including 
unemployment insurance. Firms hire non-regular workers 
because of the lower labor costs and to enhance employment 
flexibility. However, labor market dualism creates serious 
equity problems as a significant portion of the labor force 
works in precarious jobs at relatively low wages and with 
less protection from social insurance. It is important to 
adopt a comprehensive approach to break down dualism, 
including reduced employment protection for regular workers 
and improved social insurance coverage and expanded training 
for non-regular workers.
Several aspects of education–low investment in pre-primary 
education, heavy reliance on private tutoring, particularly in 
hagwons, and the high cost of university education–raise equity 
issues. In particular, the proportion of 15-year-olds participating 
in after-school lessons in Korea is more than double the 
OECD average, in part to help students gain admission to 
prestigious universities. The severe competition to enter 
the top universities is driven by academic credentialism–the 
emphasis on where a person studied rather than on their 
abilities, accomplishments and potential. However, the reli-
ance on private tutoring places heavy financial burdens on 
families and is cited by families as a key factor explaining 
Korea’s extremely low birth rate. Moreover, the amount of 
spending is positively correlated with family income, as is the 
quality of the university attended, thus perpetuating inequality. 
Private tutoring has a number of other negative impacts. First, 
it competes and overlaps with public education, thus raising 
total expenditures on education unnecessarily. Second, it reduces 
the effectiveness of schools, which have to cope with students 
of widely differing educational levels. Third, it makes for 
very long days for children, thus hindering their development. 
To reduce the role of private tutoring, further measures are 
needed to improve the quality and diversity of schools and de-
emphasize the role of the standardized exam in the university 
admission process.
There is also a role for well-targeted increases in social spending. 
The government should move cautiously and incrementally 
in developing social welfare programs that are carefully de-
signed to achieve their intended objectives, while avoiding 
wasteful spending and negative externalities. One priority 
should be the elderly, given that nearly one-half of the over-
65 age group lives in relative poverty. However, there is a 
need for caution as public social spending is already increasing 
at the fastest rate in the OECD area. Under current policies, 
population aging alone is projected to boost public social 
spending from 7.6 percent of GDP to around 20 percent, 
the average of OECD countries, by 2050. Rising social spend-
ing should be financed by tax increases that limit the negative 
impact on economic growth. This suggests limiting the increase 
in labor taxes to maintain work incentives, while relying pri-
marily on the VAT and environmental taxes as the primary 
sources of additional revenue. Keeping Korea’s sound fiscal 
position and low level of government debt is a priority, given 
the country’s rapid aging and the uncertainty about the eventual 
costs of economic rapprochement with North Korea.
Increasing Labor Force Participation to  
Mitigate the Impact of Population Aging
Rapid population aging implies a substantial fall in Korea’s 
labor force. If participation rates were to remain at their current 
levels for each age group and gender, the labor force would peak 
at 27.2 million in 2022 and then fall by one-fifth, to around 21.5 
million, by mid-century. By that point, there would be only 1.2 
persons in the labor force per elderly person, compared with 4.5 
in 2010, imposing a heavy burden on workers to finance social 
spending. One option is to increase immigration. At present, 
Korea has around 0.7 million foreign workers, accounting for 
only about 3 percent of the labor force, well below the shares in 
most other OECD countries.
The most important strategy to mitigate demographic change 
would be to increase the female labor force participation 
rate. For women between the ages of 25 and 54, the rate was 
62 percent in 2010, the third lowest in the OECD area. 
If the female participation rate in Korea were to converge 
to the current level for males for each age group by 2050, 
the labor force would only decline to around 25.6 million, 
almost 19 percent higher than in the case of unchanged 
participation rates. Raising the female participation rate 
requires a comprehensive approach. First, the gender wage 
gap, the highest in the OECD area, should be narrowed by 
reducing the high share of non-regular employment and 
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making greater use of performance-based pay. Second, the 
availability of affordable, high-quality childcare should be 
increased. Third, maternity leave should be lengthened from 
90 days and the take-up of maternity and parental leave 
increased. Fourth, expanded flexibility in working time would 
make it easier to combine paid employment with family 
responsibilities, given that total working hours in Korea are 
the longest in the OECD area. 
Korea’s participation rate for young people is also one of 
the lowest in the OECD area. Although this partly reflects 
the large share in tertiary education, it is also a result of the 
mismatch between the skills taught in school and those 
demanded by firms. Upgrading vocational education would 
boost employment and reduce labor shortages in SMEs. 
According to a 2011 government survey, 43 percent of small 
firms said that they currently face a labor shortage and 40 
percent expect to face one. 
In addition, there is some scope to increase the participation 
rate for older workers, or at a minimum, prevent a decline as 
the pension system matures. It is also important to more ef-
fectively utilize older workers, who tend to retire from firms by 
age 55. More than one-third become unemployed. Moreover, 
one-third of workers over age 50 are self-employed, compared 
to 13 percent of those under that age, primarily in services 
with low productivity. Given strict employment protection for 
regular workers, firms set mandatory retirement ages so that 
they can dismiss older workers once their seniority-based wages 
surpass their productivity. Establishing a minimum age at 
which firms can set mandatory retirement and then gradually 
raising it would put pressure on firms to adjust wages in line 
with productivity as workers grow older. The ultimate goal 
should be to abolish firms’ right to set a mandatory retirement 
age, as has been done in some other OECD countries. 
Conclusion
While Korea’s economy remains one of the fastest growing 
among OECD countries, rapid population aging and other 
challenges will make it difficult to reach the level of the 
highest-income countries. Changes in economic policy to 
diversify away from exports are needed to sustain economic 
growth. Such a strategy should aim not only at the rate of 
growth, but also at ensuring that it is environmentally and 
socially sustainable, while maintaining a sound government 
financial position. Such a policy should include measures 
to develop the service sector and promote green growth, 
accompanied by reforms to promote social cohesion and 
greater labor force participation. 
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KOREA’S TRADE STRUCTURE AND ITS  
POLICY CHALLENGES
By Lee Junkyu
Abstract
In 2011, Korea achieved one trillion dollars in international trade amidst the global crisis, which marked a new page in Korea’s 
history. Korean trade will no doubt continue to strengthen its economy. Only eight countries are ahead of Korea in terms of 
achieving one trillion dollars in trade, and Korea should no longer be a follower, but instead a country which sets the course of 
trade policy within the global economy. It cannot be emphasized enough that Korea should be recognized as a model for its past 
economic accomplishments and to illustrate the beneficial cycle between trade and growth for the future. The following 
sections will first investigate changes of Korea’s trade structure over a longer period, and its recent export structure by product 
and destination as well as of the import structure. The next section will look further ahead with trajectories of Korea’s trade 
policies and a dramatic policy shift jumping onto the active FTA policy stance as well as with the FTA roadmap. Furthermore, 
it will review the comprehensive and high-quality FTAs pursued by Korea since the implementation of the FTA roadmap. Finally, 
it concludes with challenges facing Korea’s future trade policy, including an enhancement of the competitiveness of the service 
sector, and discusses how to support inclusive and sustainable economic growth with an indispensable pillar, which is free trade 
policy in the Korean economy. 
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Trade Structure Change
Over the past decades, Korea’s trade structure by country has 
changed greatly. Specifically, as seen in Figure 1, in 1986, the 
United States took the largest share of 30.8 percent in Korea’s 
total trade, and was followed by Japan with 24.6 percent. 
The share of China in 1986 was 1.1 percent. But, in 2011, the 
situation became very different. The largest trade share in 
Korea’s total trade became China with 20.4 percent, followed 
by ASEAN (11.6 percent), by Japan (10 percent), the EU (9.6 
percent) and the United States (9.3 percent). In a nutshell, trade 
partners became more diverse by country and the rapid rise of 
the Chinese share is catching attention. Notably, Korea’s trade 
depends much more on China in 2011 than in 1986, but it is not 
as high as Korea dependence on the United States in 1986. It 
points out that Korea’s efforts to diversify its international trade 
by country have worked to a certain extent, but that it should 
not stop its efforts to further reduce excessive concentration of 
by-country trade. 
Moreover, there has been a great deal of change to Korea’s 
regional trade structure with emerging economies receiving 
bigger shares.
Compared to the trade structure in 1971, in 2011 Korea 
traded much less with advanced economies and much more 
with emerging and developing countries. During the past 
four decades, Korea’s trade share with emerging economies 
rose from 17.5 percent to 67 percent. Since the 2008 global 
financial crisis, advanced economies continue to face 
major brakes on growth while emerging economies appear 
to maintain solid growth momentum. Accordingly, although 
Korea was not immune to weak recovery with the major 
advanced economies, Korea’s recent high trade share with 
emerging economies has definitely played an important role in 
lowering the risks of negative spillovers from the crisis. 
Similarly, by region, from 1986 to 2011, Korea traded much 
more with Asia (37.0 percent→50.8 percent) and the Middle 
East (7.2 percent→14.1 percent), and much less with North 
America (33.8 percent→10.4 percent). According to the 
IMF (WEO, April 2012), in 2011 the United States grew 1.6 
percent and developing Asia registered an economic growth 
rate of 7.8 percent, which is higher than that of any other region 
in the world. Asian exports have also recovered strongly since 
the global financial crisis, contrasted with those of developed 
economies. Notwithstanding continued anemic growth in 
advanced economies, Korea’s high trade share with Asia helped 
counter the negative impact of the recent Great Recession 
on its trade performance in 2011, although the latest Korean 
exports data (April 2012) show moderation in export 
momentum. Korea is expected to continue its rising trend of 
intra-regional trade over the next decades. 
Product Composition Change of Trade
There has also been a great deal of trend change in Korea’s 
exports by industry over the past decades. In the 1960s, more 
than 72 percent of Korea’s exports were primary industry goods. 
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As seen in Table 1, since the 1970s, Korea’s major exports have 
been composed of industrial products. For example, in 2011 the 
share of industrial products was 97.2 percent.
Among them, heavy and chemical products increased greatly 
from 21.5 percent in 1972 to 91 percent in 2011. In the 1960s, 
Korea exported labor intensive products like clothes and textiles. 
In the 1970s, the Korean government strongly pushed the 
development of heavy and chemical industries, such as steel, 
shipbuilding, and automobiles. From the 1980s until now, the 
Korean economy has been exporting a great deal of capital and 
technology intensive goods. This trend change explains why 
Korea’s top exports include ships, automobiles, semiconductors, 
displays and mobile communication devices. 
Recent Exports Structure
Korea’s exports have been a useful indicator and a barometer 
to gauge Korea’s economic vitality and the soundness of global 
economic growth. The following sections highlight Korea’s 
recent export structure by product and destination. 
By Product
Korea’s exports in 2011 registered 19.3 percent growth from 
a year earlier and reached the historic figure of $556.5 billion. 
While the global economy remained in a heightened state 
table 1 Trend in Product Composition of Korea’s Exports
Share (%) 1962 1972 1980 1995 2000 2011
Primary industry goods 72.3 11.1 7.7 4.9 2.8 2.8
Industrial products 27.7 88.9 92.3 95.1 97.2 97.2
Light NA 67.4 48.4 19.9 16.2 6.2
Heavy NA 21.5 43.9 75.2 81 91
Source: KITA (April 2012)
Note: NA means not available
of uncertainty due to the euro zone sovereign debt crisis be-
ginning in the second half of 2011, the Korean economy 
exported its largest value thanks to the competitiveness of 
Korea’s major exports products and its FTA policies. Accord-
ing to MTI3 digit classification, vessels, articles of petroleum, 
automobile, and parts of automobiles reached their high-
est level, while semiconductors, flat display, and wireless 
communication apparatus declined respectively by 1.1 percent, 
4.9 percent, and 1.1 percent year-on-year.
It is worth noting the significant rise in exports such as ves-
sels, automobiles and their parts, and petroleum products. 
Despite the euro zone debt crisis in the second half of 2011, 
vessels and ocean structure exports rose significantly in 2011 
to $54.5 billion year-on-year. Growth rates of vessel exports 
were 3.7 percent in 2009, 10 percent in 2010, and the rate rose 
by 15.2 percent in 2011. The share of vessels was the high-
est, with 10.2 percent of total exports. In terms of growth rates, 
petroleum was the highest with 63.7 percent year-on-year and 
reached $52 billion in 2011 due to high oil prices. Although 
Korea is not an oil-producer, it exported a large amount of 
refined oil products—even to OPEC countries, such as Indo-
nesia. In 2011, Korea’s petroleum exports equaled $11 billion to 
China, $8.6 billion to Japan, and $6.5 billion to Indonesia. 
This momentum is expected to continue due to high oil prices 
table 2 2011 Top Five Major Exports (in U.S. millions)
Export items
2010 2011
Value Growth (%) Value Growth (%)
Total 466,384 28.3 555,214 19
Vessel, ocean structure and 
part of vessel, ocean 49,112 8.8 56,588 15.2
Articles of petroleum 31,531 37.3 51,600 63.7
Semiconductor 50,707 63.4 50,146 -1.1
Automobile 35,411 39.4 45,312 28
Source: Korea International Trade Association (2012)
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and strong demand for refined products from emerging 
economies. Automobile exports in 2011 rose by 28 percent 
year-on-year to the amount of $45.3 billion, which was an 
8.2 percent share in total exports. Of Korea’s total automobile 
exports, the United States received the highest (19.7 percent), 
followed by Russia (7.1 percent), and China (5.2 percent). 
Exports of automobile parts continued to rise every month 
and reached $23.1 billion with a growth rate of 21.8 percent in 
2011 compared to the previous year. Due to its competitiveness 
and active FTA policies, an increase in auto parts exports is 
expected in the following years. 
By Destination
In 2011, Korean exports increased by more than two digits to 
most countries. However, exports to the EU appeared to grow 
at a weaker pace, by just 4.2 percent, due to the negative im-
pact of the European sovereign debt crisis. While the debt crisis 
did negatively impact Korea’s export performance, the Korean 
economy was able to withstand the adverse impact due to a 
larger share of its exports to developing economies. The share 
of emerging economies to Korea’s total exports rose from 65.9 
percent in 2007 to 72.5 percent in 2011, which contributed to 
safeguarding the economy against the debt crisis. 
Regarding Korea’s 2011 exports to China, they reached their 
largest value of $134.2 billion with a growth rate of 14.9 
percent year-on-year. The share of Korea’s exports to Chi-
na compared to total world exports fell from 25.1 percent in 
2010 to 24.2 percent in 2011, but the share has remained 
above 21 percent since 2005. During 2009, the share rose to 
23.9 percent and, during 2010, it jumped to 25.1 percent. 
Accordingly, even a little hiccup in the Chinese economy 
would likely produce a major impact on the Korean economy. 
Except for in 2009, Korean exports to China have remained on 
an upward trend of two-digit growth rates. From 2002-2011, 
average annual growth rates of Korea’s exports to China 
registered 21.2 percent. 
Korea’s exports to the United States reached a level of $56.2 
billion in 2011 with a 12.8 percent growth rate year-on-year. 
In 1971, Korea’s export share with the U.S. reached its max-
imum level of 49.8 percent. Subsequently, it is surprising to 
observe the rapidly declining share of Korea’s exports to the 
United States in Korea’s total exports. As of March 15, 2012, the 
Korea-U.S. FTA entered into effect, which will likely contribute 
to a rise of the U.S. share in Korea’s exports, thereby reducing 
a risk of high dependency on trade with China. It is too early to 
confirm that Korea’s exports point to a balance between China 
and the U.S. However, according to the Customs Office, from 
January to March 2012, the share of exports China received fell 
by one percentage point while the share of exports to the U.S. 
rose by 1.5 percentage points. 
With the Korea-EU FTA coming into effect on July 1st, 
2011—at the height of the euro zone debt crisis—it is 
important to gauge the impact of the FTA on Korea’s exports in 
that context. From August-September 2011, Korea’s exports to 
the EU rose, but turned negative in October 2011 due to the 
deepening concern of the euro zone debt crisis. In sum, 
Korea’s exports to the EU reached $55.7 billion with a just 
4.2 percent rise in 2011. However, the rise of only 4.2 
percent does not necessarily reflect the full effect of the FTA 
on Korea’s exports to the EU. 
According to a report1 by the Korea International Trade 
Association (KITA, March 2012), the group showing “an 
effect of tariff removals,” in particular, had a great deal of 
export performance compared to exports of other countries to 
the EU over July-November in 2011. The report argued that, 
over the period, Korea’s exports of the group to the EU pre-
sented a 14.8 percent rise compared to Chinese exports of a 
0.5 percent rise, Japanese exports of a 2.6 percent rise, and 
the world’s exports of a 7.9 percent rise to the EU. Evidently, 
while there is surely a positive effect of the FTA on the export 
items of tariff-reduction schedules, there remains an issue of 
how Korea and the EU can enhance the overall positive effects 
of the FTA on the economy as a whole regardless of tariff- 
reduction schedules. Regarding Korea’s exports to Japan, 
Korea achieved $39.7 billion with a rapid rise of 40.9 percent 
year-on-year and Korea’s trade deficit with Japan decreased 
from $36.1 billion in 2010 to $28.6 billion in 2011 due to the 
impact of the Japanese earthquake. 
Korea’s Recent Import Structure
During 2011, Korea’s imports reached $524.4 billion with 
a growth rate of 23.3 percent from a year earlier. The largest 
value of imports is mainly due to persistently high commodity 
prices such as crude oil. Recent import statistics point to high 
growth in raw materials (31.4 percent) and consumer goods 
(25.6 percent) and slower growth in capital goods year-on-year. 
Imports of raw materials during 2011 grew 31.4 percent from 
the previous year, a share of 62.5 percent in Korea’s total 
exports. The average annual growth rate of imports of raw 
materials is 14.9 percent, which is almost double the rate of 
imports of capital goods, 8.0 percent over 2005-2011. The 
main driver behind the high rate is due to increased volume 
and prices of crude oil. Compared to 2010, the volume grew 
6.6 percent and the unit import price per barrel rose 37.8 percent. 
The growth rate of imports of capital goods dropped substan-
tially from 28.2 percent in 2010 to 7.8 percent in 2011. The 
share of capital goods in Korea’s total imports has steadily fall-
en from 34.7 percent in 2005 to 27.4 percent in 2011. A steady 
rise of the import share of raw materials and a continuous fall of 
the share of capital goods are likely becoming a long-term issue 
to the Korean economy. 
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table 3 Korea’s Recent Imports by Use (in U.S. billion, as a %)
Export items
2005 2009 2010 2011
Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share
Total 261.2 100 (16) 323.1 100 (-25.8) 425.2 100 (32) 524.4 100 (23)
Raw materials 142.3 54.5 (20.9) 186.1 57.6 (-31.5) 249.5 58.7 (34.1) 327.8 62.5 (31.4)
Capital goods 90.7 34.7 (11.7) 104.0 32.2 (-15.4) 133.4 31.4 (28.2) 143.8 27.4 (7.8)
Consumer goods 26.4 10.1 (13.3) 32.7 10.1 (-18.4) 41.9 9.8 (27.8) 52.4 10.0 (25.2)
Source: KITA (2012)
Note: ( ) shows growth rates
The share of consumer goods has remained stable at around 
10 percent while consumer goods grew 27.8 percent in 2010 
and 25.2 percent in 2011 year-on-year. This increase in 
consumer goods is mainly driven by a rise in imported auto-
mobiles, clothes, beef and pork. 
Korea’s Trade Policies to Date
During the 1950s, the key policies for the Korean economy were 
import substitution industrialization. The policies helped protect 
domestic import-substitution industries, but also impeded 
exports. A big shift from import substitution to export-oriented 
policy was introduced in the early 1960s by the Korean gov-
ernment. During the 1970s, the government provided much 
support to the heavy and chemical industries. In the 1980s, the 
government initiated the Comprehensive Liberalization Policy, 
including the Import Liberalization Five Year Plan, which was 
implemented from 1983-1988. The simple average tariff rates 
were 23.7 percent in 1983 which fell to 18.1 percent in 1988. 
The ratio of import liberalization in 1983 was 80.3 percent and 
it rose to 95.2 percent in 1988. In 1995, it rose to 99 percent. 
During the 1980s, the government transformed its trade and 
industrial policy from government led to liberalization and com-
petition led policy. During the early 1990s and the beginning 
of the WTO, Korea further strengthened its policy direction 
of market openness, deregulation, and free trade. During 
the early 2000s, building on its continued policy stance of 
openness and competition promotion policy, Korea expedited 
its trade liberalization in pursuing Free Trade Agreements 
with developing and advanced economies around the world. 
From the early 2000s until now, Korea’s trade policy, being 
in line with the GATT/WTO, has been centered on pursuing 
active FTA policies more than any other country in the world. 
A Policy Shift Towards FTA Policies
The proliferation of the regional trade agreements since the 
1980s has been an important factor for encouraging free trade 
and liberalization in the world trade order. Before the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, Korea had put more policy weight on 
the multilateral trade front. Since the 1997 crisis, Korea had no 
choice but to push forward complete structural reforms across 
the economy and to promote trade liberalization. Accordingly, 
the crisis made Korea well-poised to benefit from taking free 
trade agreements, which would impact the whole economy by 
revamping its economic health and structure. 
With the proliferation of regional trade agreements, if Korea 
did not jump on the wagon of free trade agreements during 
the 2000s, it would be in a difficult situation. In the short-run, 
Korea would have a relative disadvantage in the global market 
and in the long-run, it would hamper the country’s economic 
growth potential. The Korean government, mainly thanks to 
its determination to survive in the global market, turned FTA 
promotion into critical policy tools and measures to enhance its 
industrial and national competitiveness. 
The FTA Roadmap and its Step Forward
Korea concluded an FTA negotiation with Chile in October 
2002. Following that effort, in September 2003, the Korean 
government announced “the FTA Roadmap” as its national 
economic development agenda. The FTA Roadmap marked a 
dramatic policy shift as it changed the country’s passive FTA 
stance to an active one. 
The Roadmap reflects two important policy principles. First, 
if Korea can conclude as many FTAs as possible in a short 
period of time, it can recover its competitiveness in the global 
market and reduce opportunity costs for Korean companies, 
which have observed rising disadvantages in the markets where 
Korea did not conclude FTAs. Second, the Roadmap pursues 
multi-track and simultaneous FTA negotiations with large 
economies. The main reason is to maximize whole economic 
benefits while minimizing negative costs from FTA negotia-
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tions. Building on those two principles, the Roadmap heav-
ily pursues comprehensive and high-quality FTAs in terms of 
sectors and commitments.
In 2010, the share of Korea’s trade with its FTA partners 
versus Korea’s total trade was just 14.6 percent, which is 
much lower than that of the world average, 49.2 percent 
according to KITA’s estimates (April 2011). The U.S. had a 
34.1 percent share with FTA partners, and the EU had more 
than a 70 percent share. However, during 2011, Korea’s trade 
share with its FTA partners rose to 27.4 percent due to the 
Korea-EU and Korea-Peru FTA. Over this period, Korea’s 
exports to its FTA partners increased 18.4 percent ($166.8 
billion) and the imports from them increased 20.6 percent 
($129.4 billion). 
The KORUS FTA entered into effect on March 15, 2012. 
Although it is too early to present an accurate analysis from 
the KORUS FTA, according to the Korea Customs Service 
(May 2012), in its initial two months Korea’s exports to the 
United States rose by 11.3 percent and the imports from the 
United States rose by 2.0 percent. This increase occurred 
despite weakening Chinese economic growth and the deepening 
euro zone crisis. Korea’s trade with the United State appears to 
have grown more stable due to the FTA. 
In analyzing the FTAs Korea has concluded to date, it is reason-
able to say that Korea established a global FTA network and 
became a hub country in the region. It made itself well-poised 
table 4 Korea’s FTA Progress
Status FTA partner Dates in force
FTAs in force  
(8 FTAs, 45 countries)
Chile Apr 2004
Singapore Mar 2006
EFTA Sept 2006
ASEAN
Jun 2006 (goods)
May 2009 (service)
Sept 2009 (investment)
India Jan 2010
EU Jul 2011
Peru Aug 2011
US Mar 2012
FTAs, signed recently Turkey Mar 2012
FTAs, under negotiation Canada, Mexico, GCC, Australia, New Zealand, Colombia, China
FTAs, under examination Japan, Korea-China-Japan, Mercosur, Israel, Vietnam, Central America,  
Indonesia, Malaysia
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (as of April 2012)
to benefit from the FTAs by liberalizing the market and enhanc-
ing the investment environment.
Comprehensive and High Quality  
FTAs Pursued
As argued, Korea has pursued comprehensive and high- 
quality commitments, that is to say, the NAFTA style, 
complemented with the South-South style. From the eight 
FTAs in force, Korea’s average concession rate is 97.5 percent 
with due consideration of sensitive sectors, such as the agricul-
tural sector in the KORUS FTA.
By sector coverage, the KORUS FTA comprehensively 
includes all sectors, for example, from goods to services and 
investment, MRA, competition, IPR, Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement, e-commerce, labor and environment. 
Trade Policy Challenges Facing Korea
In 1966, Korea’s total trade was about $1 billion and within a 
half century it topped $1 trillion. Membership in the $1 trillion 
dollar club is all the more important because the Korean 
economy achieved such a surprising performance amidst 
the heightened global economic crisis. Korea’s effective 
economic policy demonstrated that an economy could grow 
through trade. Despite its eye-popping trade performance, 
there are challenges and opportunities facing Korea’s trade 
policy for the future. Specifically, Korea faces the challenge of 
evaluating its trade performance not only by quantity, but also 
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by quality. Accordingly, Korea should look at what should be 
done to sustain economic growth and to continue its high 
performance in international trade. 
First, the Korean economy should continue to diversify its 
trading partners and products to reduce the risks of external 
shocks. If the crisis does not subside, it will impact the Korean 
economy through trade channels as well as financial channels. 
As seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the Korean economy has been 
making a great deal of effort to minimize its risk of too much 
dependence on a small number of trading partners. The effort 
to lower its excessive exposure has worked, but the economy 
should not become complacent.
Furthermore, while the export share of China-US-Japan-EU-
ASEAN in Korea’s total exports has been in a falling trend as 
indicated in Figure 3, the 2007-2011 share appears to stay at 
around 65 percent. This means that Korea has yet to run away 
from its high-trade dependency on its big five trading partners. 
In 2011, according to the MTI 3 digit, Korea’s top ten 
export products had a share of 60.3 percent, which shows 
much greater product concentration compared to the numbers 
FTA Korea’s concession rates (%)
Korea-Chile 99.8
Korea-Singapore 91.6
Korea-EFTA 99.1
Korea-ASEAN 99.2
Korea-India 93.2
Korea-US 99.8
Korea-EU 99.6
table 5 Korea’s Concession Rates in the FTAs
Source: MOFAT, KIEP, and author calculation
of other economies. According to a KITA report,2 in average, 
from 2008 to 2010, the share of top ten export products was 
27.1 percent for the U.S., 28.8 percent for China, 24.2 percent 
for Germany, and 34.7 percent for the UK. The shares of these 
countries were much lower than that of Korea, which was 51.1 
percent in the report. Accordingly, it is desirable for SMEs to 
enhance their competitiveness and reduce concentration by ex-
porting a variety of goods and services. This is easier said than 
done, requiring a longer term effort and continued commitment 
by the government and SMEs. 
Second, the Korean economy needs to enhance the competitive-
ness of its services sector and increase the share of its service 
exports in the world.
As seen in Table 6, the share of Korea’s service exports in the 
world rose from 2.1 percent in 2007 to 2.3 percent in 2011, 
while China rose from 3.6 percent to 4.4 percent over the 
same period. Specifically, during the last decade (2001-2011), 
according to the WTO (2012), the share of Korea’s 
merchandise exports rose from 2.4 percent to 3.0 percent while 
the share of Korea’s service exports rose from only 2.0 percent 
to 2.3 percent. Moreover, the annual average growth rate of 
Figure 3 Exports Share of China-US-Japan-EU-ASEAN (as a %)Figure 3 Exports Share of China-US-Japan-EU-ASEAN (%) 
Source: KITA (2012)
55.0
60.0
65.0
70.0
75.0
80.0
85.0
90.0
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
table 6 Export Shares in Commercial Services by Country
Share (%) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
United States 13.7 13.4 14.1 13.9 13.9 
UK 8.4 7.3 7.1 6.6 6.6 
Germany 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.2 6.1 
China 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.5 4.4 
Japan 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.4 
Korea 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.3 
Source: WTO (2012)
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Korea’s merchandise exports is 13.9 percent, which is higher 
than that of its service exports, 12.3 percent.3 
However, while Korea’s ranking in merchandise exports rose 
from 13th to 7th from 2001-2011, Korea’s ranking in the 
services exports fell from 13th to 15th. According to the Bank 
of Korea, in regards to Korea’s services’ balance between 
2000- 2006, it has continued to widen the trade deficit. As seen 
in figure 4, while reaching its peak deficit in 2006, Korea still 
maintained a substantial amount of the service trade deficit. 
Economic evidence builds that the service sector helps promote 
job-creation and economic growth. Yet, Korea’s trade policy 
thus far has been centered on strengthening the manufacturing 
sector, leading up to an inevitable rising gap between goods and 
services in terms of trade balance.
Imperatively, the Korean economy will not be able to sustain 
itself or promote more balanced growth in the mid-to-long term 
without enhancing the competitiveness of the service sector. 
Third, Korea must implement policy measures to further 
enhance the effectiveness of its FTAs. There should be domestic 
reform measures commensurate with free trade agreements. 
For example, domestic reform measures in distribution 
services should be implemented to make consumers feel 
price cuts through tariff reductions. Should consumers not 
reap the benefits of price reductions, static welfare effect will 
not be materialized, and thereby the non-competitive market 
structure will eventually erode the support of consumers 
for further trade liberalization. Domestically, it is impera-
tive to make the market more competitive to benefit from the 
FTAs and to raise the utilization rates in those FTAs in force. 
According to a recent KIEP4 report, except for the Korea-
Chile FTA which has around 95 percent utilization, most of 
the existing FTAs have low utilization rates. For example, the 
Korea-India FTA maintained just a 25 percent rate for exports. 
Last but not least, Korea has to continue gathering internal 
constituent support for FTA policies. It must also enhance 
policy communications with a variety of groups and sectors 
across the economy, including opponents to its FTA policies. 
As trade liberalization moves forward, it is natural to see some 
sectors win and other sectors lose, while achieving a net 
positive gain for the whole economy. Frequently, widening 
income gap between winners and losers would cause conflicts 
among the sectors or the groups in the economy, which can 
play a negative role by impeding economic growth and stalling 
consumer benefits. 
Therefore, it is important to prepare a compensation mecha-
nism as well as promote competitiveness in the specific sector 
which is adversely affected by free trade policy. Legitimate 
concerns of the sector should be properly addressed by 
the government and a mutual consensus should be pursued 
among the members of the society. Conclusively, free trade 
policy has been an indispensable pillar of support for 
economic growth in Korea. Building on free trade agreements 
already concluded, Korea should pursue an inclusive and 
sustainable growth trajectory with strong support of its citizens 
for future FTAs. It must also continue to figure out a new 
growth opportunity by implementing measures such as pro-
moting R&D, expanding the FTA network in Asia and other 
regions, and advancing high valued-added technology.
Dr. Lee Junkyu is a Senior International Economic Adviser, 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea.
1 Trade Focus, Vol.11, No.15, p.8-14. March, 2012, Korea International Trade  
 Association (KITA-IIT)
2 Trade Focus, Vol.10 No.55, November 2011, KITA: The data comes from the  
 UN Comtrade by HS 4 digit. 
3 According to the calculation based on the WTO (2012), the annual average growth  
rate of world merchandise exports was 11.4 percent and that of the world services 
exports was 10.8 percent from 2001 to 2011. 
4 Korea’s FTA Networks and its Global Leadership, Young gui Kim, May 8, 2012, KIEP. 
Figure 4 Korea’s Service Trade Balance  (in U.S. 100 million)Figure 4 Korea’s Service Trade Balance (in US$ 100 million)
Source: Bank of Korea (2012)
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IMPACTS AND MAIN ISSUES OF THE  
KOREA-CHINA FTA
By Choi Nakgyoon
Abstract
In May of this year, after Korea finalized all necessary domestic measures, Korea and China officially launched bilateral FTA 
negotiations. This paper looks at the FTA from the Korean perspective. The FTA talks will be conducted in two stages. In the first 
stage, they will finalize the modalities for trade in goods, services, investment and other areas. In the second stage, they will discuss 
all the main issues regarding goods, services, and trade-related rules following a single undertaking method. For its part, Korea 
needs to protect sensitive sectors including agriculture and fishery, among others. The FTA will be beneficial for the sustainable 
growth of Korean economy and the service and investment liberalization will be no less important than the tariff reductions for 
the impact of the FTA. The FTA will also benefit Korea as China has shifted its policy directions in favor of domestic demand 
rather than exports. However, the agreement is expected to have negative effects on the Korean agricultural and fishery sectors. 
Beyond economic benefits, the Korea-China FTA is expected to contribute to stabilizing the diplomatic and geo-political relationship 
between Korea and China. It can also be seen as a first step in accomplishing Northeast Asian regional integration.
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In January 2012, Korean President Lee Myung-bak had a 
summit meeting with Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao and 
announced that Korea would initiate steps domestically to 
officially launch Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations 
between Korea and China. The two countries decided to 
officially launch bilateral FTA negotiations in May after 
Korea finalized all necessary domestic measures regarding a 
public hearing and the ministerial meeting for international 
economic affairs.
In retrospect, there was more than seven years since the two 
countries agreed to begin joint research on a Korea-China FTA 
by private institutions in 2004. The joint study investigated 
the macroeconomic benefits expected from the bilateral FTA. 
From 2007 to 2010, the joint research of industry, government 
and academia on Korea-China FTA focused on impacts to 
industrial sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing 
industries, discussing how to deal with sensitive products. 
Until recently, China strongly hoped to launch Korea-China 
FTA negotiations as soon as possible. For its part, Korea needs 
to protect sensitive sectors including agriculture and fishery, 
among others. In order to facilitate the negotiations, the two 
countries will take the following two-stage approach. In the 
first stage, they will finalize the modalities for trade in goods, 
services, investment and other areas. They are expected to 
focus on the share and composition of the tariff lines placed 
in the sensitive as well as highly sensitive list. In the second 
stage, they will discuss all the main issues regarding goods, 
services, and trade-related rules following a single undertaking 
method. That means nothing is considered final until everything 
is actually agreed upon.
This paper deals with the Korea-China FTA from the 
Korean perspective. It reviews the current status of economic 
relations between Korea and China, dealing with the benefits and 
potential costs of a Korea-China FTA. It also touches upon the 
main issues of the bilateral FTA, comparing it to the proposed 
Korea-China-Japan FTA.
Economic Relations between Korea  
and China
The interdependency between Korea and China has rapidly 
increased in recent years. According to research conducted by 
KIEP1, Korean exports to China will increase by about 2 percent 
and real GDP will increase by about 0.22-0.38 percent, if the 
Chinese real GDP increases by 1 percent. China has become the 
biggest exporting and importing country for Korea since 2004 
and 2007, respectively. Currently, Korea is China’s number 
four trading partner after the U.S., Hong Kong and Japan. 
Korean exports to China amounted to $134.2 billion in 2011, 
occupying 24.1 percent of total Korean trade, followed by 
the U.S. (10.1 percent), Japan (7.1 percent), Hong Kong 
(5.6 percent), and Singapore (3.7 percent). Korea imported 
$86.4 billion from China, occupying 16.5 percent of 
total Korean imports, followed by Japan (13.0 percent), the 
U.S. (8.5 percent), Saudi Arabia (7.1 percent), and Australia 
(5.0 percent). 
A breakdown of Korean exports to China by final usage 
shows that the majority are products for re-exports, such as 
parts and material. According to a Korea International Trade 
Association (KITA) report2, Korean exports for domestic use 
to China in 2011 were 34.4 percent, which was very low 
compared to Japan (51.7 percent), Hong Kong = (59.5 percent), 
and the United States (66.7 percent). As we are all aware, the 
tariffs on exports for use in re-exporting are exempt or re-
funded in most countries including China. Therefore, almost 
two-thirds of Korean exports are not disadvantaged by high 
levels of Chinese tariffs.
On the other hand, Korea’s bilateral trade with China was 
$220.6 billion, which amounted to 20.4 percent of total trade 
in 2011, followed by Japan (10.0 percent) and the U.S. (9.3 
percent). Korea recorded a bilateral trade surplus of $47.8 bil-
lion, which represents 155.2 percent of the total trade surplus in 
2011. That means Korea would have recorded a trade deficit of 
$17 billion without its trade with China. According to the Bank 
of Korea, the average Korean GDP growth rate from 2008 to 
the first half of 2010 was 4.2 percent, while the contribution 
level of exports to China was 2.2 percent, indicating that the 
contribution of exports to China on the Korean GDP is approxi-
mately 52 percent. 
China has been one of the most important partners for Korea in 
terms of inbound as well as outbound FDI. Outbound Korean 
FDI to China increased rapidly in recent years in order to make 
the most of China’s expanding market3 and low labor costs. 
Figure 1 Korea’s Trade with China, the US and the EU (in U.S. billion)Figure 1 Korea's Trade with China, the US, and the EU (in US$ billion)
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As of 2012, China is second among Korea’s overseas 
investment destinations, surpassed only by the United States 
(20.4 percent). Korean outbound investment to China 
amounted to $35.9 billion, or 18.9 percent of total Korean 
overseas investment, followed by Hong Kong (6.5 percent), 
the UK (4.6 percent), Vietnam (3.9 percent), Canada (3.4 
percent), Netherlands (3.3 percent), Indonesia (3.0 percent), 
Singapore (2.2 percent), Australia (2.1 percent), and Brazil 
(2.0 percent).
On the other hand, inbound FDI from China from 1991 to 2000 
amounted to $149.1 million, jumping to $3.58 billion from 
2001 to 2011, which means that Chinese investment to Korea 
has been accelerating during the last decade. The total of 
China’s FDI stock in Korea amounted to $3.74 billion from 
1962 to 2011, and its share in the total inbound FDI in Korea 
turned out to be 2.0 percent. This number is relatively 
small compared to the U.S. (24.6 percent), Japan (15.1 
percent), Netherlands (11.2 percent), the UK (6.2 percent), 
Germany (5.7 percent), Singapore (3.9 percent), Malaysia 
(3.9 percent), France (3.3 percent), Canada (2.8 percent), and 
Hong Kong (2.5 percent).
FTA Policies of Korea and China
Korea designated Chile as its first FTA partner because Chile 
was regarded as being in a strategic position for advancement 
into other Latin American countries. After completing the 
negotiations with Chile in 2002, Korea concluded FTA nego-
tiations with Singapore, the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
India, the European Union, Peru, and the United States. 
Notably, Korea diversified its FTA partnership among the 
Americas, Europe, and Asia. As an export-oriented economy, 
Korea urgently needed to access the major markets and mini-
mize the negative effects from the FTAs of competing coun-
tries. Interestingly, Korea finalized FTA negotiations without 
any hesitation with regional bases such as Chile in America, 
Singapore in Asia, and the EFTA in Europe. 
Upon a review of Korea’s FTA policy, we found that Korea 
uses the FTAs to liberalize its domestic markets, as seen in 
the FTAs with the United States and the European Union. It 
table 1 Chinese Contribution to Korean Inbound and Outbound FDI (in U.S. million)
Before 1990 1991-2000 2001-2011 Total Chinese Contribution Chinese Share (%)
Foreign Direct Investment  2.8 149.1 3,584.8 3,736.7 2.0 
Overseas Investment 22.5 5,369.1 28,718.8 34,110.4 17.7 
Source: Ministry of Knowledge Economy and Korea Eximbank
also has taken care of its sensitive sectors by providing re-
structuring programs for the agricultural sector and designing 
assistance related to trade adjustment. 
On the other hand, China shifted its international economic pol-
icy in favor of FTAs after joining the WTO in 2001. Specifical-
ly, China pursued FTA negotiations with neighboring countries 
including ASEAN in 2005, Pakistan in 2006, Chile in 2006, 
and New Zealand in 2008. Currently, it has been negotiat-
ing with many countries including Iceland, Norway, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), and the South African Customs 
Union (SACU).
A review of the Chinese FTA policy reveals that China 
uses FTAs with neighboring and strategic base countries to 
support its diplomatic policy, as demonstrated by its desig-
nation of ASEAN as its initial FTA partner. China has not 
shown an interest in FTAs with developed countries such as 
the United States and the EU because they have not granted 
China market economy status. Specifically, it concluded FTA 
negotiations with Pakistan which imports armaments from 
China. It has been negotiating with Australia and the GCC, 
in consideration of the importance of energy resources and 
geo-political interests. 
Benefits and Potential Costs 
The Korea-China FTA is expected to provide economic and 
geo-political benefits. First of all, it will be beneficial for the 
sustainable growth of Korean economy. According to KIEP, 
the Korea-China FTA is expected to increase Korea’s real GDP 
by about 0.95-1.25 percent in five years and 2.28-3.04 percent 
in ten years4. The KIEP study included only concessions of the 
tariff schedule in its Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) simulations. It did not consider service and investment 
liberalization in the model. According to KIEP, the service and 
investment liberalization will be no less important than the 
tariff reductions for a FTA feasibility study, which indicates 
that the potential dynamic effects will be possibly greater than 
the static effects of tariff reductions.
Specifically, Korea can use the Korea-China FTA to make 
further advances into the Chinese domestic market, which is 
being regarded as the market with the biggest potential after 
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the global economic crisis in 2008. China has shifted its policy 
directions in favor of domestic demand rather than exports. It 
is currently putting more emphasis on domestic demand than 
exports, according to the five-year economic development 
plan released in 2010. 
It is noticeable that tariffs on exports for domestic use are neither 
exempted nor refunded. Thus, the Korea-China FTA will be very 
conducive to exports for domestic use. This is because China’s 
major trading partners have not negotiated bilateral FTAs with 
China, with the exception of Taiwan which has finalized the 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010. 
The ECFA is reputed to be a preliminary step for China-Taiwan 
FTA negotiations. Thus Taiwanese products that have been com-
peting with Korean export commodities in the Chinese market 
were given advantages by the ECFA, specifically in the chemical 
and electronic sectors. If main negotiations in the various areas 
such as goods, services, investment, and economic cooperation 
are concluded, it will have great impact on Korean exports. The 
Korea-China FTA will be expected to address Korean concerns 
about the potential increase for Taiwan in Chinese market shares.
On the other hand, the effects from the service and invest-
ment liberalization are expected to be substantial because 
beyond-the-border barriers in China are reputed to be very 
high. More specifically, a Korea-China FTA will contribute to 
the market expansion of producer services embodied in the 
Korean manufacturing exports. It is also expected to provide an 
impetus for substantial increase in the outbound FDI to China 
as well as intra-firm exports of services, in light of the rapidly 
expanding Chinese domestic demand.
In contrast to the benefits for the manufacturing and service 
sectors, the Korea-China FTA is expected to have negative 
effects on the Korean agricultural and fishery sectors. China 
is different from previous Korean FTA partners in that it can 
export fresh vegetables and live fish for the Korean market 
because it is geographically closer to South Korea. Therefore, 
potential costs from the Korea-China FTA are expected to 
accrue to the agricultural and fishery sectors.
Specifically, the imports of sensitive products from China 
have been increasing very rapidly in recent years. Korean 
agricultural exports to China amounted to $556.1 million 
while its agricultural imports from China reached $3.23 
billion. The trade deficit in the agricultural sector amounted 
to $2.67 billion. Marine products from China also represent a 
sensitive problem for the Koran economy, as Chinese products 
have account for more than 30% of Korean fishery imports. 
Besides the above-mentioned economic effects, the Korea- 
China FTA is expected to have geo-political effects in Asia. 
Above all, it will contribute to stabilizing the diplomatic and 
geo-political relationship between Korea and China, thereby 
contributing to the reunification of the Korean peninsula. The 
Korea-China FTA is expected to result in the expansion of 
bilateral cooperation and greater interdependency. It will also 
help the Chinese leadership and private sector to realize the 
importance of political as well as military security in the 
Korean peninsula. For its part, Korea can use the Korea-China 
FTA to develop a strategic and cooperative relationship with 
China while maintaining the Korea-U.S. alliance.
Main Issues 
Korea and China concluded (at the joint research of  industry, 
government and academia) that a Korea-China FTA will lead 
to positive effects for both economies. However, they did not 
launch official negotiations because they have reacted sensi-
tively to various products imported from each other. This dem-
onstrates the importance of dealing with sensitive products. 
The two countries should design concession lists to maximize 
the expected benefits and maintain the balance of economic 
interests for both countries. The two countries are planning to ne-
gotiate the modality of market access for goods in the first stage 
of the FTA negotiations. 
Specifically, Korea has a keen interest in how to liberalize the 
agricultural sector in the Korea-China FTA negotiations because 
most of the negative impacts of the bilateral FTA will be felt in 
that sector. On the other hand, China recorded huge trade deficits 
in the manufacturing sector including automobiles, chemical, 
and electronics among others and has an interest in these areas. 
In addition, rival companies of the two countries are engaged in 
competition to increase their market shares in third-country mar-
kets. For its part, China is expected to place many manufacturing 
tariff lines in the sensitive as well as the highly sensitive list.
Regarding rules—including intellectual property rights, anti-
dumping, environment and competition policies, and gov-
ernment procurement—Chinese legal institutions substan-
tially improved during the process of WTO accession in 2001. 
However, there were many complaints from Korean companies 
about the effective enforcement of Chinese rules. It is highly 
probable that a compromise on rules will be very difficult to 
achieve. It would be tough to apply domestic rules differently to 
member and non-member countries of a FTA.
Notwithstanding the geographic proximity and economic 
interaction between the providers and consumers of each 
country, the trade in services between Korea and China has been 
trivial compared to trade in manufactured goods. Yet the poten-
tial for future expansion in services trade is substantial in light of 
cultural homogeneity and the bilateral trade volume between the 
two countries.
A review of China’s FTAs with New Zealand, Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan revealed that China liberalized various 
 THE FUTURE OF KOREAN TRADE POLICY - 33
services sectors including telecommunication, transportation, 
government-related services, and business services. However, 
New Zealand is not noted for being competitive in the above 
service sectors. On the other hand, Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan all belong to the greater China economic area. Thus, it 
is not surprising to see that China has been reluctant to 
liberalize the service sectors in the case of the other previous 
Chinese FTAs. Part of the reason is that the competitiveness 
of China’s own service sectors are lagging and the Chinese gov-
ernment tends to regard domestic regulations as security issues.
In the second stage of Korea-China FTA negotiations, the 
two countries are scheduled to discuss all the main issues 
regarding goods, services, and trade-related rules following a 
single undertaking method. In previous FTA negotiations, 
China’s position in services and investment liberalization was 
a decidedly negative one. Thus, enhanced access to Chinese 
service markets and improvement of the Chinese investment 
environment are expected to be top priority agendas in the 
Korea-China FTA negotiations. Specifically, a guarantee 
of future liberalization, transparency, rational domestic 
regulation, and mutual recognition will likely be the main 
issues in negotiations for services and investment. 
A Comparison with the Proposed Korea- 
China-Japan FTA
Discussions about regional economic integration in Asia have 
not been as enthusiastic as those in other regions. For example, 
European countries launched an ambitious program for 
regional integration in the 1950s, and the North American 
countries concluded North American Free Trade Agreement, 
or NAFTA, in the 1990s. The Korea-China FTA will have 
potential effects not only on the two countries, but also on 
neighboring Asian countries. 
A review of recent economic statistics finds that greater inter- 
dependency has developed among Korea, China, and Japan in 
terms of trade, investment, and technology cooperation in recent 
years. Amidst head-to-head competition among the three countries, 
there are also many opportunities for them to cooperate with each 
other to expand mutual economic relations through FDI, 
strategic alliances, and technology transfers.
For example, as we can see in Table 2, shares of trilateral trade 
among Korea, China, and Japan increased very rapidly for 
Korea and Japan. In the case of China, it decreased to 15.78% 
in 2010 because China diversified its trade partners for its 
aggressive advance into the global market. 
Recognizing the importance of trilateral economic cooperation, 
discussion of the FTA among Korea, China, and Japan started in 
2002. Specifically, the three countries launched a joint study of 
private institutions to investigate the feasibility of the trilateral 
FTA from 2003 to 2008. The joint study dealt with a wide range 
of topics including macroeconomic effects, impacts on industries, 
and rules of origin, among others. Since 2009, the joint research 
of industry, government and academia indicates that the trilateral 
FTA will lead to substantial macroeconomic effects in all three 
economies, meaning that it will be a win-win strategy to be 
adopted for regional integration.
Reportedly, China recognizes the importance of Korea’s 
bridging role because of its intermediary position between 
China and Japan in terms of development level. Currently, 
both China and Japan are courting Korea to launch FTA 
talks. For its part, Korea may possibly restart the FTA with 
Japan and has announced it will launch a trilateral FTA with 
China and Japan after officially starting FTA negotiations 
with China. Thus, a Korea-China FTA can be seen as a first 
step in accomplishing Northeast Asian regional integration. In 
addition, it will also provide momentum for an East Asian 
FTA including ASEAN+3 because the three countries all 
concluded their FTAs with ASEAN. Furthermore, a Korea-
China FTA will have international political impact on the 
discussion of a greater Asian FTA among China, Japan, 
Korea, ASEAN, India, Australia, and New Zealand.
It is highly probable that politico-economic factors are more 
important than economic ones in the process of trilateral FTA 
negotiations. Thus, the three countries need to set up the modality, 
table 2 Bilateral/Trilateral Trade Shares (as a %)
Year
China Japan Korea
Japan Korea C-J-K China Korea C-J-K China Japan C-J-K 
2000 16.14 5.63 21.77 8.91 5.79 14.70 8.02 14.95 22.96 
2005 12.49 6.72 19.20 15.98 6.27 22.26 17.51 12.77 30.28 
2010 9.63 6.14 15.78 19.58 6.14 25.72 20.46 10.06 30.52 
Source: Comtrade Database, UN
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scope, and framework for the trilateral FTA, considering the 
template of the Korea-China FTA and the dynamic economic as 
well as political relations between China and Japan. 
Conclusion
The Korea-China FTA is expected to have substantial benefits for 
the two countries, but they have conflicting views on the main 
issues. Thus it will take a certain period of time to reach a com-
promise in goods, rules, and services areas. The Korean govern-
ment is known to have precluded the possibility of concluding a 
Korea-China FTA within a pre-specified period. 
Specifically, it is very important to negotiate successfully on the 
modality in market access for goods. If the two countries reach 
a compromise for a low-level FTA to take gradual concession 
schedules, then it will not be consistent with Article 24 of GATT 
1948. In addition, it will not be the optimum choice in terms 
of economic benefits for the two countries to liberalize only a 
limited range of tariff lines. 
Thus, one of the acceptable options for the two countries 
is to consider an ‘ASEAN FTA plus’ in order to protect the 
sensitive products of each country. This is because the level of 
concessions in the goods area of the Korea-ASEAN FTA is 
higher than that of the Korea-India Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement (CEPA), but lower than the FTAs with 
developed countries including the U.S. and the EU.
To conclude, the Korea-China FTA will provide more benefits 
for the Korean economy than potential costs, considering that 
it will strengthen its market competitiveness and upgrade its 
industrial productivity. If it is successfully concluded, Korea 
can become a business hub that connects the United States and 
European countries to Asian economies. In addition, the Korea-
China FTA is expected to be an effective catalyst in speeding 
up the discussion about Asian regional economic integration.
Choi Nakgyoon is a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea 
Institute for International Economic Policy.
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KOREA: BEYOND PREFERENTIAL TRADE DEALS
By Shiro Armstrong
Abstract
Korea has managed to sign free trade agreements (FTAs) with nearly all its major trading partners and the major global 
economies except for Japan and China. Although it has made some progress in trade liberalization due to FTAs, there is little 
evidence they have had, or will have, anywhere near the transformative effects on the Korean economy as did the earlier unilateral 
trade liberalization in the 1980s. Now that it is running out of potential FTA partners, Korea can be a leader in moving forward 
with untangling the extensive network of its FTAs and supporting the multilateral trading system. That would benefit Korea, its 
trading partners, regional trade flows and contribute to buttressing the global trading system when that is greatly needed. 
Preferential tariffs can be mulitilateralized, MFN rates can be reduced to the lowest preferential rates, or reduced to zero. 
The liberalization in service sectors can be extended with relative ease so that the Korean domestic economy can go beyond giving 
FTA partner country firms national treatment to allowing entry (and exit) of all foreign and domestic firms. It is in Korea’s interest 
to extend the opening of its market which has been achieved via FTAs to all countries.
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The State of Play
Korea1 owes its rapid growth and economic modernization to 
its opening up to, and integration into, the global economy. 
Korea went from being one of the poorest countries in Asia in 
the 1960s to an economic success story boasting the world’s 
twelfth largest economy with membership in the club of 
wealthy countries, the OECD. 
The export-oriented, but heavily protected Korean economy, 
really took off as it opened up unilaterally in the 1980s. 
Unilateral liberalization was underpinned by commitment 
to the multilateral trading system and supported through 
concerted liberalization through APEC. Concerted unilateral 
liberalization within the framework of GATT negotiations 
helped Korea and many of the East Asian economies to open 
up their economies and led to increasing trade shares and rap-
id economic modernization. 
Korea has developed into a significant middle economic 
power and an active contributor to the global economic system. 
President Lee showed strong leadership during the global 
financial crisis to ensure no backsliding into protectionism. 
Korea hosted the G20 summit in 2010 and is playing an active 
role in keeping the global trade and economic system open.2 
More recently Korea has been an aggressive participant in 
trade liberalization mostly in the form of signing free trade 
agreements (FTAs).3 Korea has been very successful in its 
strategy of signing FTAs with large and important trading 
partners and given this success (despite the political difficul-
ties in ratifying KORUS with the United States), it is now 
time to think about the next stage of Korea’s trade policy 
strategies and economic diplomacy. 
Taking Stock of Korea’s FTAs
At the turn of the century, Korea was one of the few East 
Asian economies not to have any FTAs and was still flying the 
multilateral flag. That changed when the Chile-Korea FTA 
was signed in 2003 and came into force in 2004. In less than a 
decade following its first venture into preferential trade, Korea 
has managed to sign agreements with nearly all its principal 
trading partners and the major global economies except for 
Japan and China. Nor has it yet signed an FTA with Australia, 
one of its key resource and food suppliers.
The Korea-US FTA (KORUS) came into effect in March 
2012 giving Korea eight concluded FTAs with a further seven 
under negotiation and nine under consideration. While those 
numbers are not particularly high compared to its neighbors 
(Japan with twelve and Singapore with eleven, for example) 
what is significant is the partners of those FTAs. Of the 
completed FTAs, the economically and politically significant 
ones in addition to KORUS are with the European Union 
(KOREU), India and ASEAN. Among the countries with 
which Korea currently has FTAs under negotiation are 
Australia, Canada, Mexico, the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
New Zealand, and in the consideration stage are 
agreements with Japan, China, Japan and China together 
(CJK), Indonesia, Vietnam and MERCOSUR. If those were 
all completed, Korea will have trade agreements with its 
largest trading partners and political allies. 
The economic effects of FTAs are usually quite limited with 
sensitive sectors exempted and difficult protection measures 
avoided, but for Korea, KOREU and KORUS have played 
an important role in liberalizing Korea’s heavily protected 
automobile and agriculture sectors. There has also been success 
in opening up some service sectors to U.S. and European firms. 
KORUS and KOREU have managed to include the phase-out 
of protection of sensitive sectors in Korea including pork, dairy 
and other agricultural goods (except for rice). Although the 
tariff phase-out varies and is quite lengthy for some sensitive 
sectors (up to fifteen or twenty years for some products), they 
will eventually move to duty free.4 
Although Korea has made some progress in trade liberaliza-
tion due to FTAs, there is little evidence they have had, or 
will have, anywhere near the transformative effects on the 
Korean economy as the earlier liberalization in the 1980s. 
Earlier unilateral liberalization was undertaken in concert with 
other APEC economies so that the economic benefits to open-
ing up were multiplied. Unlike liberalization through FTAs, 
unilateral liberalization does not distort trade towards preferred 
partners and allows for a more efficient allocation of resources 
determined by market forces.
The other major trade agreement in the region that could 
involve Korea is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which 
is a trade deal being negotiated by nine countries including 
the United States, Chile, Peru and Singapore—with whom 
Korea already has FTAs—and with Australia, New Zealand, 
Vietnam, and Malaysia—with whom Korea has FTAs under 
negotiation or consideration. Mexico and Canada are set to join 
the TPP negotiations and Japan has shown interest in joining. 
All three and are also currently undergoing talks with Korea 
for signing FTAs. 
There is a chance that Korea will find it congenial to join the 
TPP given that it has, or will have, deals with all the mem-
bers, and importantly the United States. But given it already 
has deals with those members, and the political difficulties it 
had in passing KORUS, it is unlikely that Korea can or will 
attempt to join TPP talks in the near future. Korea has less 
incentive than Japan to join TPP negotiations, for example, 
because Japan does not have an FTA with the United States.
The trade agreement talks with China and Japan (Korea’s 
two largest import sources and largest and third largest export 
markets, respectively) have recently been given a boost from 
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the progress of the TPP, given that it is highly unlikely China 
can join the TPP any time soon.5 As the world’s second largest 
economy and the largest trading partner for most of the East 
Asian economies, China is an important element in Korean, 
Japanese and East Asian trade. The TPP has also given impetus 
for other broader regional arrangements such as an ASEAN+3 
FTA and the ASEAN+6 FTA, in both of which Korea would 
be involved. 
Historical baggage and differences in political systems could 
mean that any FTA signed with Japan, China or both together 
could be either full of exemptions and lack liberalization or 
take a long time to conclude. The three countries should work 
at making a clean (fewer exemptions), multilateral friendly 
(lack of discrimination) agreement even if that requires longer 
phase-in periods. 
While Korea has made significant progress in signing FTAs, 
and that may be the end point for trade negotiators, trade 
liberalization should not stop with the conclusion of these 
trade agreements. 
Distortions and Inefficiencies
The problems with bilateral or regional preferential agreements 
are well known. Preferential trade agreements are a policy tool 
used to discriminate among trading partners and they divert 
trade away from third party countries regardless of whether 
they are members of the WTO and should have most favored 
nation (MFN) treatment in trade. 
Korean trade is regulated by eight different preferential 
arrangements (in addition to the global rules and norms of 
the trading system) and potentially up to twenty-four if all 
those under negotiation and consideration come to fruition. 
Given the loss of political face for both sides of FTA negotiating 
countries, it is likely that the FTAs currently under negotiation 
will conclude at some stage, in some form, albeit with exclusions 
and potentially very little liberalization. 
The proliferation of FTAs in the region has led to cumbersome 
rules of origin (RoOs) for trade across borders that involve 
different duties charged on different components or parts based 
on the country where value was added. Trade between two or 
more countries can come under different rules depending on 
which agreement or regulatory regime the trader chooses. 
The gains in market share that Korea has achieved through 
FTAs will be eroded as its trading partners conclude more FTAs 
and divert trade from Korea. But that is not a main issue. 
FTAs can inhibit competition, rather than encourage it. 
Preferential trade deals create interest groups around new 
preferences, or preferential access to investment or service 
delivery, that can make it harder to liberalize further. With 
European and U.S. beef enjoying preferential access to the 
Korean market, there now exists strong U.S. and European 
interest in protecting that preference from other suppliers, such 
as Australia and New Zealand. 
FTAs have yet to demonstrate that they complement and 
promote multilateral liberalization, as their protagonists 
argue. For FTAs to be building blocks towards multilateral lib-
eralization, and for this ‘competitive liberalization’ to work, the 
messy web of overlapping FTAs (noodles in the Asian noodle 
or spaghetti bowl) that have introduced distortions to business 
needs untangling. There also needs to be multilateralization or 
elimination of the preferences so that they add to the openness 
of the global trading system, not detract from it. 
The problems that FTAs raise are compounded by the frag-
mentation of production and division of labor across countries 
in international production networks. Trade within produc-
tion networks, and in other contexts, extends beyond bilateral 
trade but often, preferential trade deals are bilateral. 
Even when trade agreements involve more than two countries, 
they inevitably raise trade barriers relative to those outside 
the agreements. Each FTA that is brought into force in the 
region adds restrictions to trade, in the form of RoOs or a new 
set of discriminatory measures.
The proliferation of Korea’s FTA can be argued as successful 
competitive regionalism, where countries sign FTAs to offset 
the discrimination they face in the Korean market. Some see 
KOREU as a response to KORUS,6 although KOREU ultimately 
came into effect earlier than KORUS, and now there appears to 
be a big incentive for Japan to sign an FTA with Korea to offset 
the discrimination Japanese auto manufacturers face in Korean 
markets, for example. 
What should Korea do once it has signed deals with Japan 
and China? It will have no important trade partners left to 
negotiate FTAs. The bicycle theory of trade suggests that 
a country should continue to liberalize otherwise they will 
backtrack into protectionism or liberalization will become 
stalled. Korea has been pedaling very fast but is it toward a 
dead end with too strong a focus on FTAs? Negotiating trade 
deals consumes a lot of resources and bureaucratic energy but 
is it worth it to sign more deals with smaller countries? Would 
pedaling in a different gear or different direction move Korea 
forward more effectively?
Liberalization through FTAs can be phased in but, unlike non-
discriminatory framework agreements or agreements based 
on granting of MFN status, this liberalization has a tendency 
to stop there making them a somewhat static instrument for 
liberalizing trade. Interests privileged in participating partners 
have motivation to protect that privilege and frustrate more 
general liberalization. In addition, once a bilateral agreement 
is completed, for all practical purposes, that is the end for trade 
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negotiators. Renegotiation or further liberalization in an FTA 
framework does not happen automatically even when review 
arrangements are built into the outcome, and is in fact very rare. 
Trade liberalization is an ongoing process of removing barriers 
to efficiently allocate resources towards their most productive 
use and to further the division of labor for a freer, flexible and 
more open economy. 
Liberalization that occurs through negotiating FTAs, it is 
argued, may engage export interest groups that directly benefit 
from foreign market opening in overcoming resistance to trade 
reform. Yet by far the largest gains in trade liberalization accrue 
from what you give up, not what you extract from others in a 
negotiating framework, so it would appear that more produc-
tive catalyst might be found through mobilizing the interest of 
consumers and end-users on importable goods and services in 
trade reform and liberalization.
Korea has the opportunity to show leadership in untangling 
the FTA noodles given that it has signed FTAs with so many 
of its important trading partners; its record as a positive force 
in active middle power economic diplomacy; its location in 
the world between three economic giants; its secure trade 
agreement with the EU and its ally the United States; and its 
place in a dynamic, integrated region. 
Asian, Trans-Pacific or Global  
Trade Policy?
The choice of a bilateral, regional, trans-Pacific or global trade 
policy is a false choice in that if those options are seen as mutu-
ally exclusive, the global edifice into which they are built will 
be corroded. Bilateral and regional initiatives should be consis-
tent with Korea’s global outlook and be designed to foster open 
trade arrangements generally. 
The failure of the Doha round in the WTO was used as an excuse 
to pursue FTAs but it has locked in preferences and meant that 
this second best (or even third best) FTA solution has become 
the enemy of the first best, non-discriminatory multilateral so-
lution. Now that the Doha round has collapsed, it is a dangerous 
time to further weaken the multilateral system. Rather, there is 
need to show leadership in reversing some of the damage that 
bilateral deals have done to the non-discriminatory multilateral 
trading system. 
The GATT was created to avoid a repeat of the retreat into 
preferentialism of the interwar period, where trade declined by 
seventy percent as preferential trade proliferated.7 The interwar 
collapse in trade extended the Great Depression and exacerbated 
political tensions with the ‘Dissatisfied Powers.’ The global 
trading system has played a significant role in dampening 
political tensions. One prime example in Korea’s neighborhood 
is the way in which it has underpinned growth of the economic 
relationship between Japan and China where that relationship 
has prospered despite the political tensions between the two 
countries. The unilateral liberalization that China undertook 
as part of its accession bid for entry to the WTO demon-
strated commitment to the global trading system’s rules and 
norms. This commitment to further reforms and marketization 
gave Japanese (and other international) investors and traders 
confidence in economic engagement with China even when 
political differences arose.8 
Korea can be an active agent, or better, a leader in moving 
forward with untangling the extensive network of its FTAs 
and supporting the multilateral trading system. That would 
benefit Korea, its trading partners, regional trade flows and 
contribute to buttressing the global trading system when that 
is greatly needed. It would hurt narrow interests that currently 
have preferential access to Korean markets but those 
preferences are at the expense of Korean consumers and third 
party country trading partners. It is in Korea’s interest to extend 
the opening up of its market which has been achieved via FTAs 
to all countries. 
Digesting the Noodles 
Korea can be a leader in untangling the noodle bowl to make 
it more digestible. There are at least three ways forward in 
dealing with FTAs.9 The first, which proponents of FTAs as 
stepping-stones towards regional trade agreements and then 
onto multilateralization might favor, is the consolidation 
approach. That would involve bilateral preferential deals 
being consolidated into regional deals. The second is to dilute 
the distortionary effects of FTAs by multilateralizing the 
preferences and other accords or by reducing the MFN rates. 
The third involves pushing deregulation and structural reform 
to level the playing field in the Korean domestic market and 
developing a regional and international agenda of regulatory 
reform and integration. 
While the idea of consolidating, or joining up, FTAs may sound 
attractive, it is in practice unlikely to succeed in a way that will 
not be damaging to the global trading system. Where regional 
trade agreements have been brought into effect involving 
existing FTA partners, bilateral deals have not disappeared 
or become less important. The outcome is another layer or 
set of trade rules and restrictions within that region. If the 
consolidation approach did succeed, however, it is likely to 
further fragment global trade. Consolidation of intraregional 
FTAs is difficult enough10 but consolidation of interregional 
FTAs is close to impossible. For example, if Korea succeeds 
in its FTA negotiations with Mexico and Canada, this will not 
qualify Korea to join NAFTA nor can those agreements join up 
in any easy way. And KOREU will not lead to Korea enjoying 
equal treatment among EU members. 
Although Korea has FTAs with the United States and ASEAN, 
there is little chance that Korea could connect those two FTAs 
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as the United States would have to extend KORUS preferences 
to ASEAN. But for Korea, there is powerful incentive to level 
the playing field between the U.S., Southeast Asia and other 
firms in the Korean economy. 
The TPP was originally cast in terms of being the solution to 
overlapping FTAs and the related restrictions, such as RoOs, 
by consolidating FTAs in the region and providing a pathway 
towards a broader regional agreement encompassing all APEC 
members (a Free Trade Agreement of Asia and the Pacific). 
The goal of having a consolidated text with common market 
access schedules for all members and no exemptions is at risk. 
Instead of a truly clean regional FTA that liberalizes, albeit 
preferentially, a U.S.-led compromise made in Brunei in 2009 
has led to market access offers on a bilateral basis or to the 
TPP as a whole.11 There are signs that the TPP will end up 
as a series of bilateral deals which adds to the problems of 
overlapping FTAs instead of solving them,12 in which case 
Korea should not join. 
Diluting Tariff Preferences
In order to reduce and eventually eliminate the distortions in 
Korea’s FTAs, different aspects of the FTAs have to be dealt 
with in different ways. Preferential tariffs, for example, can 
be mulitilateralized, and MFN rates can be reduced to the 
lowest preferential rates, or reduced to zero. ASEAN has 
managed to multilateralize most of the preferences in the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area. 
Korea has achieved opening up some sensitive sectors, such 
as agriculture and automobiles, in KORUS and KOREU 
(albeit with varying phase-in periods and safeguard measures 
in the event of import surges to protect domestic producers) 
that are arguably more difficult to achieve multilaterally. 
Some negotiations may be easier with only two parties but 
once those protected sectors are opened up to foreign 
competition, liberalizations can more readily be extended 
on an MFN basis. 
Korea will completely remove its tariff on U.S. automobiles 
by 2016, from the pre-KORUS level of eight percent (they 
dropped to four percent as soon as KORUS came into force). 
Under KOREU, tariffs towards European automobiles 
will be eliminated roughly around the same time as with 
KORUS, with tariffs on light trucks eliminated a year or 
two earlier. Korean consumers will be paying more for 
Japanese automobiles which will incur eight percent tariffs 
and hence be at a disadvantage in competing in the Korean 
market. But given that Korea will have opened up to U.S. and 
European automobile companies, it should be relatively 
easy to eliminate tariffs towards Japanese automobiles, and 
all other auto-mobile suppliers, so that the Korean 
automobile market is more open, competitive and prepared 
to improve Korean consumer welfare. There is no justification 
for making any potential innovative or cheaper cars from 
Japan, China or elsewhere relatively more expensive in 
favor of U.S. or European cars.
The same applies for other sectors. Australia and Korea do 
not need an FTA for Korea to extend the tariff reductions 
to Australian beef and other agricultural goods that have 
already been extended to the United States and Europe. If 
Korean consumers can access cheap American and European 
agricultural goods, that access should be extended to Australian 
and Brazilian agricultural producers. Korean consumers can 
benefit from a more competitive market, including more product 
varieties, cheaper goods and more liberal trade with producers 
in the Southern Hemisphere with different climates.
Another way to dilute tariff preferences is to reduce MFN rates 
so that the margin of preference shrinks. Korea is already a 
relatively open economy with average tariffs at around nine 
percent, and now that it has succeeded in liberalizing some 
sensitive sectors for the first time, could work towards 
eliminating the remaining tariffs. Korea would then no longer 
be contributing to the RoO problem. 
There is no justification for preferential treatment under other 
non-tariff barriers to trade that have been identified and 
liberalized through bilateral trade agreements. 
A Level Playing Field for Korean and  
Foreign Firms
But FTAs are not only about preferential treatment of goods 
at the border in terms of tariffs. They include services 
trade and often cover labor and environmental standards, 
intellectual property rights, competition policy, rules on 
investment, e-commerce, government procurement and other 
issues. Most of those are domestic economic policy issues 
to do with making the market more efficient and contestable. 
There is little evidence13 that preferential services com-
mitments deliver much in terms of liberalization outside 
of Europe, but Korea has opened up its legal, financial, 
and telecommunications sectors in varying degrees for U.S. 
and European service delivery. Healthcare and education 
services are still protected sectors in Korea and have been 
excluded from all its FTAs. What gains in service trade 
liberalization Korea has achieved through its FTAs can be 
multilateralized relatively easily from the preferential accords 
that are in place.14 Some of the services trade liberalization 
measures mean American and European law firms are now 
allowed to open offices in Korea. The forty-nine percent foreign 
voting share limit for telecom providers was removed for U.S. 
and European telecommunication service providers, European 
and American financial firms had data transfer restrictions 
lifted, and American and European accounting and taxation 
service providers are allowed to enter the Korean market. 
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Those hard fought trade “concessions” can be extended with 
relative ease so that the Korean domestic economy can go 
beyond giving U.S., European and other FTA partner 
country firms national treatment to allowing entry (and exit) of 
all foreign and domestic firms. As with many barriers to en-
try for firms, it is a domestic issue more than a trade issue 
and more about creating a level playing field for Korean and 
foreign firms in Korea. Barriers to entry that exist for domes-
tic firms are just as important an issue as barriers to entry 
to foreign competition. 
The aim for Korea is to have well-regulated and competitive 
markets, not markets with barriers to entry and national 
treatment for preferred country firms. As one of Asia’s most 
developed economies, Korea should focus on adopting 
regulatory best practice and using its membership of the 
OECD, for example, to co-opt the most advanced benchmarks 
for new regulatory challenges.15 Such regulatory leadership 
will not only help the Korean economy, but can contribute to 
the global and regional regulatory standards and the provision 
of this public good can be championed at APEC and the OECD.
With investment accords, instead of having different rules 
protecting foreign investors depending on their country of 
origin, Korean interests are much better served with a set 
of robust, transparent investment rules and regulations that 
afford all foreign investors protection in order to attract 
foreign capital and technology, as well balancing that with 
protecting Korean interests.
Other provisions or chapters labeled “WTO-plus” in FTAs 
such as labor and environment standards, as well as 
strengthened IPR, are measures usually included in FTAs to 
level the playing field between countries. They are usually 
measures introduced from more developed countries so that 
countries cannot gain competitive advantages when the cost 
of environmental degradation is not factored into the cost of 
production and wages are artificially low due to unregulated 
labor markets. The argument for IPR chapters is for protec-
tion of IPR in order to encourage innovation. Such measures 
can be seen as protectionist measures that do not recognize 
different stages of economic development and try to erode 
some of the comparative advantages in lower cost production, 
especially in developing countries. 
Korea has a mature economy and does not have many of the 
problems that other developing countries might in meeting 
U.S. or EU standards for WTO-plus provisions. The one area 
where this is an issue in KORUS and KOREU, but not in most 
of Korea’s other FTAs, is in relation to goods produced in the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex located in North Korea. 
Preferential treatment for products originating from 
Kaesong being traded between Korea and the United States 
or Europe will require further negotiation. Problems would 
arise if Korea demanded similar WTO-plus standards from 
its other trading partners, especially developing countries, 
before it engages in trade deals with them. 
A New Trade Paradigm: Beyond FTAs
Korea needs a new trade liberalization paradigm and strategy 
that takes it beyond FTAs. 
Korea does not need negotiated trade agreements based on 
tit-for-tat trading of preferences and discrimination in order to 
liberalize trade. The domestic sell should move from opening 
up certain sensitive sectors like beef and automobiles to global 
powers bilaterally to opening up for a more efficient, open and 
contestable market and strengthening Korea’s global role. 
In APEC and the G20, Korea has the platform to show 
leadership in unilateral initiatives that dilute the effects of 
the discrimination in its trade agreements. Korea can make 
clear commitments to the multilateralization of preferences 
over time as well as commitments to multilateralizing special 
treatment in services trade or delivery. As the Korean 
economy moves towards a new economic model based 
on green growth, there is an opportunity to frame its commit-
ments to trade globally in a manner consistent with its moves 
to free trade in green technologies. 
The dilution or multilateralization of the adverse effects of 
FTAs will provide a regional and even a global public good, 
which can be supported and emulated at APEC, for example. 
Leading a concerted approach to untangling noodles will 
compound the benefits. 
Korea sits between two economic giants in Japan and China, 
with both of whom it has large economic relations; is part of the 
production networks in a deeply integrated region; and has a major 
FTA with its important political ally in the United States. Korean 
interests are best served by eliminating the discriminatory and 
distortionary features in its trade arrangements and by being a 
leader in keeping the global trading system open and strong.
The debate must move to making Korea more competitive 
internationally and to continuing its economic development 
success story, and away from picking trading partners and 
leading the world in riding the FTA bicycle.
Shiro Armstrong is a Research Fellow at the Crawford School 
of Public Policy at the Australian National University and 
Editor of the East Asia Forum.
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THE SECRET SUCCESS OF U.S. AID TO SOUTH KOREA
By Andrew S. Natsios
In the 1950s South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, and yet today it is one of the richest with the 13th largest 
economy and a functioning parliamentary democracy. Between 1961 and 1979 per capita income rose eight fold, and its economic 
growth rate exceeded 1400 percent. How did this economic miracle take place? What role did the United States aid program play 
in this transformation? 
In the 1950s the Korean people were hungry, impoverished, and in poor health. The U.S. aid program imported massive amounts 
of food aid to feed the population, but focused on increasing agricultural development to produce food for Japanese markets. 
Dr. Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea between 1948 and 1961, also pursued a policy of import substitution 
based on what is called dependency theory. Under this theory the government created (and still continue to own) local 
businesses that produced products for domestic consumption to reduce the need for imports. This approach has consistently failed 
to produce sustained rates of growth in nearly every country it has been attempted, including in South Korea in the 1950s. Typically, 
the government-run businesses created by import substitution become inefficient monopolies that try to protect their exclusive 
control over domestic markets, avoid risk, innovation, and improvements in productivity. Thus import substitution policies impeded 
rather than increased economic growth. 
General Park Chung-hee’s assumption of the presidency in 1961 coincided with the arrival of a new USAID mission director 
(Bernstein) who proposed to Park that Korea shift focus from producing agricultural to industrial products for export. This 
appealed to Park who adopted the strategy and approached the effort as a military commander. He held regular staff meetings of 
his cabinet and business leaders at which he demanded accountability and results, established market-based export quotas of 
industrial goods the business community had to meet based on market demand, and created heavy incentives for those businesses 
which met the goals, and withdrew incentives when businesses failed to meet them. The industrialization effort was done through 
what were called the chaebol business elite who Park had earlier put in jail for corruption, but later released to lead his export- 
led growth strategy. 
KorEa’s rolE In EConoMIC dEVEloPMEnt
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The Park strategy was part Korean and part American, and 
was partly based on a book called the Stages of Economic 
Growth by Walter Rostow, which had just come out on 
development economics. The author was a senior advisor to 
both President Kennedy and later President Johnson. Rostow 
argued that foreign aid could be used to accelerate growth 
at certain stages of economic development in poor countries 
using economists and other technocrats to guide the 
implementation. USAID provided both the funding and 
the economists to the South Korean government. Michael 
Pillsbury is currently writing an important new book, based on 
recently declassified CIA cables, called The Secret Successes 
of USAID which describes the aggressive nature of U.S. 
efforts in Korea to ensure that the growth strategy was 
successful. At times Park complained to the CIA that these 
USAID economists were running the country—though he 
continued to support the recommended policies.
The Korean economic model did not enjoy universal support 
among development professionals even as late as the 1970s 
when some questioned whether this was the right strategy. It 
was not until the 1980s that it became indisputably obvious that 
the Park strategy was a remarkable success. 
What lessons can we draw from the Korean experience? Firstly, 
growth strategies required a long time horizon—two decades. 
It could not produce immediate, visible, and quantifiable 
results which policy makers in Washington often demand of 
aid programs. In fact none of the Asian economic success 
stories—Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, China, 
or South Korea—produced quick results. 
Secondly, to be successful the strategy required President 
Park’s strong and aggressive support over the entire period— 
without local leadership the strategy would have failed. This 
also meant donors—in this case the United States—had to 
provide consistent support for the strategy over a long period 
of time. The U.S. economic aid program was not phased out 
until 1982. Without country leadership the strategy would 
have failed.
Thirdly, the strategy would not have succeeded if there had been 
a civil war or widespread political instability in South Korea 
because “capital is a coward” as Colin Powell has often said. 
Investors avoid putting private capital at risk in an unstable 
country with an internal conflict raging. 
Fourthly, the fear of a looming North Korea on the other side of 
the border with the South backed by the Communist Chinese and 
Soviet governments motivated President Park and the South 
Korean political and economic elite to make their strategy 
work. They took risks, avoided using aid money to reward 
friends and loyal supporters with unproductive govern-
ment jobs and crony protection schemes (a problem in many 
developing countries), and avoided making unproductive 
but politically popular economic investments. The abiding 
external threat over two decades created the motivation for 
leaders to ensure the strategy worked. 
What worked in South Korea is not necessarily a model for 
every country. Each country has its own unique set of local 
challenges, its own historical narrative, and its culture and 
values which influence its development trajectory. But the 
Korean growth strategy, which the U.S. government aid pro-
gram, according to the CIA declassified cables, played a ma-
jor role in helping the South Korean government formulate 
and implement, produced the jobs and prosperity that created 
a South Korean middle class which later demanded political 
reform, democracy, and free institutions. Those skeptics who 
argue that foreign aid does not work should examine the shin-
ing example of South Korea. Other developing countries could 
benefit from learning how South Korea achieved its economic 
and political miracle. 
Andrew S. Natsios is Executive Professor at the George H.W. 
Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A and 
M University. He previously served as the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development.
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AID BY KOREA: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES
By Lee Kye Woo
Abstract
This paper aims to evaluate the progress made in Korea’s official development assistance (ODA) since 2008, when the 
country applied for accession to the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and established its Medium-term 
Aid Plan (2008-2010). Using empirical statistical data, it assesses the performance of Korea’s ODA against the norms and practices 
of DAC member countries. In particular, this study analyzes the Korean government’s achievement in addressing the 2008 concerns 
of the OECD’s Special Review Team about Korea’s aid allocation to developing countries and coordination of the policies and 
programs of its numerous aid agencies. 
46 - KOREA’S ECONOMY 2012      
Introduction
2012 marks a special year for Korea’s official development 
assistance (ODA). A year after Korea hosted the Busan 
International Conference on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in 2011, 
the country’s aid is to be evaluated by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) peer review 
team for the first time since Korea joined the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2010. The DAC, which 
discusses and coordinates member donor governments’ 
foreign aid policies, is composed of the European Union 
and twenty-three of thirty-four OECD member countries.
The DAC conducts a peer review of its member states’ 
ODA policies and practices every two to three years, and 
publishes the results. The review will analyze changes in 
Korea’s ODA since it applied for DAC membership in 2008 
and offer recommendations for future improvement. The 
baseline reference will most likely be the OECD’s 2008 
Special Review Report, which provided data for evaluating 
Korea’s DAC membership application. Although the review’s 
recommendations are not binding, all DAC members agreed to 
follow Committee policies and regulations when they joined. 
Accordingly, as a way of analyzing Korea’s aid policies and 
practices, this paper is intended to evaluate any changes 
(or lack of changes) in Korean aid since the OECD’s 2008 
report. In particular, it analyzes issues and concerns raised by 
that report and compares Korean ODA policies and practices 
during the period 2008-10 with those that prevailed before the 
report was issued, i.e., the period 2005-07. 
The Special Review Report urged changes to the scale and 
terms of Korean aid, and highlighted two additional concerns. 
One was that Korean ODA was ineffective mainly due to 
fragmentation: aid was administered by many ministries and 
other public agencies without a coherent legal and policy 
framework. Korea’s bilateral ODA was divided between grants 
offered by KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency) 
under the policy guidance and supervision of the MOFAT 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade) and concessional loans 
offered by the EDCF (Economic Development Cooperation 
Fund) under the guidance and supervision of the MOSF 
(Ministry of Strategy and Finance). In addition, some 25% of 
total bilateral grants were offered by more than thirty central 
and provincial governments and independent public 
organizations. Multilateral ODA was offered by more than 
twenty agencies to more than eighty intergovernmental 
organizations. Coordination and cooperation between the 
major grant and loan agencies, KOICA/MOFAT on the one 
hand and EDCF/MOSF on the other, and their programs 
was ineffective. Moreover, coordination was lacking between 
these agencies/programs and more than thirty other grant- 
giving agencies. 
The other concern was the unclear criteria for selecting ODA 
recipient countries and allocating aid. The ODA allocated to 
recipient countries by income level was inconsistent with the 
ODA objectives generally agreed upon by all DAC members. 
A similar concern was expressed with respect to aid allocated 
to recipient countries classified by region, sector, and project.
Therefore, in addition to reviewing changes in the scale and 
terms of Korea’s ODA since 2008, this paper will review 
shifts in legal and policy coherence, as well as selection and 
allocation criteria, as aimed in the Mid-term ODA Plan 
(2008-10). This paper will also empirically analyze Korea’s aid 
allocation practices in comparison with other DAC member 
states. Finally, this paper will highlight conclusions and future 
challenges for Korean ODA.
The Scale and Terms of Aid
The Special Review Report (OECD 2008) expressed 
satisfaction with Korea’s plan to increase ODA and encouraged 
a strong commitment. The incoming Lee Myung-bak govern-
ment in 2008 promised to follow through with the plan, which 
was set up by the exiting Roh Moo-hyun government. The 
Mid-term ODA Plan 2008-10 stipulated that the volume of aid 
would increase from 0.06% of gross national income (GNI) in 
2006 to 0.25 percent by 2015.
Since 2008, Korea has pursued the goal with vigor. During the 
period 2006-10, whereas Korea’s total fiscal expenditure in-
creased at 7 percent per year, its ODA expenditure rose at 29 
percent per year. In 2010, the net ODA disbursed increased 
sharply, reaching $1.174 billion, the equivalent of 0.12 percent 
of GNI. The size of ODA has scaled up by 0.03 percentage 
points every two years, i.e., 0.06 percent of GDP in 2006, 0.09 
percent in 2008, and 0.12 percent in 2010. If this trend contin-
ues, the size of ODA will reach 0.27 percent of GNI in 2015, 
exceeding the 0.25 percent goal.
Figure 1 Korea’s Net ODA
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The Special Review Report (2008) also encouraged Korea to 
soften its ODA terms. A 1978 DAC agreement on improving 
ODA terms includes three standards. First, 86% of annual ODA 
commitments should be a grant element. Second, annual ODA 
commitments should be above the ODA members’ average 
(0.28 percent of GNI in 2010). Third, ODA commitments for 
all least developing countries (LDCs) should contain a grant 
element above 90 percent annually, or ODA commitments for 
each LDC should contain a grant element above 86 percent on 
a three-year average basis.
Korea satisfied the first and third standards in 2010. The aid 
commitments contained a 93.6 percent grant element; annual 
aid commitments to all LDCs reached 94.5 percent, and the 
three-year average aid commitment to each LDC also exceeded 
86 percent. This was made possible not by reducing the share of 
loans in total bilateral ODA, as recommended by the DAC; in 
fact, the share of loans in total bilateral aid rose steadily from 27 
percent in 2007 to 36 percent in 2010. Instead, Korea achieved 
these goals mainly by softening concessional loan terms via re-
ductions in interest rates (up to 0.01 percent) and extensions of 
the grace and repayment periods (up to forty years), especially 
for those loans directed to LDCs, green growth, and climatic 
change preparedness. 
Regarding the DAC’s second standard for ODA commitments 
at 0.28 percent of GNI, Korea’s 2010 ODA commitments 
reached only 0.20 percent of GNI. However, Korea’s ODA 
commitment would approach the second standard by 2015 
if it attains the net ODA disbursement goal of 0.25 percent 
of GNI by 2015, and would nearly meet it if its loan com-
mitment continues to increase as it has in recent years. 
Even if Korea’s ODA does not attain the second standard, 
DAC members would likely understand: currently France 
fails to reach the first standard; Portugal falls short of the 
second standard; and Greece (0.17 percent), Italy (0.16 
percent), and the United States (0.25 percent), like Korea, fail 
to reach the third standard. 
Integrated Legal and Policy Frameworks
The integrated or coherent legal and policy frameworks for 
Korean ODA can be discussed at two levels: at all recipient 
countries level and at each individual recipient country level. 
First, at the level of all recipient countries, Korea has continu-
ously pursued a coherent legal and policy framework since 
2005. This effort finally came to fruition at the end of the 
Mid-term ODA Plan, when the government promulgated the 
Basic Law on International Development Cooperation in early 
2010. Second, at the individual recipient country level, Korea 
decided to prepare Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) papers 
to coordinate all Korean aid agencies’ programs and projects. 
Basic Law and Related Mechanisms
The 2008 OECD Special Review Report recommended a 
single integrated legal framework to encompass all aid types 
and agencies, and a single integrated aid controller to guide and 
supervise all aid agencies and programs.
Basic Law
The government of Korea decided not to establish such an 
integrated aid agency, which may require a major reorganiza-
tion of the rights and responsibilities of many ministries and 
a sharp increase in government officials. Instead, the govern-
ment attempted to promote coordination and cooperation of 
numerous aid agencies through the Basic Law on Interna-
tional Development Cooperation of 2010. This law requires 
the government to designate controlling aid agencies for 
grants and loans, respectively, for a coherent legal and policy 
framework, and prepare a mid-term aid plan and annual 
implementation programs, for coordinated and cooperated 
aid implementation programs and projects. 
The Basic Law designated MOFAT (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade) as the controlling agency for all grant aid 
agencies, and MOSF (Ministry of Strategy and Finance) for 
loan aid agencies. The controlling agencies are responsible 
for coordination, monitoring and supervision, and support of 
other aid agencies, especially the thirty-plus grant agencies. 
In addition, the Basic Law elevates the existing Committee 
on International Development Cooperation as the apex 
agency for deliberation and coordination of all aid agencies 
and programs. 
At present, there is no consensus on whether the OECD’s 
2008 recommendation as implemented in the Basic Law was 
appropriate for Korea. A single, overarching ODA law was not 
universally adopted by DAC member countries. At that time, 
only twelve of twenty-two members adopted such legislation; 
the other ten used only fundamental policy documents for 
managing ODA. Seven of those twelve members having such 
legislation also prepared and used a fundamental policy 
document (Sohn 2009). 
While it is clear that the Basic Law has contributed to the 
coordination and regulation of Korean ODA efforts, the 
legislation also has a potential downside. Prior to 2010, 
Korea had several laws on ODA activities, including the 
organic laws for EDCF (1987), KOICA (1991), and KOFIH 
(Korea Foundation for International Health: 2005), which 
together provided legal authority and responsibility to handle 
about 80 percent of total bilateral ODA in Korea. These laws 
outlined two simple and clear ODA objectives: economic 
development of recipient countries and mutual exchanges. 
However, the Basic Law lists eight, adding such objectives 
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as: resolution of global development issues; promotion of 
human rights for women and children; gender equality; 
achievement of humanitarianism; improvement of developing 
countries’ institutions and systems; and contribution to 
global peace and prosperity. Therefore, one risk that the 
Basic Law poses is that it may provide a legal basis for 
the proliferation of new agencies to specialize in some of 
the six additional aid objectives, potentially complicating 
rather than easing Korea’s efforts to reduce proliferation of 
aid agencies and coordinate their ODA initiatives. Another 
problem with the law is that it does not give any sense of 
priority among the diversified objectives for aid resource 
allocation and execution. 
Coordination and Cooperation Mechanisms
In accordance with the Basic Law, the controlling and other 
aid agencies collaborated to prepare the Aid Modernization 
Strategy Paper (Office of Prime Minister 2010) and Five-Year 
Aid Plan: 2011-15 (Office of Prime Minister 2011). This plan 
provided a basis for preparing annual aid implementation 
programs, the country assistance strategy for priority recipient 
countries, and the volume and grant elements of total ODA. 
Therefore, it indirectly enhanced aid predictability for all stake-
holders and aid coordination among domestic aid agencies, 
goals that were emphasized in the Paris Declaration for Aid 
Effectiveness (OECD 2005), Accra Agenda for Action (OECD 
2008), and the Busan Outcome Document on Aid Effectiveness 
(OECD 2011). 
While the Five-Year Aid Plan improves aid predictability, the 
Annual Aid Implementation Program (AAIP) tries to ensure 
coordination and cooperation among all aid agencies and pro-
grams, and consistency between the Five-Year Plan and the 
annual aid budget. Before 2008, there was no planning 
and management instrument to ascertain coordination and 
coherence among programs of almost forty aid agencies, 
and monitor and evaluate their implementation. 
The AAIP is similar to the International Assistance Envelope 
System in Canada, under which all aid related agencies and 
the budget authority work together to determine priorities and 
annual budget proposals for all aid agencies within the budget 
envelope given by the Ministry of Finance (OECD 2009).
However, Korea’s AAIP does not function like Canada’s 
system since it is put into effect in several sequential steps by 
aid implementing agencies, the controlling agencies, and 
the Committee on International Development Cooperation. 
Moreover, the program has no binding effects on the Ministry 
of Finance since it is prepared only by aid-related agencies 
without an aid budget envelope. To enhance aid predictability 
and consistency with the Five-Year Plan, Korea should try to 
include in the AAIP at least an indicative aid amount for the 
next two years, as has been done by more than half the DAC 
member states in their annual budgets (OECD 2009). 
Country Partnership Strategies
For each priority aid recipient country, Korea is committed to 
prepare a Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) and update it 
every three years. Currently there are twenty-six priority 
countries. By the end of 2011, strategies for three countries 
had been completed, with half of the remaining scheduled for 
completion in 2012 and the other half in 2013. 
Preparation of the CPS is a great stride forward for recipients’ 
aid predictability and coordination among diverse Korean 
aid agencies. Before 2008, there were numerous cases of over-
lapping or conflicting aid programs or projects among numerous 
Korean aid agencies in each recipient country. There were also 
unbalanced or inequitable aid programs between recipient 
countries since each of the two major aid agencies (KOICA 
and EDCF) prepared their own country assistance strategy, 
and aid programs operated without any strategy documents 
for many recipient countries. Although there had been efforts 
to prepare a single assistance strategy paper for a particular 
recipient country before 2008, these simply combined KOICA 
and EDCF documents without a coherent assistance strategy 
or program, as pointed out by the 2008 OECD Special 
Review Report. 
Currently, the CPS documents are flawed in that they contain 
only strategy and lack any implementation program over a 
three-year period. Therefore, the documents do not provide as 
much aid predictability to stakeholders as they could. Nor do 
they provide any guidance for the preparation of the Annual Aid 
Implementation Program or annual budgets. Moreover, the CPS 
system does not solve the problem of aid coordination and coop-
eration among aid agencies, especially Korea’s numerous grant 
aid agencies, since the document does not discuss or include 
any implementation programs or projects at a recipient country 
level. Although the Five-Year Aid Plan provides a broad guide 
to the emphasis of EDCF’s loan aid programs (e.g. infrastruc-
ture, green growth, climatic change preparedness), no guidelines 
have yet been provided for the division of labor or specialization 
among more than thirty grant aid agencies. 
Selection of Recipients and Aid  
Allocation Criteria
The Special Review Report (OECD 2008) recommended that 
Korea should pay more attention to aid for the least developed 
(LDCs) and other low income developing countries (LICs), and 
should clarify the criteria for selecting recipient countries, al-
locating aid transparently among countries. To assess the prog-
ress made since the OECD report, it is useful to review Korea’s 
aid allocations by recipient’s income level, region, and sector. 
Aid Allocation by Income Level
One of the most critically reviewed issues by the OECD team 
in 2008 was Korea’s aid allocation by recipient’s income level. 
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The review criticized Korea’s allocation of grants and loans, 
which went against generally agreed upon international aid 
policies, such as poverty reduction or achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The criticism is 
summarized as follows, using the KOICA and EDCF aid 
only, which accounted for about 80 percent of total bilateral 
ODA during 2005-07. 
First, KOICA and EDCF allocated only 35 percent of 
total bilateral aid to the least developed (LDCs) and 
other low income countries (LICs), well below the DAC 
average of 44 percent. At the same time, the agencies 
allocated 56 percent of total bilateral aid to middle income 
countries (MICs). 
Second, while EDCF—the loan agency—allocated loans 
mostly to LDCs (63 percent; and including LICs 54 percent), 
KOICA—the grant agency—allocated grants mostly to lower 
middle income countries (LMICs 68 percent). In other words, 
Korea allocated grants to LMICs, which have relatively 
greater capacities to repay debts, but provided loans to LDCs 
and LICs, which generally have weaker capacities to service 
debts. Such aid allocation policies were not only inequitable, 
but also would jeopardize debt sustainability in LDCs and 
LICs, and would risk the achievement of the MDGs. Such aid 
allocation practices were indicative of Korea’s lack of a coherent 
or integrated aid framework and policies at a national level. 
However, during the period 2008-10, Korea has shown 
starkly clear changes in aid allocation practices, reflecting the 
OECD’s recommendations. First, of the total bilateral aid by 
KOICA and EDCF, aid to LDCs and LICs increased from 35 
percent during 2005-07 to 43 percent during 2008-10, which 
is nearly the same level as the DAC average. Aid to MICs 
decreased from 56 percent to 49 percent, with aid to LMICs 
in particular seeing a drop. Second, of the total KOICA and 
EDCF aid given to LDCs, the share of loans decreased from 
63 percent to 45 percent, and the share of grants rose from 
37 percent to 55 percent, a change that likely contributed to 
poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs. Such 
changes are due to policy shifts by the KOICA and EDCF, as well 
as coordination efforts made by the Prime Minister’s office and 
the Committee on International Development Cooperation. 
Aid Allocation by Region
During 2005-07, the bilateral ODA by KOICA and EDCF 
focused on Asia by allocating 35 percent of total aid. The 
OECD’s Special Review Report (2008) called the practice 
understandable, which is to be expected since the DAC 
recommended a focus and concentration in aid allocations. 
During 2008-10, the bilateral ODA by KOICA and EDCF 
allocated 55 percent of aid to Asia. KOICA’s aid to Asia 
(47 percent) almost attained the Mid-term ODA Plan (2008-10) 
goal for grant aid of 50 percent. 
Korea also increased its aid to high-poverty-rate Africa, from 
13 percent to 15 percent of total bilateral aid. KOICA’s aid 
(17 percent) almost attained the grant aid goal of 20% set in 
the Mid-term ODA Plan. Korea’s aid to Africa was expected 
to increase sharply since the country announced its Initiative 
for Africa Development in 2006 with the aim of tripling aid 
to that continent by 2008. Although the goal was not quite 
attained, aid to Africa nearly doubled from a total of $154 
million to $278 million during the two periods compared.
table 1 Korea and DAC: Aid Allocation by Recipients’ Income Level, 2005-07 (net ODA)
Countries
Korean ODA Average (2005-2007) DAC average  
(2005-2007)
KOICA (grant) EDCF (loan) Total
$ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) %
Least  
Developed
39 17.2 65 39.3 103 26.6 28,962 27.1
37 63 100
Other Low 
Income
25 11.1 9 5.4 34 8.7 17,543 16.4
74 26 100
Lower Middle 
Income
127 56.5 59 35.7 186 47.7 31,903 30
68 32 100
Upper Middle 
Income
5 2.2 26 15.8 31 8.0 4,220 4
16 84 100
Unallocated 29 13.0 6 3.8 36 9.1 24,091 22.5
Total 225 100.0 165.0 100.0 390 100.0 106,680 100.0
50 - KOREA’S ECONOMY 2012      
The OECD Special Review Report recommended that 
Korea give adequate consideration to the aid policies and 
practices of other numerous and active donors in Africa and to 
the relatively high income level and low poverty rates in 
Latin America. In fact, Korean aid to Latin America increased 
from 6.5 percent to 10 percent of total bilateral aid during 
the two periods compared. However, KOICA provided only 
11 percent of its total aid to Latin America, which is much 
lower than the goal for grant aid to the region (15 percent) set 
in the Mid-term ODA Plan. This means that the increase in 
aid to Latin America, the relatively high income region, was 
made mainly by EDCF loans and was consistent with the 
OECD recommendation. 
Korean aid in the Middle East did not meet its goals. KOICA 
and EDCF were tasked with providing $100 million each 
in grant and loan aid to Iraq under the Mid-term ODA Plan. 
However, the two agencies fell far short of this target.
Aid Allocation by Sector
The OECD Special Review Report (2008) recommended 
that Korea’s aid should focus on two-to-three sectors in each 
recipient country, taking into account the aid provided by other 
donors in the same country and the comparative advantage 
of Korean aid in those sectors. The special report pointed 
out that Korea tended to spread its relatively small amount 
of total aid too thinly across many countries and sectors.
However, during 2008-10, Korea’s aid allocation by sector 
failed to make progress. Korea offered aid to all countries and 
sectors covered by other DAC member states. For example, 
table 2 Korea and DAC: Aid Allocation by Recipients’ Income Level, 2008-10 (net ODA)
Countries
Korean ODA Average (2008-2010)* DAC average  
(2008-2010)*
KOICA EDCF Total
$ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) %
Least  
Developed
112 33.4 90 32.3 202 32.9 41,398 32.2
55 45 100
Other Low 
Income
54 16.2 8 2.8 62 10.1 13,753 10.7
87 13 100
Lower Middle 
Income
118 34.9 135 48.2 252 41.0 28,028 21.8
47 53 100
Upper Middle 
Income
6 1.7 42 15.0 48 7.7 7,832 6.1
12 88
Unallocated 47 13.9 5 1.7 51 8.3 37,646 29.2
Total 336 100.0 279 100.0 616 100.0 128,657 100.0
on the one hand, KOICA offered grant aid for seven sectors 
on average in each of some sixty ordinary partner countries 
and for the multi-sector at a rate much higher than the DAC 
average (18 percent versus 9 percent). On the other hand, it of-
fered no aid for the program sectors (sector or budget supports) 
and reduced humanitarian sector aid from 7 percent to 4 per-
cent, which is much smaller than the 8 percent DAC average. 
During 2008-10, social-administrative infrastructure sector aid 
made up 42 percent of total Korean ODA, which is somewhat 
higher than the DAC average (39 percent). However, during 
the same period, economic infrastructure sector aid made up 
32 percent of total Korean ODA, which is much higher than 
the DAC average (17 percent). These results may be due in 
part to the peculiar aid policies in Korea. EDCF loans, which 
share a greater part of total bilateral aid relative to other DAC 
member states, focus on economic infrastructure. However, KO-
ICA’s grant aid also covers economic infrastructure at 18 percent 
of its total. Likewise, EDCF’s loans also allocate a high share 
to social-administrative infrastructure at 40 percent of its total. 
Aid for economic infrastructure contributes more effectively 
to economic growth in a shorter period, while aid for social-
administrative services contributes to economic growth 
over a relatively longer period of time, but more effectively 
improves welfare of the poor in the short-run (Radelet et al 
2005). Therefore, loans may focus more on aid for economic 
infrastructure to generate funds to be used for repaying the 
loans in a shorter period, while grants may concentrate on 
aid for social-administrative infrastructure and services. 
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table 3 Korea and DAC: Aid Allocation by Region, 2005-07 (net ODA)
Region
Korean ODA Average (2005-2007)
DAC average  
(2005-2007)
KOICA EDCF Total
$ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) %
Africa
27 12.1 24 14.6 51 13.1 39,257 36.8
53 47 100
Asia
76 33.7 97 58.9 173 44.6 20,275 19
44 56 100
Latin 
America
21 9.1 11 7.0 32 8.2 6,885 6.5
66 34 100
Middle East
64 28.4 11 6.6 75 19.2 17,713 16.6
85 15 100
Oceania
1 0.3 - - 1 0.2 1,217 1.1
100.0 - 100 100
Europe
8 3.5 15 9.2 23 5.9 4,418 4.1
35 65 100
Unallocated 29 12.8 6 3.8 35 9.0 16,915 15.9
Total 225 100.0 165 100.0 390 100.0 106,680 100.0
table 4 Korea and DAC: Aid Allocation by Region, 2008-10 (net ODA)
Region
Korean ODA Average (2008-2010)
DAC average  
(2008-2010)
KOICA EDCF Total
$ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) %
Africa
59 17.4 34 12.2 93 15.0 46,971 36.5
63 37 100
Asia
157 46.6 183 65.4 339 55.1 26,437 20.5
46 54 100
Latin 
America
36 10.8 24 8.7 61 9.8 9,707 7.5
59 41 100
Middle East
19 5.8 5 1.9 25 4.0 13,263 10.3
23 77 100
Oceania
- - - - - - 1,704 1.3
Europe
19 5.6 28 10.1 47 7.7 5,608 4.5
40 60 100
Unallocated 47 13.8 5 1.7 51 8.3 24,967 19.4
Total 336 100.0 279 100.0 616 100.0 128,657 100.0
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By allocating their aid according to recipients’ income level, 
KOICA’s grants and EDCF’s loans made progress in improv-
ing their division of labor and specialization. Likewise, these 
aid agencies need to work more on allocating their aid by 
sector as well. In particular, the numerous aid agencies 
offering grants should develop a clear division of labor and 
specialization among themselves. The Committee on Interna-
tional Development Cooperation and MOFAT, the controlling 
and coordinating agencies for grant aid, should take up the 
challenge rigorously.
An Econometric Analysis of Aid  
Allocation Criteria
The OECD Special Review Report (2008) argued that 
Korea’s aid recipients were too numerous and that the criteria 
for selecting recipients and allocating aid were unclear. In 
2008, the number of recipients reached 129 countries, which 
were divided among three groups: priority, ordinary, and other 
recipients. The priority recipients included nineteen countries 
in the KOICA list and eleven countries in the EDCF list. How-
ever, seven priority countries were common to both lists, and 
therefore there were a total of twenty-three priority countries. 
Both the criteria for selecting those countries and the criteria 
for allocating aid to those three groups of countries were un-
clear. Although the Mid-term ODA Plan indicates that priority 
countries were those with Korean embassies, the list included 
some priority recipient countries without a Korean ambassador. 
The Basic Law of 2010 indicates that the priority countries 
are basically the LDCs, but there are many non-LDCs on the 
list. The difference between the ordinary and other recipients 
is also unclear. 
During the period 2008-10, there was little progress in 
reducing the number of recipients and clarifying the criteria 
for electing countries and allocating aid to them. However, 
few DAC member countries have clarified the country 
selection or aid distribution criteria (except perhaps the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation of the U.S.). Even when 
some member countries declared their policies or criteria, 
there were substantial gaps between the announced policies 
and actual practice (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Alesina and 
Weder 2002, Easterly and Pfutze 2008). 
Some recent empirical studies of the data during the 1990s (and 
through 2003) indicate that DAC members increasingly selected 
recipient countries and allocated aid to them in accordance with 
the aid objective of poverty reduction (Dollar and Levin 2004; 
table 5 Korea and DAC: Aid Allocation by Sector, 2005-07 (net bilateral ODA)
Sector
Korean ODA Average (2005-2007)
DAC average 
 (2005-2007)KOICA EDCF Total
$ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) %
Social- 
Administrative
Infrastructure
111 49.5 61 36.9 172 44.2 37,764 35.4
65 35 100
Economic 
Infrastructure
51 22.5 84 50.9 135 34.5 12,374 11.6
38 62 100
Production
11 4.7 12 7.1 22 5.7 5,654 5.3
50 50 100
Multi-sector
33 14.9 1 0.4 34 8.8 6,934 6.5
97 3 100
Program
- - - - - - 3,520 3.3
Humanitarian
16 6.9 - - 16 4.0 8,644 8.1
100 100
Others  
(debt service, 
adm., other)
3 1.5 8 4.6 11 2.8 31,790 29.8
27 73 100
Total 225 100.0 165 100.0 390 100.0 106,680 100.0
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Berthelemy and Ticher 2004; Claessens, et al 2007; Bandyo-
padhyay and Wall 2007). That is, DAC members increasingly 
allocated more aid to those developing countries with lower 
per-capita income, greater needs for human capital develop-
ment, sounder political and economic policies and institutions, 
and a larger number of poor people. However, the studies did 
not reveal consistent results, and the estimation models were 
fraught with defects or weaknesses. Therefore, this paper makes 
an empirical analysis, overcoming the defects of the past es-
timation models, and using data on 157 recipient countries 
and twenty-three donor countries during the period 2005-10 
(Annex 1). The analysis aims to confirm whether DAC 
member states, including Korea, provided ODA in a manner 
consistent with the optimum aid allocation model for poverty 
reduction (Collier and Dollar 2002). 
The generalized least square model with heteroskedasticity to 
estimate the aid allocation practice of DAC member states can 
be expressed as follows:
A
ijt
= a0+bi+ct+dj+fXijt+eijt (1)
A
ijt
 : bilateral ODA from each donor country (j) to each  
recipient country (i) over the sample period (t)
a0 : common intercept
bi : recipient country dummy, specific to each recipient  
but fixed over the period
ct : year dummy, common to all countries in the sample  
but varies over the period
d
j
 : donor country dummy, specific to each donor but  
fixed over the period
X
ijt
 : independent variables including all variables explaining  
recipient countries’ developmental needs and donor  
countries’ economic interests in offering aid to recipients 
(i.e., per capita income and its squared value, infant 
mortality rate and its squared value, index of civil rights/
participation rights, index of government effectiveness, 
size of population and its squared number, imports from 
the donor and its squared value, exports to the donor 
and its squared value, foreign direct investment from the 
donor and its squared value). 
Estimation of DAC Members’ Aid  
Allocation Criteria
The results of the analysis conducted for twenty-two DAC 
member states excluding Korea can be summarized as follows 
(Lee 2011). First, DAC member states did provide more aid to 
table 6 Korea and DAC: Aid Allocation by Sector, 2008-10 (net bilateral ODA)
Sector
Korean ODA Average (2008-2010)*
DAC average  
(2008-2010)*KOICA EDCF Total
$ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) %
Social- 
Administrative
Infrastructure
147 43.8 110 39.5 258 41.9 49,469 38.45
57 43 100
Economic 
Infrastructure
60 17.9 136 48.5 196 31.8 21,550 16.75
31 69 100
Production
30 9.1 27 9.5 57 9.3 9,135 7.1
53 47 100
Multi-sector
60 17.9 2 0.6 62 10.1 11,836 9.2
97 3 100
Program
- - - - - 5,403 4.2
Humanitarian
14 4.0 - - 14 2.2 10,679 8.3
100 100
Others  
(debt service, 
adm., other)
24 7.2 5 1.9 30 4.8 20,585 16
80 20 100
Total 336 100.0 279 100.0 616 100.0 128,657 100.0
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those countries with lower per-capita real income and a larger 
population. However, the aid level was in a negative relation-
ship with the civil rights and government effectiveness levels. 
Moreover, the need for human capital development, reflected 
in such measures as the infant mortality rate, was not seriously 
considered. Such practice contravenes the optimum aid al-
location model. On the other hand, DAC member states also 
seriously considered their own economic interests in actual 
aid allocation practice. More aid went to those countries that 
import more from and export more to the donor country, 
although investment in the aid recipient countries (FDI) did 
not show a relationship at a statistically significant level.
Estimation of Korea’s Aid Allocation Criteria
The same model was applied to the total aid by KOICA and 
EDCF during the periods 2005-07 and 2008-10, respectively, to 
ascertain any progress made toward the optimum aid allocation 
model for poverty reduction.
The results indicate that the total aid allocation by Korea 
made statistically significant progress toward the optimum aid 
allocation model between the two periods compared 
(Annex 2). During the Mid-term ODA plan period (2008-10), 
Korea provided more aid to countries with lower per-capita real 
income, higher infant mortality rates, and a larger number of 
the population. Moreover, more aid was provided to countries 
with higher levels of government effectiveness. However, 
total aid allocation by Korea during this period did not 
consider the civil rights level, which was well considered in 
the previous 2005-07 period. 
On the other hand, Korea’s total aid allocation in 2008-10 did 
not consider national interests, as was the case in the previous 
period. Imports from the recipient countries and exports to the 
recipients did not have any statistically significant influence on 
aid amount to recipients. This situation goes well for the 
modernization of Korea’s aid system. However, it contravenes 
the domestic mandates given to KOICA and EDCF, since 
their organic laws, as well as the Basic Law on International 
Development Cooperation, stipulate that they should pursue 
the economic development of recipient countries and “mutual 
exchanges and friendships” at the same time. 
On average, other DAC member states significantly follow 
their national mandates, which are often specified as their aid 
aim in either their laws or basic policy documents, such as 
“mutual benefits” (e.g. Netherlands), “national security” or 
“foreign policy objectives” (e.g. U.S.). These examples point 
to the difference between development assistance by the private 
sector (corporations, NGOs, philanthropic organizations, etc.) 
and official development assistance by governments and govern-
mental organizations. Korea should strive to strike a balance 
between the competing objectives of ODA, as other advanced 
DAC member governments have done.
Multilateral Aid Allocation
Korea maintained about 30 percent of its total ODA for multi- 
lateral aid, i.e., non-earmarked contributions to intergovernmental 
organizations, as other DAC member states did. While this 
share was only 17 percent in 2006; it rose sharply to about 30 
percent on average during 2007-10, although the share declined 
to 23 percent in 2010. Korea even joined the Multilateral 
Organizations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) with 
other DAC members in 2008. 
As in bilateral ODA, the most critical issue in multilateral aid 
for Korea is a lack of a coherent allocation mechanism. During 
2005-07, more than twenty government ministries, including 
the MOFAT, allocated aid to some eighty inter-governmental 
organizations. Korea has contemplated establishing a guideline 
for cooperating with international organizations, since minis-
tries and government agencies were aiding numerous interna-
tional organizations with overlapping small contributions and 
programs. However, the government has not yet developed any 
overarching and coherent strategy document to set priorities 
among competing objectives and international organizations. 
Conclusions and Future Challenges
This paper aims to assess the progress made in ODA manage-
ment by Korea since it expressed its interest in joining the DAC 
in 2008. Since the topic to be covered is so broad, this paper 
focuses on those issues and problems most critically reviewed 
by the OECD Special Review Report of 2008. They can be 
summarized as the scale and terms of aid, and a lack of a coher-
ent aid management framework and aid allocation criteria. 
Regarding the scale and terms of aid, Korea has made satisfac-
tory progress since 2008. While total government expenditure 
rose by 7 percent per year, total aid increased by 29 percent per 
year. Based on this trend, it is expected that Korea will most 
likely attain its promised net ODA goal of 0.25 percent of GNI 
by 2015 and terms of ODA commitments comparable to those 
of other DAC member states.
As to the need for a unified and coherent aid framework 
encompassing all aid agencies and programs, substantial 
progress has been made since 2008. The Basic Law on Inter- 
national Development Cooperation (2010) mandated that 
Korea formulate an integrated Five-Year Aid Plan and the 
Annual Aid Implementation Plan. The Committee on 
International Development Cooperation, led by the Prime 
Minister, was designated as the apex agency for delibera-
tion and coordination of all ODA related matters, and the 
MOFAT and MOSF assumed the responsibilities for 
monitoring, coordinating, and supporting all grant and loan 
aid agencies and programs, respectively. A new list of twenty-
six priority aid recipients, which is common to both grant and 
loan aid programs, was drawn up, and an integrated country 
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partnership strategy document was prepared for each of three 
priority recipients in consultation with all stakeholders. 
However, the documents contain only strategy; an integrated 
implementation program covering three-year aid activities 
of all grant and loan programs per country has yet to be 
prepared and included in each of the strategy document. 
Moreover, the linkage between this country partnership strategy 
document and the Annual Aid Implementation Program as 
well as the annual budget proposal should be established and 
strengthened over time.
Although clear policies and criteria for selecting aid recipient 
countries and allocating aid have not been announced 
yet, grant/loan coordination in allocating aid by recipient 
countries’ per capita income and region has substantially 
improved during the 2008-10 period. Contrary to the earlier 
period of 2005-07, grant aid tends to focus on the least 
developed or lower income countries, while loan aid focuses 
more on middle income countries. However, a coordination 
challenge still remains in allocating aid by country and sector. 
The challenge of clarifying the criteria for division of labor 
or specialization by sector at each recipient country 
level still remains between grant and loan aid agencies, in 
particular among more than thirty grant aid agencies. More- 
over, Korea still tries to spread a small amount of total aid too 
thinly across some 130 developing countries. The total 
number of recipient countries may not be easily reduced. 
However, the major aid agencies like KOICA and EDCF 
should concentrate mainly on delivering aid to priority 
and ordinary recipient countries, and aid for the rest of 
the countries should be relegated to other numerous public aid 
agencies and private sector aid agencies like corporations and 
NGOs. Even for the priority and ordinary recipient countries, 
a challenge remains in reflecting the “Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation” with other public aid 
agencies and the private sector organizations (OECD 2011).
To estimate the actual criteria for selecting recipient countries 
and allocating aid, an econometric analysis was conducted 
with an improved estimation model and the most recently 
available data. Although Korea’s aid allocation does not quite 
reach the level of other DAC member states, the country 
has made progress toward selective (or modernized) aid 
allocation. Since 2008, it has allocated more aid to countries 
with lower per-capita income, greater needs for human 
development, a larger number of poor people, and a more 
effective government. However, Korea has not taken into 
account policies and political institutions, such as the 
promotion of civil rights/participation, and national economic 
interests simultaneously.
The Five-Year Aid Plan (2011-15) emphasizes the need to 
tackle these remaining issues and challenges, but does not 
provide specific policies or programs. The Committee on 
International Development Cooperation and monitoring 
agencies, such as the MOFAT and MOSF, should show leader-
ship and work harder with other stakeholders to fill that void.
Lee Kye Woo is the Chair Professor of the Graduate School 
of International and Area Studies at Hankuk University of 
Foreign Studies.
1 Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” 
Journal of Economic Growth 5(1), 2000, pp.33-63.
2 Alesina, Alberto and Beatrice Weder, “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign 
Aid,” NBER WP 7108, 1999.
3 Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu and Howard J. Wall, “The Determinants of Aid in the Post-
Cold War Era,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 89(6), 2007, pp.533~547.
4 Berthelemy, Jean-Claude and Ariane Tichit, “Bilateral Donors Aid Allocation Decisions: 
A Three-dimensional Panel Analysis,” International Review of Economics and Finance 
13(3), 2004, pp.253~274.
5 Burnside, Craig and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” American Economic 
Review 90(4), September 2000, pp.847~868.
6 Claessens, Stijn, Danny Cassimon, and Bjorn Van Campenhout, “Empirical Evidence 
on the New International Aid Architecture,” IMF Working Paper, WP/07/277, 
Washington, D.C., 2007.
7 Collier, P. and D. Dollar, “Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction,” European Economic 
Review 46(8), 2002, pp.1475-1500.
8 Dollar, D. and V. Levin, “The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid: 1984-2002,” Policy 
Research Working Paper, No. 3299, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004.
9 Easterly, William and T. Pfutze, “Where Does Money Go? The Best and Worst  
Practices in Foreign Aid,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(2), 2008, pp.29-52.
10 Lee, Kye Woo, “Aid Allocation Policies and Practice: A Comparison between  
 Advanced Countries and Korea,” The KDI Journal of Economic Policy 33(4),  
 2011, pp.49-83 (in Korean).
11 OECD, Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, Paris, 2011.
12 OECD, Managing Aid, Paris, 2009.
13 OECD, Special Review of Korea, Paris, 2008.
14 OECD, The Accra Agenda for Action, Paris, 2008.
15 OECD, The Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness, Paris, 2005.
16 Radelet, Steven, Michael Clemens, and Rikhil Bhavnani, “Aid and Growth,”  
 Finance and Development 42(3), 2005.
17 Sohn, Hyuk Sang, “Policy Agenda for the Korean Aid beyond the Accession to  
 DAC,” International Development Cooperation Review 2(1), 2010, pp.33-49  
 (in Korean).
56 - KOREA’S ECONOMY 2012      
annex 1 Sources of Data
Variable Source URL
ODA- DAC member OECD http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=427326
ODA- Korea KOICA http://stat.koica.go.kr:8077/komis/jsptemp/ps/stat_index.jsp
GDP Deflator World Bank http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&DisplayAggregation=
N&SdmxSupported=Y&CNO=2&SET_BRANDING=YES
GDP per capita World Bank
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&DisplayAggregation=
N&SdmxSupported=Y&CNO=2&SET_BRANDING=YES
Infant Mortality World Bank
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&DisplayAggregation=
N&SdmxSupported=Y&CNO=2&SET_BRANDING=YES
Civil Liberty &  
Political Rights
Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/templatecfm?page=25&year=2010
Govt. Effectiveness World Bank
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&DisplayAggregation=
N&SdmxSupported=N&CNO=1181&SET_BRANDING=YES
Population World Bank
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&DisplayAggregation=
N&SdmxSupported=Y&CNO=2&SET_BRANDING=YES
Export to the Donor UNCTAD http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx
Import from the Donor UNCTAD http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx
FDI from the Donor OECD http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=427326
FDI from Korea Korea Eximbank http://odisis.koreaexim.go.kr/fv/fvweb/login.jsp
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annex 2 Korea and DAC: Regression Analysis of Aid Allocation (net bilateral ODA) 
Dependent Variable: Aid Amount  
($ in constant 2005 price)
DAC Members
(2005-09)
KOICA+EDCF
(2008-10)
KOICA+ EDCF
(2005-07)
Recipient Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Time Dummy Y Y Y
Donor Dummy Y Y Y
Common Intercept 57.81821* (18.80) 52.67486* (3.07) 2.683334 (0.88)
Real GDP per capita -1.812406* (-5.13) 0.027868* (-24.71) (dropped)
Real GDP per capita squared 0.0775636* (4.70) 1.29E-06* (34.96) -1.14E-06* (-52.96)
Infant Mortality -0.0593616 (-0.47) 0.2771697* (5.09) 0.0318128 (0.77)
Infant Mortality squared -0.001732* (-2.21) -0.002664* (-5.17) -0.000306 (-1.04)
Civil Liberty & Political Rights -0.490909* (-3.12) 0.0021943 (0.09) 0.2347748* (3.8)
Govt. Effectiveness -1.984915* (-2.89) 1.597834* (2.51) 0.0871865 (0.38)
Population 0.3969686* (2.89) 0.0011204* (31.25) (dropped)
Population squared -0.000157 (-1.79) -2.94E-10*(-30.71) 1.33E-12* (6.20)
Real Export to the Donor 4.32E-07*(2.45) 2.14E-07 (1.23) -3.71E-07 (-1.79)
Real Export to the Donor Squared -3.90E-15* (-5.20) 5.81E-15 (0.57) 1.03E-14 (0.43)
Real Import from the Donor 1.30E-06* (4.20) -3.54E-08 (-0.2) 4.62E-07 (1.85)
Real Import from the Donor wSquared 3.77E-14* (2.46) -1.28E-15 (-0.93) -3.55E-14 (-1.26)
Real FDI from the Donor 0.0015829 (1.88) 7.94E-07 (0.19) 9.70E-07 (0.35)
Real FDI from the Donor Squared -5.84E-09 (-0.03) -8.64E-13 (-0.24) 2.22E-12* (2.29)
No. of Observations 5,540 336 366
Overall Specification Test
Wald chi² (170)=30882
Prob>chi²=0
Wald chi²(124)=58859.21
Prob>chi²=0
Wald chi²(131)=6000.33
Prob>chi²=0
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KOREA’S ROLE AND THE ACHIEVEMENTS  
OF THE FOURTH HIGH LEVEL FORUM ON  
AID EFFECTIVENESS IN BUSAN
By Enna Park
Abstract
On 29 November 2011, over 3,000 participants gathered in the bustling city of Busan to seek a new consensus on 
aid and development. The Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) represents a turning point in global development 
by shifting the paradigm from aid to development effectiveness and forging a new global partnership for development. 
The promise of the Busan Partnership will be met when the political momentum and active participation by all 
development stakeholders continue. 
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Background
Three years ago, in March 2009, the decision was made in 
Paris that Korea would host the last High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness (HLF-4) with the unanimous support of all 
the members of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 
(WP-EFF). Korea’s hosting the global development event holds 
special meaning in the history of development cooperation. 
Despite the remarkable economic progress in emerging and 
developing countries, poverty remains a global challenge. 
In addition, recurring global crises such as climate change, food 
insecurity, and financial instability have posed a great threat to 
both developed and developing countries. 
The donor community has made significant efforts in terms 
of expanding the assistance to developing countries through 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and enhancing the 
quality of aid with a series of OECD-led high level forums on 
aid effectiveness starting in Rome in 2003. Yet, the results of 
development cooperation have been not fully satisfactory. 
With the target year of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) approaching in less than four years, the Busan 
Forum was uniquely positioned to take stock of progress and 
challenges in the past and to define new directions in develop-
ment cooperation. In this context, Korea, as an exemplary case 
of showcasing the power of effective aid, offered an inspiriting 
setting to discuss aid effectiveness and to look beyond the 
horizon of aid toward effective development cooperation.
Lessons Learned
Five years of implementing the Paris Declaration and a global 
reflection on the changing development landscape have left 
invaluable lessons, putting the Busan Forum in a different 
context from previous forums. 
As evidenced in the three-time monitoring surveys and 
independent evaluations, aid effectiveness matters for develop-
ment results. Yet, political will, especially from the donor, is 
critical to bring further progress. The call for moving from the 
process-oriented, technical talks to more focus on sustainable 
development results has been increasing throughout the years. 
At the same time, the global community needs to adapt to a 
series of changes in the global development landscape. 
While North-South cooperation remains the mainstream 
of development cooperation, developing countries are 
increasingly becoming vital sources of trade, investment, 
knowledge, and development cooperation. Moreover, NGOs, 
global programs, private funds and businesses are actively 
engaging in development, providing innovative thinking and 
approaches to development. The diversity of development 
players and the expansion of development resources beyond aid 
are reshaping the global development architecture. This means 
that the development agenda set and led by donor countries 
alone will no longer be relevant and effective. This change calls 
for more inclusive development partnership. 
In addition, as an Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) Chair previously noted, the global development com-
munity is now moving from “a transactional aid relationship” 
to a “transformational development relationship.” Aid is an 
important, but limited, resource for development. It is time to 
deepen the understanding of development in a broader context. 
As development is increasingly intertwined with other policy 
issues—such as trade, investment, the environment, security, 
etc.—promoting greater coherence among these policies is 
essential to producing better development results. 
Key Achievements in Busan
Against this backdrop, the Busan Forum marked a turning 
point in development cooperation by making an important step 
forward in several ways. 
Political discussion on aid and development 
The Busan Forum brought together the broadest range of 
stakeholders in development. Several heads of states, over 100 
ministers from 160 countries, 30 heads of international 
organizations, around 90 parliamentarians, 300 partners from 
civil society organizations, and more than 100 representatives 
from the private sector and academia attended the meeting. 
Most notably, there were high-profile political leaders in Busan 
including President Lee Myung-bak, President Paul Kagame of 
Rwanda, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, 
and OECD Secretary General Angél Gurrίa. 
The unprecedented high level of participation reflected the 
gravity of responsibility and enthusiasm for the work they 
are undertaking in Busan. All development actors represented 
in Busan were tasked with responding to the increasing call 
for more effectiveness, accountability and, most importantly, 
results of their efforts. 
truly Multi-stakeholder Partnership:  
Busan’s Contribution to MdG 8
Unlike previous forums, the Busan Forum was attended by a 
large number of diverse development actors beyond govern-
ments and international organizations. With Korea’s leadership, 
several multi-stakeholders events were organized including 
the Parliamentarian Forum, the Private Sector Forum, and the 
Youth Forum. Also, prior to the main event, the Civil Society 
Forum was organized with over 500 participants. 
The Busan Forum recognized these development actors as 
true partners in development and facilitated their substantive 
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contributions to the Busan agenda and the outcome document, 
contributing to realizing the MDG goal of global partnership 
for development. 
From aid to development Effectiveness 
It was well noted that there was much “unfinished business” in 
the aid effectiveness journey as only one of thirteen 
indicators of the Paris Declaration had been met. In response, 
the participants in Busan agreed to keep the promise on 
aid effectiveness by renewing core commitments including 
transparency, predictability, accountability and agreeing to 
monitor progress. 
However, deepening the aid effectiveness agenda would 
not suffice to promote sustainable growth and development, and 
to respond to the rapidly changing world. To make development 
happen and enhance the impact of cooperation, there is a need 
to take a broader approach to development. Some critics argued 
that Busan was facing the risk of being “a lowest-common 
denominator without bite or focus by becoming more general 
and inclusive” and diluting the level of commitment by donors. 
However, sticking to the previous aid effectiveness agenda 
would make Busan even less significant. 
To large extent, Korea’s vision for development effectiveness 
was largely based on its own development experience. And 
it was well supported by African countries through the Tunis 
Consensus. Aid should be used as a catalyst to leverage other 
development financing including trade, private investment, 
and domestic resources. By doing so, it can create the 
enabling environment to realize the country’s own potential 
for growth and development. 
oECd-Un Joint Partnership
Another initiative proposed by Korea was to forge more 
systematic cooperation among global development fora, calling 
for a synergic partnership between the OECD and the United 
Nations (UN) for the first time in the history of global devel-
opment cooperation. This proposal was well received by the 
participants and incorporated into the outcome document. 
Departing from the previous process led by donor countries, 
the Busan Forum demonstrated that developing countries can 
and should take the lead in setting the development agenda. 
The participants also recognized the role of the UN in enhanc-
ing effective development cooperation and invited the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) along with the 
OECD to work together in supporting the effective function-
ing of the Busan Partnership. Given the UN’s universal con-
vening power and the UNDP’s field presence in developing 
countries, inviting the UNDP as a core partner is expected 
to provide greater legitimacy and political clout to the 
new partnership. 
Issues and Breakthroughs 
The outcome document, Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation, was the result of an inclusive year-
long process of consultation with a broad range of governmental, 
civil society, and private actors in development. 
A small group of sherpas representing each constituency were 
responsible for negotiating the document. Like any other inter-
national negotiation processes, the Busan outcome document was 
finalized after a great deal of political nudge and compromise. 
Korea, as host country, played brokering roles and exerted dip-
lomatic leadership to bridge the gap of differences and bring key 
issues into the consensus. 
south-south Cooperation Providers 
The Busan Forum marked a significant progress in en-
gaging South-South cooperation partners by recognizing 
their complementary roles and creating a space for them 
under the principle of “common but differential commitments” 
and “voluntary participation” in the partnership. 
The outcome’s second paragraph clearly states, “The principles, 
commitments and actions agreed in the outcome document 
in Busan shall be the reference for South-South partners on a vol-
untary basis.” 
Arguably, the paragraph lessened the overall ambition of Busan 
commitments. However, it is neither legitimate nor realistic to 
apply the same standards to South-South Cooperation provid-
ers as traditional donors. South-South partners have a relatively 
short history of development cooperation as providers. Also, 
they remain developing countries and face poverty at home. As 
the Mexican sherpa articulately explained during the negotiation, 
the engagement of South-South cooperation partners should be 
approached with a progressive manner. The so-called “twin-
track” deal, thus, was an optimal option grounded on the careful 
political calibration of changing realities.
Korea’s Gender Initiative
Korea’s proposal to include gender equality in the Busan 
agenda was not enthusiastically received at the initial stage. How-
ever, Korea, in close cooperation with the United States, the UN 
Women, and the GENDERNET, successfully placed the issue 
high on the effectiveness agenda. 
The political support rendered by the UN Women and Secre-
tary of State Clinton was also instrumental to highlighting the 
significance of gender equality and women’s empowerment 
for development effectiveness. As a result, a special session 
on Gender Equality was organized as the main event of the 
Busan Forum and a Joint Action Plan for Gender Equality and 
Development was adopted. More than twenty countries and 
organizations rendered support to this voluntary action plan. 
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the role of Private sector
Another notable aspect of Busan was the active involvement 
of the private sector. For the first time, over 100 representa-
tives from the private sector participated in the Busan Forum 
as full members of the broader effectiveness partnership, 
including large and small firms from both developed and 
developing countries. 
Korea was among the leaders like the United States to 
advocate the role of private sector in development. A strong 
private sector and well-functioning market has been the key 
driver of poverty reduction, job creation, and sustainable 
growth in Korea. However, the private sector’s contribution 
should not be confined to funding only, but involve market-
driven technical input as well as training and capacity building. 
For this, a model where a profit objective meets with a develop-
ment objective should be adequately explored.
The notion that development and the emergence of new 
markets can benefit the business’s long-term profits was 
addressed in A Joint Statement on Expanding and Enhancing 
Public and Private Co-operation for Broad-based, Inclusive and 
Sustainable Growth at the Private Sector Forum. This statement 
was endorsed for the first time by both representatives from the 
public and the private sector in Busan. 
Effective Institutions 
Effective institutions are important to deliver develop-
ment results in a sustainable and holistic manner. This issue 
was broadly recognized at the Busan Forum where thirty 
organizations and countries endorsed a New Consensus on 
Effective Institutions. 
Strengthening effective institutions covers the issues beyond 
the existing work on the use of country system and procure-
ment, and addresses the importance of political economy of 
reform, capacity building, and institutional changes. 
Busan Follow-up 
The outcome document has left the details of the Busan 
Partnership to be determined after the Busan Forum. The 
mandate of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness has been 
extended to prepare for this transition period. Making 
maximum use of the existing group of sherpas who success-
fully negotiated the Busan outcome document, the members 
of the Working Party agreed to form a Post-Busan Interim 
Group (PBIG) to prepare detailed transition plans and 
lead consultative processes. The members of the PBIG have 
been extended from the existing sherpas to ensure a broader 
inclusiveness of stakeholders. After broad consultations, 
the final proposals of the working arrangements and the 
global monitoring framework of the Busan Partnership will 
be submitted to the last Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 
meeting in June for endorsement. 
Closing 
Busan represents the high aspirations of the global develop-
ment community for effective development cooperation. The 
impact of the new Global Partnership largely depends on 
support by all development stakeholders. In particular, the 
voluntary and proactive participation of emerging economies is 
essential to drive the new global partnership forward. Building 
trust through policy dialogues and knowledge sharing should 
be the starting point to work with the new partners. However 
daunting a task this may be, the Busan Forum demonstrated 
that with right spirit and strong political will, progress can be 
made. The Republic of Korea will remain fully committed to 
working closely with the global community to make the Busan 
spirit alive throughout the progressive transformation of the 
new global partnership. 
Enna Park is Director General for Development Cooperation 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea.
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KOREAN PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT DEVELOPMENT AID
By Kwon Yul and Park Sukyung
Abstract
Since joining the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009, Korea as a new donor has been actively 
carrying out reforms to improve its development aid system. This article provides recent trends of public opinion in 
Korea on issues of aid and development cooperation by presenting the survey results. It introduces the background of 
past opinion polls and presents public attitudes and perceptions in Korea on foreign aid. It identifies the level of public 
support, awareness, motives for aid giving, priorities in development aid, as well as the assessment of the contribution of Korea’s 
official development assistance (ODA). Finally, it examines how the Korean government could respond to challenges to 
improve the effectiveness of development cooperation and to convince its citizenry to pursue its ambitious aid policy. 
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Introduction
Korea’s history as an official donor country and an OECD 
DAC member is short, but this new donor country has been 
proactive in setting a foundation for development cooperation 
since it accession to the DAC in November 2009. Followed by 
the first ODA reform plan in November 2005, the Inter-
national Development Cooperation Act was enacted in early 
2010 and the ODA Advancement Plan was also prepared in 
October 2010. 
Despite the achievements and progress it made, Korea still 
has a long way to go in order to improve the quantity and 
quality of its aid. Korea pledged to the international develop-
ment community to expand its aid volume to achieve an ODA/
GNI ratio of 0.25 percent by 2015, which requires doubling 
of the current level of ODA budget. Besides this challenge, 
Korea has been facing several aid effectiveness issues such as 
fragmentation in aid implementation, a bifurcated aid delivery 
system and lack of coordination. 
As Korea is scheduled to have its first official DAC peer 
review in 2012, it would be timely and meaningful to review 
the achievements of and changes in Korea’s development 
cooperation for the past two years since its accession to 
DAC through the eyes of the Korean public. As the discussion 
on the reform of aid policy and management system is ongoing, 
Korea needs to closely monitor how the public’s perception of 
global development, poverty issues and international develop-
ment cooperation policies has been shaped. 
This paper reviews how Korean citizens perceive the relatively 
new issue of development cooperation and how the Korean 
government could pursue its policy objectives based on pub-
lic awareness and opinion. Particularly, it analyzes the level of 
public support, awareness, preference and participation about 
foreign aid in Korea to see how it has evolved over time and how 
it relates to Korea’s ODA policy and practice. Furthermore, we 
will also make comparisons with other countries’ public survey 
results where relevant to find out unique or common character-
istics of Korean public opinion in a broader context. 
Trends in Public Opinion on Development 
Aid in Korea
Background of surveys on development aid in Korea
Facing a downturn in the level of ODA spending after the Asian 
financial crisis in the late 1990s, public surveys on foreign aid 
in Korea began. The first survey was initiated by KOICA in 
1999 and MOFAT1 conducted another survey in 2002 for the 
targeted group of ‘opinion leaders’ who are more engaged in 
ODA policy, in addition to the general public. In 2003, Dong-A 
Daily, one of the major newspapers in Korea, launched a joint 
survey with KOICA. The earlier surveys were designed mainly 
for the purpose of public relations about ODA. The questions 
focused on the level of attention on ODA, and the awareness 
on Korean government’s ODA and its implementing agencies. 
As its ODA level began to increase noticeably from $423.3 
million in 2004 to $752.3 million in 2005, securing public 
support for the expansion of ODA was posited as one of the 
Korean government’s policy priorities. In this regard, the Korea 
Information Agency conducted a survey in 2005 and MOFAT 
also initiated surveys in 2008 and 2010 respectively. These 
surveys added questions closely related to decision-making 
issues such as opinions about the expansion of ODA volume, 
priority regions and sectors to provide assistance, and ODA’s 
contribution to poverty reduction or national interest. 
This section of the paper presents the result of the most recent 
public survey on development cooperation conducted in 2011 
by Gallup Korea on behalf of the Korea Institute for Inter- 
national Economic Policy (KIEP) through a face-to face survey 
involving 1,000 respondents. The detailed demographic char-
* Total number of respondents: 1,000 (100%)
* Gender | male (49.3%), female (50.7%)
* Age | 19-29 (18.9%), 30-39 (21.0%), 40-49 (21.9%),  
50-59 (18.4%), 60 and above (19.8%)
* Region | Seoul (21.2%), Busan (7.4%), Daegu (5.0%),  
Incheon (5.5%), Gwangju (2.7%), Daejeon (2.9%),  
Ulsan (2.1%), Gyunggi (22.7%), Gangwon (3.0%),  
Chungbuk (3.1%), Chungnam (4.1%), Jeonbuk (3.7%),  
Jeonnam (3.8%), Gyungbuk (5.4%), Geyungnam (6.4%),  
Jeju (1.0%)
* Occupation | self-employed (19.8%), blue collar  
(24.6%), white collar (26.1%), housewife (19.5%),  
students (6.5%), others (3.5%)
* Level of education | below primary school (6.3%),  
junior-high (9.0%), high school (38.7%), college/ 
university (43.5%), graduate school (2.4%)
* Level of monthly household income (KRW)| below  
1 million (2.9%), 1-2 million (14.0%), 2-3 million  
(26.9%), 3-4 million (28.0%), 4-5 million (12.4%),  
above 5 million (15.2%)
Box 1 Demographic Characteristics of KIEP Survey 2011
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acteristics of the respondents in this survey are summarized 
in Box 1. The composition of respondents by gender was 50 
percent each for male and female. The age group was divided 
into five categories of 19-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59 and above 
60 and the ratio in each group was set at approximately 20 
percent. In terms of region, the survey followed the 
administrative district of the country and the number of sample 
was proportionately distributed according to the regional 
population; Seoul and Gyunggi area had the largest number 
of respondents over 20 percent each and the rest of the 14 
regions had 1.0 to 7.4 percent of respondents depending on 
the size of the regional population.
The survey questions include various aspects of foreign 
aid such as motives for aid giving, level of support for aid, 
priorities in aid policy, effectiveness of aid as well as access 
to relevant information. It also reviewed the results of past 
surveys conducted in Korea as well as in other donor countries 
such as the EU2 to gain a more comprehensive understanding 
of the Korean public’s opinion on aid within various time series 
and country context.
Comparing the results with the previous surveys, three 
data sets are reviewed to compare the trend of public perceptions 
and attitudes toward foreign aid in Korea.3 Additionally, the 
survey results of other donor countries will be introduced 
to compare the similarities and differences vis-à-vis Korea 
despite limitations imposed on the direct comparison among 
donor countries due to variations in the design, methodology 
and the respondent sample of each survey limit.
The following section introduces the level of support and 
awareness of the Korean public in general. More specific 
table 1 Overview of Public Surveys on Foreign Aid in Korea
Korea Information Agency MOFAT MOFAT KIEP
Target group (age)
Sample size
Sampling method
 
Survey mode
Duration of survey
Number of questions
Sampling error
 
Survey agency
20+ years
1,000
proportional sampling
 
Telephone
2005.8
12
±3.1%p 
(95% C.L.)
TNS
19+ years
500
proportional sampling
 
Face to face
2008.8
25
±4.38%p 
(95% C.L.)
Gallup
20+ years
1,002
proportional stratified /
systematic sampling
Telephone
2010.10
12
±3.8%p 
(95% C.L.)
InfoMaster
20+ years
1,000
multi-stage stratified 
random sampling
Face to face
2011.15
22
±3.1%p 
(95% C.L.)
Gallup
MOFAT: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; KIEP: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy; C.L: Confidence Level;  
this table only list surveys conducted after 2005. 
responses to various policy related issues such as motivation 
of aid, volume of aid, priority regions and areas as well as the 
assessment of aid effectiveness will be presented in the next 
part of the paper with corresponding policy initiatives and 
changes in Korea.
Public support 
The Korean public appears highly supportive of ODA as 
more than 90 percent of respondents strongly acknowledged 
the importance of development aid. The support level 
increased by more than 30 percent compared to the 2005 
survey. This level of support in Korea is on par with the 
ones of other donors such as Sweden (93 percent), Denmark 
(92 percent), Ireland (92 percent) or EU (90 percent) 
according to the 2010 survey. Given that two thirds 
of (62.7 percent) of people in the 2011 survey still regard 
Korea as a developing country, it is interesting to know that 
the recognition of national status did not much affect the 
level of support for foreign aid.
While Koreans are largely supportive of development aid, 
survey results indicate that they tend to be less enthusias-
tic when it comes to scaling up the aid volume. Though 
Koreans are more generous than before regarding the level 
of aid, the majority still prefer to preserve the status quo. 
Such limited support for the expansion of the ODA budget 
despite the higher level of support for the principle of devel-
opment assistance could be best explained by the concerns 
over the current state of the economy, according to previous 
survey results. Particularly, among those who are opposed 
to the provision of aid, the majority (70.7 percent) of 
respondents were concerned with the country’s economic 
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situation and this is consistent with the 2005 survey result 
that showed two thirds of people think that “Korea is not 
rich enough to provide aid.” 
Public awareness 
Almost half of the Korean public is aware that the Korean 
government is providing aid. This ratio has been constantly 
increasing; from 37 percent in 2005 to about 50 percent in 
2008 and 2011. According to socio-demographic analysis, the 
younger generation in their 20s showed the lowest level of 
awareness. Similar to the case of support level, better-educated 
respondents knew more about the fact that Korea is providing 
aid to developing countries.
In terms of awareness of global development agenda items, 
such as MDGs (Millennium Development Goals), more 
than half (59.1 percent) have “never heard of” MDGs. 
The relatively low level of awareness of global agendas 
has remained largely unchanged in comparison with a 
previous survey in 2008. Interestingly, those who “have heard 
of it without knowing in detail” represent almost a third of 
the respondents. This group would be the priority target of 
table 2 Public Attitude Toward the Volume of Aid (as a %)
2008 2011 Change
Too big
Too small
Adequate
33.6
13.6
44.0
26.7
10.0
63.3
-6.9
+3.6
+19.3
Source: MOFAT (2008), KIEP (2011)
development education to boost the level of interest and 
awareness on foreign aid in the future. Analysis of the 
demographic determinants of public opinion shows that the 
younger generation in their 20s was, again, the least informed 
about MDGs.
There was correlation between the level of support and aware-
ness. Those who know better about MDGs tend to strongly 
support foreign aid. Out of those respondents who are well 
aware of MDGs, 42.6 percent “strongly support” and another 
54.1 percent “support” development aid. This group is more 
enthusiastic about the expansion of ODA budgets, as almost 
one third of the respondents think that Korea should increase 
its ODA above the committed level. This result confirms the 
previous research outcomes that no effective action is taken 
without sufficient prior awareness.4
Motives of aid Giving
The unique characteristic of Korea as a former-recipient- 
to-donor inevitably influences its motivation for aid giving. 
In 2011, 13.4 percent of people think that “Korea should give 
aid to give back what it had received from other countries” 
Figure 1 Level of Awareness on Korea’s ODA Provision
Know Don’t know
2005
2008
2011
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
51 49
51 49
37 63
Figure 1 Level of Awareness on Korea’s ODA Provision
Note: “know” includes both “know very well” and “know.” “Don’t know” includes both “have 
heard of it without knowing in detail” and “don’t know at all.”
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table 3 Correlation Between the Level of Awareness and Support (as a %)
Awareness about MDGs
Know very well
Heard about it without 
knowing in detail
Never heard of it
Support for  
foreign aid 
Strongly support
Support
Oppose
Strongly oppose
42.6
54.1
3.3
-
96.7 17.2
77.0
4.9
0.9
94.2 12.7
72.4
13.0
1.9
85.1
5.8 14.9
Current ODA volume
Too large
Too little
Adequate
19.7
11.5
68.9
21.6
10.6
67.8
30.5
9.5
60.1
Expansion of  
ODA volume
More commitment needed
Maintain commitment level
Don’t expand
Reduce the volume
29.5
54.1
9.8
6.6
17.8
58.0
12.9
10.9
15.4
54.7
16.8
12.7
Source: KIEP (2011)
Figure 2 Motives of Aid: Why Should Korea Give Aid to Developing Countries? (as a %)
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Figure 2 Motives of Aid: Why Should Korea Give Aid to Developing Countries? (as a %)
Source: KIEP (2011)
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according to the survey by KIEP. This tendency is also found 
in the 2008 survey, where the response ratio was higher, at 30 
percent. Among other donor countries, Poland shows similar 
survey results regarding motives for giving aid. Almost half 
of the people in Poland think that it is their turn to help poor 
people since they benefitted from foreign aid from affluent 
countries; the ratio for this response rose to 50 percent from 
33 percent in 2004.5 
Aside from this particular consideration for Korea’s past 
international status as an aid recipient, the Korean public seems 
to be driven more by humanitarian and egalitarian reasons. 
According to a 2011 survey, almost a third of the respon-
dents replied that Korea should give aid to “contribute to 
global peace and stability” (28.2 percent), followed by “moral 
responsibility as a global citizen” (25.2 percent). The percent-
age of those who defend the aid for reasons of economic and 
self-interest was relatively low, at 20.1 percent.
Looking at examples from other donor countries, a 2009 
EU survey shows that two out of three Europeans 
responded with reasons based on self-interest for giving aid 
(64 percent), namely to facilitate trade, to deter terrorism, to 
prevent migration and maintain positive political relations with 
developing countries. This tendency is particularly strong in 
Greece, France and Belgium.
The motive for giving aid also differs by age and level of 
education. Respondents over the age of 60 who have had 
direct experience as aid recipients in their lifetime tend to 
find the reasons of aid giving based on their personal events. 
A large number of better-educated respondents regard 
moral responsibility as the foremost reason for giving aid 
(41.8 percent) while a less-educated group tends to define 
Korea’s past experience as a recipient country as the primary 
motivational factor. 
The International Development Cooperation Act enacted 
in 2010 specifies the objectives of Korea’s ODA as follows: 
“to reduce poverty and enhance sustainable development in 
developing countries based on humanitarianism; to promote 
economic cooperation with partner countries and to pursue 
global peace and prosperity.”6 The debate over what the motive 
for foreign aid should be is not new and Korea is not the only 
country that has had difficulty answering the question. 
It is natural for Korea as a new donor to struggle to define 
its aid philosophy and ethics among contending norms and 
values. In Korea, what the objective of aid should be has been 
long debated. Should ODA proceed primarily for economic and 
humanitarian reasons, or should national interest play a part as 
well? Korea’s strong inclination to assimilate into the group 
of traditional donors who are often referred to as advanced 
donors by the Korean government strongly implies to what 
direction the country is headed.7 This sentiment is also emulated 
in Korea’s aid philosophy and the de jure principle of Korean 
aid leans towards international values. 
Priorities 
According to 2011 survey results, almost 40 percent of 
Korean people consider sub-Saharan Africa as the most 
important destination for Korean aid while attention to Asia 
also remained strong as a substantial percentage of respondents 
stated Southeast Asia (33.8 percent) and South Asia (14.9 
percent) as next in the list of priorities. The growing interest 
in Africa as a destination for ODA was also observed in the 
2005 survey; almost half of respondents indicate Africa as the 
priority region followed by Asia-Pacific (24.4 percent).8 
The share of Asian countries among Korea’s top ten recipients 
such as Vietnam, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Mongolia is 
notable, representing 65.2 percent of total bilateral aid. But 
the figure has tended to fluctuate wildly; it reached 72.6 per-
cent in 2001, down to 52.2 percent in 2008, decreased further 
to 38.5 percent in 2009, until soaring again in 2010. While 
maintaining a strong regional focus on Asia, Korea tries to 
balance its regional ODA allocation by providing more aid 
to Africa; the amount of aid going to the region more than 
tripled from $39.1 million in 2001 to $134.9 million in 2010. 
Sub-Saharan countries received most of the aid; top recipients 
in Africa include Tanzania ($21.46 million), Angola (18.83), 
Senegal (14.85) and Ethiopia (10.2) in 2010. 
The expansion of focus on Africa is partly reflected in some 
of the high-level initiatives such as President Lee Myung-bak’s 
recent visit to African countries (Ethiopia and DR Congo) in 
July 2011, and also the 2006 visit of the late President Roh 
Moo-hyun to Egypt, Nigeria and Algeria. During Roh’s visit to 
Africa, he announced the Initiative for Development in Africa 
and pledged to increase the ODA level for Africa by three-fold 
by 2008 and expand cooperation through sharing of develop-
ment knowledge and increasing the number of volunteers and 
medical teams to Africa. 
For priority sectors, the 2011 survey results show that the 
majority of Koreans think Korea can most effectively provide 
assistance in social and economic infrastructure and services 
such as health, education, transport or energy. Actually, Korea 
provided a total of $1,279.01 million in these sectors, which 
is 88.1 percent of total bilateral ODA in 2009. Beside these 
sectors, agricultural development was regarded as the 
potential sector that Korea can help out effectively: 24.5 
percent of respondents think Korea has a competitive edge in 
agricultural development and this reaction stands out among 
respondents in their 50s and 60s, with less education or 
lower income. 
By sector, social and economic infrastructure and services 
have traditionally received the largest portion amounting 
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to approximately 60 to 80 percentage of total bilateral ODA 
and it has increased significantly since 2007. Particularly, 
support in such sectors as education and government/civil 
society was outstanding in 2010 compared to previous years 
and this change has meant a doubling in the amount of aid 
disbursed to the social sectors. 
assessment on the Contribution of Korea’s oda
The attitude of the Korean public is mostly positive toward 
Korea’s ODA contributions: 79.4 percent think that 
“Korea’s ODA contributes to the economic development and 
poverty reduction in developing countries.” Those who are 
more supportive and aware of Korea’s experience as an aid 
recipient tend to be even more positive concerning Korea’s 
contribution to developing countries through aid. Attitudes 
on Korean ODA have grown even more positive since 2005, 
when slightly more than half of respondents thought that 
Korea’s ODA contributes toward tackling global issues. This 
ratio jumped significantly to 76.8 percent in 2008. 
Among skeptics of Korea’s contribution to developing 
countries are those who are concerned with problems 
prevalent in developing countries. “Weak aid management 
capacity” (28.4 percent) and “lack of self-help” (17.2 
percent) are the two main reasons when citing aid ineffective-
ness. Others pointed out some domestic issues such as “lack 
of specialization of aid agencies” (15.6 percent), “lack of 
transparency in aid management” (15.4 percent)’, “small aid 
volume” (13.6 percent), and an “inefficient aid system” (13.5 
percent). In the 2008 survey which asked the same questions, 
a third of the respondents were concerned about “corruption 
in developing countries” as well as “poor management of aid 
in developing countries” (22.4 percent).9 As survey questions 
and response options were not identical for the two surveys, 
it is hard to track down the trends of response over time. 
However, it is still worth noting that the Korean public recog-
nizes issues of developing countries as the main reasons that 
hamper aid effectiveness. 
The strong emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness of aid 
among the Korean public can also be observed in other 
aspects. The majority of the Korean public is most interested 
in whether the aid project has actually helped developing 
countries (56.4 percent) and if the aid budget was used 
efficiently (50.8 percent).10 About a third (36.9 percent) of 
respondents think that post-project follow-up and maintenance 
is important. The 2008 survey shows a similar tendency to 
focus on effectiveness and efficiency as the majority of 
respondents were interested whether aid was properly used 
by the government of the developing country (40.4 percent) 
and to what extent the aid project contributes to poverty 
reduction in the recipient country (33.4 percent). 
In terms of aid agency, Koreans demonstrate almost the same 
level of confidence toward government agencies and NGOs: 
68 percent of respondents said that NGOs are best placed to 
deliver effective aid and another 64.8 percent expected that 
aid through government agencies would be more effective.11 
An interesting difference according to the level of education 
appeared: the more educated the respondents are, the more they 
trusted NGOs than government agencies. Also, students and 
high-income groups also showed a high level of confidence 
with NGOs. 
Public Participation and Information
Slightly over two thirds of Koreans describe themselves 
as being in favor of helping developing countries, without 
being a volunteer or giving donations. The ratio of people who 
are actively engaged in activities, such as giving donations or 
volunteering, was 23%. Nine out of ten Koreans believe that 
it is important to help developing countries, however, the 
level of participation and involvement remains relatively low. 
Very few Koreans are opposed to development cooperation 
in general but one in ten Koreans seems to be indifferent to 
voluntary activities or donations as they simply mention that 
“they are not interested.” This result exhibits a discrepancy 
between the perceived importance of development coopera-
tion and actual participation. 
Socio-demographic analysis shows that high-income groups 
are more active in donations due to the natural reason of fi-
nancial affordability. However, the level of participation as 
volunteers is not necessarily related to income levels, as some 
lower-income level groups showed an even higher participation 
rate. Those who have visited developing countries appeared to 
be more willing to give donations (30.3 percent) or work as 
a volunteer (9.6 percent). It can be seen as evidence of direct 
learning experience about situations in developing countries af-
fecting the level of engagement to help developing countries. 
In terms of exposure to media coverage on foreign aid and 
Korea’s ODA activities, over half of respondents (52.4 
percent) acquired information through various media sources. 
However, a greater percentage of younger people in their 20s 
stated that they were not familiar with information on devel-
opment aid. This is consistent with the result that this group 
is the least aware of the fact that Korea received aid in the past. 
In addition, students, among other occupations, are the least 
acquainted with stories on foreign aid. 
Knowledge and information on development aid obtained from 
various media sources seem to increase the level of awareness: 
more informed groups showed higher levels of awareness on 
MDGs by nearly fourfold (9.5 percent)12 and on Korea’s pro-
vision of development aid by a factor of two (66.6 percent). In 
terms of support level, those who are familiar with information 
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on foreign aid tend to show a slightly higher level of support. 
They tend to recognize to a greater degree the importance of aid 
in helping developing countries and expressed a higher level 
of support for providing aid. In addition, informed respondents 
were more positive on their assessment of the level of con-
tribution of Korea’s ODA. However, the support level in terms 
of current ODA volume or expansion of future aid budget does 
not seem to reflect these trends.
Policy Challenges for Korea
Korea, as a new DAC member, pledged the international 
development community to expand its aid volume and has 
pursued various institutional arrangements to enhance the 
quality of its aid. For the Korean government to achieve its 
ambitious aid policy goals, one of the critical factors is to 
gain public support and to create a society-wide consensus 
on the need for better and more aid. Conducting surveys 
to gauge public opinion on development cooperation is one 
convenient way to assess the trend. Despite its relatively short 
history as a donor, the support for foreign aid in Korea is 
stronger now than in the past, as the survey results reveal. 
There definitely exists a positive environment to advance the 
Korean government’s ODA policy in the long term. 
table 4 Correlation Between the Exposure to Media and Level of Support/Awareness (as a %)
Exposure to media coverage on foreign aid
Yes No
Aware of MDGs
Know very well
Heard of it without  
knowing in detail
Never heard of it
9.5
38.7
51.8
2.3
30.5
67.2
Aware of Korea’s ODA
Know very well
Know it
Heard of it without  
knowing in detail
Never heard of it
7.6
59.0
66.6
3.6
31.2
34.8
27.2
6.1
35.8
29.5
Current ODA volume
Too large
Too little
Adequate
23.0
11.2
65.7
30.7
8.6
60.6
Contribution of  
Korea’s aid in  
developing countries
Contributing
Not contributing
83.8
16.2
74.5
25.5
Importance of helping 
developing countries
Very important
Fairly important
Not so important
Not important
32.0
61.9
93.9 26.1
61.5
87.6
5.9
0.2
6.1
11.8
0.6
12.4
Support for  
providing aid
Strongly support
Tend to support
Tend to not support
Not support
20.2
71.7
91.2 11.8
74.7
86.5
7.8
1.0
8.8
11.6
1.9
13.5
However, Korea still faces several challenges despite these 
advances. According to survey results, immediate improve-
ment is needed with respect to enhancing transparency of aid 
policy and dissemination of information on aid as well as 
post-completion management of aid projects. In terms of trans-
parency, the Korean government needs to pay attention to the 
fact that the general public is more interested in efficiency 
and effectiveness of aid policy and their implementation than 
before. It needs to regard the general public as one of the key 
stakeholders in development cooperation, as they pay taxes 
which fund aid programs in other part of the world. The 
nature of development aid, where the policies do not directly 
influence the well-being of its own citizens but rather 
anonymous people beyond its borders, there exists a large 
discrepancy between the opacity vis-à-vis the public and their 
concerns about global issues.13
Similarly, a large number of respondents pointed out the 
importance of post-completion management for aid projects, 
and strengthening feasibility studies and ex-ante evaluation. 
Focus on the substance and result-based management of 
aid projects has been growing as the Korean public has 
better access through media and press coverage to monitor the 
aid effectiveness. 
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In addition, other issues related to the aid system should not 
be ignored: (1) fragmentation of aid implementation bodies 
where more than a hundred government agencies take part in 
aid delivery based on their priorities has been pointed out as 
a major detriment to aid effectiveness and coherence; and 
(2) the lack of specialists who understand sectors, regions and 
situations in the field is a major hurdle Korea must overcome. 
Lastly, the Korean government could take a more systematic 
approach to enhance the level of awareness on aid and devel-
opment cooperation, particularly by forming target groups and 
strategies according to their stance on aid, age groups and per-
sonal background such as level of education. When the Korean 
public is well informed of issues related to development cooper-
ation, they are more likely to act or express their support for aid.
Conclusion
As a new DAC member, Korea has set ambitious aid policy 
goals and pursued various initiatives for providing more and 
better aid. One of the critical factors for the Korean govern-
ment in justifying its policy drives and investments is to gain 
public support and to form a broad social consensus. With the 
changes and reforms in its aid system to improve the quality of 
aid, the country has continuously striven to develop its ODA 
policy as well as to gain public support. In response to efforts to 
increase the volume of aid and to improve the aid system, public 
concerns about foreign aid policy have significantly increased 
as well. Public support towards the expansion of the ODA 
budget is essential to maintain the promise Korea made with 
the international community on increasing aid volume. 
Most DAC members conduct public opinion surveys periodi-
cally in order to analyze and assess the public’s perception 
and awareness of development assistance. This is because the 
majority of citizens are taxpayers who pay close attention to 
the effective spending of financial resources based on the 
appropriate aid policy. Moreover, survey results provide 
important background information to set up effective pub-
lic engagement and development education programs in the 
country, which positively influence the support and under-
standing of the donor’s foreign aid. 
Public opinion surveys prove to be meaningful with respect 
to recommending effective ODA policy agendas and directions 
to the Korean government. It also provides useful findings 
about important factors that affect the general public’s attitude 
towards development aid in Korea, such as the respondent’s 
Figure 3 The Most Urgent Policy Issues in Korea’s ODA
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Figure 3 The Most Urgent Policy Issues in Korea’s ODA
Source: KIEP (2011)
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socio-demographic profiles, personal experiences, perception 
of poverty, recognition of Korea’s national status (a developed 
or developing country), awareness of foreign aid projects, as 
well as experience of visiting developing countries. 
In conclusion, the Korean government must gain full 
understanding of public opinion towards foreign aid and 
implementation of its ODA policy in order to establish greater 
public support as a new and small donor. The public poll on 
development cooperation may be one useful way to see how 
Korea’s aid policy and practice are being accepted by its 
people. Despite its relatively short history as a donor, the 
support for development aid in Korea is stronger now as the 
survey results reveal. This is definitely a positive factor in 
advancing Korea’s ODA policy in the long term, and Korea 
needs to sustain the course.
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HOW KOREA CAN PUNCH ABOVE ITS WEIGHT  
ON DEVELOPMENT
By Lawrence MacDonald
Abstract
Korea has made an excellent start on becoming a global leader on development and poverty reduction, drawing on its 
remarkable experience in moving from destitution to affluence in a single generation. Korea’s leadership during the Seoul 
Summit in putting development on the G-20 agenda, in hosting the Busan high-level conference on aid effectiveness, and 
establishing the Global Green Growth Institute have attracted favorable international attention. But Korea’s development-
related policies lag far behind its rhetoric and other high-income countries. Korea can address these shortcomings by 
participating in international development organizations, improving development-related policies in areas where there is 
little domestic political resistance; and setting aside part of Korea’s modest aid budget as an aid innovation fund. None 
of these measures would require an increase in Korea’s foreign aid spending. They are smart, low-cost moves that build on 
Koreas’ tradition of punching above its weight in the global arena.
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The Republic of Korea has thrust itself onto the inter- 
national stage as a would-be leader on global development, 
achieving much in terms of international recognition. But 
Korea’s aid program and its policies towards developing 
countries often fall short, even of the relatively low standards 
set by the established donor countries. Korea can do much 
better, establishing itself as a true global leader, if it takes 
advantage of its status as a newcomer to champion promising 
new approaches, just as Korean firms became household names 
around the world by leapfrogging over analog technology to 
lead the way in the digital communications revolution. 
Korea has clearly signaled its ambition to be a leader on 
global development. Drawing on Korea’s unusual experience 
in making the transition from poverty to affluence in a 
single generation, the Korean government pushed to include 
development issues on the G-20 agenda when it hosted the 
2010 Seoul Summit, establishing an intergovernmental 
development working group that continues to operate, and 
launching a multi-year action plan. In 2011 Korea hosted the 
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, in Busan, 
drawing hundreds of aid experts and official government 
representatives from around the world.
Korea has supported the creation of the Seoul-based 
Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), a new international 
organization that provides advice on sustainable growth to 
developing countries. And Korea has joined the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Paris-based Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
Western-dominated aid donors club. 
Two men born in Korea are individually prominent in the 
international fight against poverty. UN General Secretary 
Ban Ki-moon frequently recalls the poverty of his 
childhood in Korea, when his family lacked electricity and 
he studied by kerosene light, in explaining his push to provide 
developing countries with sustainable energy for all. Jim Kim, 
an American medical anthropologist born in Korea, has 
recently been selected as the president of the World Bank. 
While Kim’s selection is not a reflection of a Korean 
government initiative, the two high level positions further 
emphasize Korea’s sudden new prominence in global 
development issues. 
For all this, however, South Korea is very much a new-
comer to global discussions on international development, 
and its aid program and non-aid policies towards developing 
countries rank at or near the bottom when compared to those of 
other high-income countries. This is not surprising, given that 
Korea has moved so quickly from being an aid recipient to 
an aid donor. Nonetheless, a frank recognition of Korea’s 
substantial shortcomings in this regard is crucial if these are to 
be overcome.
I am a great admirer of the Korean people and of the effective-
ness and resilience of Republic of Korea government institutions, 
having worked in Seoul as a reporter for AFP for two years in 
1987 and 1988, a period that included the stormy transition to 
democracy and the hosting of the Olympics. 
Although I had lived and worked in several Asian countries 
by the time I was posted to Seoul, I was deeply impressed 
by the determination of Koreans to excel internationally 
in fields as diverse as business, culture, and sports. I believe 
that Korea’s push to be a leader in development is part of 
this drive for excellence and international prestige, and that 
it can achieve similar success. By drawing on traits that have 
been a source of national strength for Korea—openness to 
innovation and an eagerness to learn from experience— 
Korea can become a true world leader in the global fight against 
poverty and inequality. First, however, it is necessary to 
recognize where Korea currently falls short. 
Korea’s aid budget, at approximately $1.3 billion per year 
in 2011, is small not only in absolute terms but also as a 
share of GDP. Of the twenty-two countries ranked in the 
Commitment to Development Index (CDI) published annually 
by the Center for Global Development (CGD), Korea ranked 
last for aid volume in 2010, giving just 0.09 percent of its GDP 
(by comparison, some European donors are close to the 0.7 
percent goal promoted by many development advocates). 
In 2010, more than half of Korea’s aid (51 percent) was tied, 
that is, recipient countries were required to use it to hire Ko-
rean firms or buy Korean products, a stipulation that reduces 
the effective purchasing power of aid since recipients are unable 
to seek out the best value for money; here again Korea ranks 
last of the twenty-two countries in the CDI. Korea also scores 
poorly on two other aid quality measures in the CDI: selectivity 
(it gives a lot of its aid to less-poor and worse-governed coun-
tries) and project proliferation (it funds a large number of small 
projects, raising transaction costs for recipients).
A more detailed measure of aid quality, CGD’s Quality of 
Official Development Assistance (QuODA), sheds further 
light on the Republic of Korea aid programs. QuODA measures 
aid quality across four dimensions: maximizing efficiency 
(rewards donors who channel aid to poor, well-governed 
countries, minimize administrative costs, support global public 
goods, and untie aid); fostering institutions (rewards donors who 
help to build the recipient government’s capacity); reducing 
burden (rewards coordination with other donors and penalizes 
large numbers of small projects); and transparency and 
learning (rewards donors for promptly releasing information and 
for encouraging recipient country evaluation and learning). 
A comparison of Korea’s performance on QuODA with that 
of Japan and the United States (see http://www.cgdev.org/ 
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section/topics/aid_effectiveness/quoda?p=i&d=20,21,19) 
shows that Japan scores better than Korea in all four dimensions. 
However, Korea scores better than the United States in three: 
maximizing efficiency, fostering institutions, and reducing 
burden. The United States does significantly better than 
Korea in one dimension: transparency and learning. 
Drilling deeper into QuODA, it’s possible to compare the 
scores of individual aid agencies (see http://www.cgdev.org/
section/topics/aid_effectiveness/quoda?p=ia&d=123,156). 
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) out- 
performs the Korea International Cooperation Agency 
(KOICA) in all four dimensions. KOICA and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) score 
about the same.
Korea’s aid score on the CDI and its rankings on QuODA 
provide a simple set of diagnostics, benchmarked against 
other donor countries, that can guide Korea’s efforts to improve 
its foreign assistance programs. Raising the amount of aid 
Korea provides need not be a priority. In fact, there is a lively 
debate within the development community about whether or 
not aid actually helps development. Instead, Korean policy-
makers should concentrate on improving aid quality, steps 
that would improve Korea’s ranking on the aid component of 
the CDI and on QuODA. Untying a larger share of Korea’s 
aid would be one important step; improving aid allocation, 
so that a large share goes to poor, well-governed countries 
is another. Allocating a larger share of Korea’s aid to activi-
ties that support global public goods, such as the fight against 
climate change, would help to improve Korea’s QuODA 
score for maximizing efficiency. 
But the single most important thing Korea can do is to lever-
age its small aid budget by becoming a champion of  innovation 
and learning. 
How? Korea should announce that it is setting aside a 
substantial share (say 20 percent) of its aid budget as an 
international “Aid Innovation Fund” that would be used 
to experiment with new approaches to foreign assistance. 
Innovations to be funded could be selected on a competi-
tive basis, and the results monitored and evaluated by an 
independent entity, with the costs of the evaluation and 
dissemination of the results also covered by the fund.
Such a fund would meet an important global need. There are 
many promising new proposals for improving aid delivery, but 
because existing funding is committed to ongoing projects and 
approaches, very few new ideas are systematically tested and 
evaluated. As a new donor, Korea is much less bound than other 
donors to traditional approaches, and has greater flexibility to 
experiment and share the results.
CGD’s proposal for Cash on Delivery (COD) aid is an example 
of one such innovation. Instead of the traditional approach of 
conditioning aid on specific policies, negotiated action plans, 
and the purchase of inputs (such as the purchase of textbooks 
or the construction of schools), funders would agree to pay for 
improvements in a specific area of progress, such as increases 
in the number of students who complete primary school and 
take a competency test. In theory, COD aid could be applied 
to any goal for which a verifiable incremental measure of 
progress can be identified and which is agreeable to a funder 
and recipient.
The ideas of COD aid have been under discussion for several 
years, and both donor and recipient countries have expressed 
interest and support. Pilot programs are now getting under-
way in Ethiopia and Tanzania. But launching the pilots has 
been a complex and time-consuming process, since available 
foreign assistance funds are typically committed several years 
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in advance. Funding an innovative idea thus requires with- 
drawing support from an existing program, a slow and 
difficult process even if the program is not performing as well 
as initially hoped. 
COD aid is but one of dozens of new approaches to aid and 
poverty reduction that should be tested and evaluated. What 
are the best techniques for increasing girls’ enrollment and 
middle-school graduation rates? What strategies work for 
reducing maternal and infant mortality? What programs are 
effective in getting kids vaccinated? What works for 
promoting small and medium-sized industries? How can 
young people who have been uprooted from their communities 
by war and civil unrest—including being forced to serve as 
child soldiers—be reintegrated into their communities when 
the fighting ends? 
Improved impact evaluation techniques, including random-
ized controlled trials (RCTs), make it possible to test new 
approaches to determine which work best in what settings. The 
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3IE), established 
in 2007 and currently based in India, serves as a funder and 
clearinghouse for such studies. The Abdul Lateef Jameel 
Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) is one of a handful of organiza-
tions that specializes in carrying out such studies and pro-
mulgating the results.
As a first step towards establishing its own aid innovation 
fund, Korea should become a member of the 3IE. This could 
be done by a variety of Korean government organizations, 
with KOICA as the most logical lead entity. By becoming 
a member, Korea would align itself—and have increased 
opportunities for interaction—with many of the most forward-
thinking and highly regarded funders of foreign assistance, 
groups such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the 
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the aid agencies 
for Australia, the UK, Norway, Sweden and the United States. 
A 3IE membership would give Korean officials and policy- 
makers an opportunity to learn more about approaches to 
impact evaluation and promising innovations that could be 
worthy of Korean funding.
One possible model for a Korean aid innovation fund 
could be USAID’s new Development Innovation Ventures 
(DIV) created in 2010 to fund new development initiatives 
with a strong emphasis on rigorous evaluation, learning and 
dissemination. It offers grants covering conceptual, pilot 
and scale-up phases. So far it has awarded twenty grants, 
including an inexpensive balloon tamponade to stop post- 
partum bleeding, a messaging campaign to reduce road 
accidents in Kenya, and grain storage bags to eliminate 
losses from insects and mold in Afghanistan. The office 
accepts applications on a rolling basis and applicants do not 
have to be from the United States. 
Looking beyond aid, Korea should seek ways to improve 
non-aid policies that affect poor people in developing 
countries. Here the non-aid components of the CDI can provide 
a valuable guide. Each of the six non-aid components of 
the index has multiple indicators. Some, such as restrictions 
on migration, may be politically very difficult to change. 
Others, such as regulations concerning foreign investment, 
may encounter little opposition and indeed be welcomed 
by key constituencies who recognize an opportunity to do well 
by doing good. A summary of Korea’s ranking on the CDI 
is available on the CGD Website.1 Highlights in the most 
recent CDI include:
trade: Korea has a score of 2.8, on a scale where 5 is the 
median, ranking 21st out of the 22 countries in the Index. 
Strengths include low agricultural subsidies (ranking 3rd). 
Weaknesses include high tariffs on agricultural commodities, 
and high barriers against textiles and apparel. As Korea moves 
increasingly into high-technology manufactured exports, these 
high tariffs on goods produced by developing countries could 
be gradually eased.
Environment: Korea scores 2.8 and ranks 22nd. Weaknesses 
include high tropical wood imports, low gas taxes, high car-
bon emissions per capita, and high fishing subsidies. Each of 
these is politically sensitive and thus likely to be difficult to 
change. Nonetheless, Korea has made green growth a national 
priority, one that would require addressing each of these policy 
areas. Raising gas taxes could be a good place to start, since it 
could either increase revenue or make it possible to cut taxes 
in other areas. 
security: Korea has a score of 1.7 and ranks 22nd. Strengths 
include no arms exports to poor and undemocratic governments 
(rank: 1). Weaknesses include small financial contributions to 
international peacekeeping operations, an area Korea might 
choose to address for other reasons, including the international 
prestige that can come from participating in such operations.
Investment: Rich-country investment in poorer countries can 
transfer technologies, upgrade management and create jobs. 
The CDI includes a checklist of policies that support healthy 
investment in developing countries. Korea does relatively well, 
with a score of 5.9 and a rank of 8. Strengths include providing 
insurance against political risk for both domestic and foreign 
firms; and not imposing restrictions on Korean pension fund 
investments in emerging markets 
Migration: The movement of people from poor to rich countries 
provides unskilled immigrants with jobs, income and know-
ledge. Korea scores well in its openness to foreign students 
from developing countries, ranking 2nd. But the small number 
of unskilled immigrants from developing countries is weighted 
more heavily and puts Korea at the bottom of the list.
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technology: The CDI captures a country’s contribution to the 
creation and dissemination of new technologies by measuring 
government support for R&D and penalizing strong intellectual 
property rights regimes that limit the dissemination of new 
technologies to poor countries. Korea does quite well on these 
measures, scoring 6.6 to earn a rank of 2nd, Korea’s highest 
rank on any of the seven CDI components, due in part to a large 
tax subsidy rate for business R&D.
This is a daunting list, a reminder of just how far Korea has 
to go to become a true champion of development. On the 
other hand, Korea’s overall average score of 3.1 on the CDI 
represents an increase of a full point compared to 2008, and 
Korea is only 0.6 points behind its traditional regional rival, 
Japan, which has been a developed country and aid donor for 
decades longer. 
Scores on the CDI tend to change slowly, since the underlying 
policies that they reflect are themselves slow to change. None-
theless, over time a country’s ranking does shift, and occasion-
ally a big policy change can lead to a large jump—or sudden 
back sliding. It would be entirely in keeping with the Republic 
of Korea’s tradition of exceptional achievement for the govern-
ment to decide that it wants to be the country that has made the 
most rapid progress on the CDI and to implement a few key 
reforms that move it out of last place, trumping Japan. 
A good first step to learning more—and providing comment 
on the design of the index itself—would be for Korea to join 
the CDI Consortium, a club of countries ranked in the CDI that 
meets annually to share ideas about how to improve the rich 
world’s support for development.
Would Korea join a club in which it is currently ranked at the 
bottom of the list? I would not be surprised, since this is very 
much in keeping with the Korean drive to learn and excel. 
My colleague David Roodman, the architect of the CDI, 
recalled in a blog post the reaction he received when 
presenting Korean officials with their country’s standing in the 
index, soon after Korea joined the OECD-DAC. 
In conclusion, Korea has made an excellent start on becoming 
a true global leader on development and poverty reduction, 
drawing on its remarkable experience in moving from desti-
tution to affluence in a single generation. Korea’s leadership 
during the Seoul Summit in putting development on the G-20 
agenda, in hosting the Busan high-level conference on aid ef-
fectiveness, and establishing the GGGI have attracted favor-
able international attention. 
But Korea’s own policies, in foreign assistance and in non- 
aid policies that impact development, lag far behind its 
rhetoric and even the relatively low standards of other high-
income countries. Fortunately, there are several steps that 
Before releasing the CDI last year my 
colleague Cindy Prieto and I visited the 
Korean embassy here in Washington to 
brief officials. We were impressed with their 
constructive attitude, which blended respect 
for the CDI and hope that Korea would 
improve as it took its place among donors. 
We congratulate South Korea on its new 
status and wish it the best as it accepts the 
attendant responsibilities.
1 http://www.cgdev.org/doc/CDI/2009/country_reports/South_Korea_2009.pdf.
Korea can take rather easily to begin to address these short-
comings. These include joining international entities such as 
the 3IE and the CDI Consortium; improving development-
related policies (and thus Korea’s CDI score) in areas where 
there is little domestic political resistance; and setting aside 
a percentage of Korea’s modest aid budget as an aid innova-
tion fund. Strikingly, none of these measures would require 
an increase in Korea’s foreign aid spending. Instead they are 
smart moves that are very much within the country’s tradition 
of punching above its weight in the global arena.
Lawrence MacDonald is Vice President for Communications 
and Policy Outreach at the Center for Global Development.
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FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA:  
DEVELOPMENT AND KOREA’S ROLE
By Park Young-Joon
Abstract
Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98, financial integration in Asia has been induced by collective intra-regional initiatives. 
It has manifested in various aspects, including gradual financial liberalization, increasing cross-border capital flows, establishing 
regional financial safety nets, and developing local currency bond markets. While financial deregulation and capital account 
liberalization has made progress, Asian countries have experienced sudden stops or sharp capital reversals due to external shocks 
and currency instability. The CMIM, a regional financial safety net, plays its role as a central platform for managing regional 
financial arrangements. In addition to its crisis resolution function, the CMIM can also be expanded by augmenting a crisis 
prevention function. Moreover, the ABMI and the ABFs were intended to achieve a more efficient recycling of Asian savings 
into investment in the region by developing regional bond markets. Gathering regional momentum, Korea’s role as an honest 
broker for further financial institutional integration is important especially in 2012 as a co-chair country of ASEAN+3. 
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The process of Asian financial integration has been induced 
by the coordinated regional initiatives of financial cooperation 
along with real economic integration through the intra-regional 
free trade agreements. Unlike in Europe, economic integration 
in Asia emerged with the need for creating regional financial 
self-help measures after the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98. 
Since then, financial integration has manifested in various 
aspects: gradual financial liberalization, increasing cross- 
border capital flows, establishing regional financial safety 
nets, and developing local currency bond markets. 
Asian economic regionalism has been driven by market-based 
forces, rather than by a grand blueprint of economic integra-
tion. In fact the Asian crisis triggered regional collective initia-
tives to promote financial integration in East Asia. The crisis 
revealed what Asia has been lagging behind in terms of its 
financial system and development compared with real sector 
integration. Poor performance in the financial sector was 
caused by several factors, such as: high risk vulnerability to 
external shocks, heavy dependence on bank financing, insuf-
ficient long-term credits and underdevelopment of regional 
bond markets, weakness of a financial surveillance mecha-
nism, and the lack of competition in financial sectors and 
premature capital markets. This process of regional financial 
integration has been supported by the rationale that it achieves 
better allocation of financial resources and better risk sharing, 
as well as ultimately promoting regional economic growth.
Intra-regional initiatives have started playing a significant 
role in fostering financial integration. Asian policymakers 
realized the absence of regional mechanisms which could 
have helped avoid the crisis and be used to prevent future 
crises. They also understood the intrinsic weakness of Asian 
financial systems and their poor development of both regional 
and domestic financial markets. As a result of extensive dia-
logue among ASEAN+31 countries, they were able to push 
forward several initiatives for regional cooperation as part of 
financial integration.
The subsequent sections focus on financial institutional in-
tegration in the region. East Asia’s initiatives in support of 
regional financial integration can be classified into four 
pillars: (1) the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and its multi- 
lateralization (CMIM) as a commitment to provide U.S. 
dollar liquidity support to member countries through currency 
swaps in response to urgent short-term liquidity shortages 
and balance of payment difficulties in crisis; (2) the es-
tablishment of the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research 
Office (AMRO) as an independent regional economic sur-
veillance mechanism; (3) new introduction of regional 
crisis prevention scheme; and (4) the Asian Bond Market 
Initiative (ABMI) and the Asian Bond Funds (ABFs) to 
develop local bond markets for recycling regional capital and 
to mitigate the double mismatch problem.
Extent of Financial Integration in East Asia
Existing literature points out Asian financial integration lags 
behind its trade and real-side economic integration. Asia’s 
intra-regional financial linkage is also weaker than the global 
link. This might be attributed to the lack of well-functioning 
regional financial institutions and underdevelopment of 
regional and domestic financial markets. Since the Asian 
currency crisis, financial market integration and cross-border 
financial transactions have begun to increase but do not yet 
reflect convergence for regional integration.
While East Asia has focused on real economic integration 
through regional trade agreements, the region has also begun 
working towards financial integration. The 1997-98 Asian 
crisis raised awareness on two points: (1) Asian countries need 
to strengthen their domestic financial sectors for managing 
the efficient absorption of capital inflows and the financial 
intermediation needs, and (2) the region needs to develop the 
institutional capacity to resolve cross-country contagion of 
common financial problems. 
Increasing the degree of financial deregulation and capital 
account liberalization since the 1990s has led to a significant 
rise in capital inflows towards emerging Asian economies. 
This surge in capital flows consists mainly of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows, portfolio investments, and short-term 
banking flows. Even though China is a dominant recipient 
of FDI inflow in Asia, the general pattern of FDI flows is 
relatively stable. However, portfolio investment flows and 
short-term banking flows are regarded as potential sources of 
systematic risk to Asian economies. In fact, Asian countries 
experienced the risk of sudden stops or sharp capital reversals 
due to external economic shocks, currency instability and the 
double mismatch problem. 
Recently the ADB warned that government authorities 
of emerging Asian economies should be ready to respond 
when volatile capital flows threaten to destabilize their 
financial markets. Surges in short-term capital inflows could 
potentially leave countries vulnerable to sudden reversals 
in portfolio investment and to currency instability. The huge 
investment from overseas has put significant pressure on 
the currencies of emerging economies. Recent surges in 
capital flows during a global financial crisis have been driven 
by portfolio equity flows, shown in Figure 1, as investors take 
advantage of earnings differential between emerging Asian 
markets and mature markets.
Financial integration implies an increase in capital flows and 
a convergence tendency for prices and returns on traded finan-
cial assets across countries. Since the 1980s, many East Asian 
countries have been gradually deregulating their financial 
markets, opening financial services to foreign investors, and 
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liberalizing capital accounts to improve the efficiency of their 
financial markets and attract foreign capital. Figure 2 depicts 
the recent trend of the cross-border portfolio investments of 
eight emerging Asian countries.2 Emerging Asia’s foreign port-
folio investments are increasingly being invested in the region, 
with intra-regional portfolio holdings rising from 17.8 percent 
of the region’s total foreign asset holdings in 2004 to 27.6 
percent in 2009. This implies a higher share of financial assets 
has been traded within the region and held by regional inves-
tors, which is evidence of ongoing financial integration in the 
regional financial market. In addition, the combined share of 
the United States and Europe in Asian emerging economies’ 
total foreign portfolio has declined from 47.3 percent in 2004 
to 36.9 percent in 2009. These patterns in emerging Asia’s port-
folio investments imply a higher degree of regional financial 
integration and cross-border openness.
Regional Financial Safety Nets
overview of CMI and CMIM
After experiencing the severe contagion of the financial crisis 
in the region, ASEAN+3 realized the need for a regional self-
help measure against the recurrence of a similar crisis in the 
future. The CMI was designed to address short-term liquidity 
difficulties as a network of bilateral swap arrangements and 
to supplement existing international financial arrangements. 
The CMI expanded the existing ASEAN Swap Arrangement 
(ASA), which was initially established by the five ASEAN 
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
and Thailand) in 1977. However, its size of $0.2 billion was 
insufficient to provide emergency liquidity in crisis. 
ASEAN+3 has extended ASA to the other five ASEAN 
members and the Plus Three countries by increasing its size 
to $1 billion. CMI was agreed to in May 2000 in Chiang Mai, 
Thailand, with the objective of establishing a network of 
bilateral swap arrangements to address short-term liquid-
ity difficulties in the region and to supplement existing in-
ternational financial arrangements. The ASEAN+3 finance 
ministers took the framework of the existing CMI and moved 
toward its multilateralization in May 2009, and the CMIM 
was finally made effective on March 24, 2010. The multilat-
eralized CMI provides emergency liquidity support from the 
total fund of $120 billion under a single agreement.3 Since 
the CMIM is financed in the form of promissory notes, there 
is no direct and immediate impact on the member country’s 
international reserves.
The CMIM represents a highly significant institutional develop-
ment for regional financial integration as it not only plays the 
role of financial safety nets in times of crisis, but also provides 
a central platform for managing regional financial arrange-
ments. In particular, it enhances ASEAN+3 inter-governmental 
dialogue for further financial cooperation in related areas by 
using CMIM governance, including financial surveillance and 
the development of local bond markets. Future progress on its 
institutional setup will also serve to facilitate financial integra-
tion in the region and contribute to the development of both 
regional and domestic financial markets.
CMIM and EsM
In early May 2010, the European sovereign debt crisis and 
its contagion in the region led European Union policymakers 
to approve three lending facilities for euro area member 
states in serious financial distress. The first facility is a 110 
billion euro support package for Greece, approved on May 
3rd and provided jointly with the IMF. The second facility is 
the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM)4 with 
60 billion euros. The third facility is the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF)5 with an amount of 440 billion euros, 
supplemented with a 250 billion euro IMF commitment. 
Comparing the CMIM with the European Stabilization 
Mechanism (ESM), which consists of the EFSM and EFSF, 
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the ESM is the facility to cope with difficulties caused by 
exceptional circumstances beyond the member state’s 
control such as its fiscal crisis. The ESM plays its role as a 
crisis resolution mechanism, much like the CMIM. However, 
while the purpose of the CMIM is to resolve short-term foreign 
exchange liquidity crisis by providing US dollars, the ESM 
aims to overcome a solvency crisis by providing euros. 
Accordingly, the CMIM conditionality requires no capital 
control, participation in the Economic Review and Policy 
Dialogue (ERPD), and maintenance of an appropriate level 
of international reserve, while the ESM conditionality focuses 
on fiscal and economic policies. In addition, CMIM supports 
short-term liquidity via currency swap arrangements, while 
EFSF is a special purpose vehicle (SPV) setup to make loans to 
euro area countries. 
new asEan+3 Economic surveillance Mechanism
In terms of regional macroeconomic and financial surveil-
lance, innovation was introduced within the CMIM frame-
work by establishing the new surveillance unit AMRO. Its 
mandate includes monitoring potential risk vulnerabilities and 
table 1 CMIM Contributions and Purchasing Multiple
Contributions
Purchasing Multiple Voting Power (%)
USD (Bil.) Share (%)
China 38.4
Exc. HK
34.2 32.0
28.5 0.5 25.43
HK 4.2 3.5 2.5 2.98
Japan 38.4 32.0 0.5 28.41
Korea 19.2 16.0 1.0 14.77
Plus Three 96.0 80.0 - 71.59
Indonesia 4.552 3.793 2.5 4.369
Thailand 4.552 3.793 2.5 4.369
Malaysia 4.552 3.793 2.5 4.369
Singapore 4.552 3.793 2.5 4.369
Philippines 4.552 3.793 2.5 4.369
Vietnam 1.00 0.833 5.0 1.847
Cambodia 0.12 0.100 5.0 1.222
Myanmar 0.06 0.050 5.0 1.179
Brunei 0.03 0.025 5.0 1.158
Lao PDR 0.03 0.025 5.0 1.158
ASEAN 24.0 20.00 - 28.41
Total 120.0 100.0 - 100.0
Source: The Joint Ministerial Statement of the 13th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting
keeping track of key macroeconomic and financial condition 
trends, as well as minimizing the moral hazard problem aris-
ing from the crisis resolution function of the CMIM through 
short-term liquidity support. It is also important to ensure that 
potential recipient members of ASEAN+3 maintain proper 
conditions to repay loans from the CMIM. Established in 
Singapore in April 2011 by ASEAN+3 countries, AMRO is 
expected to perform regional macroeconomic surveillance 
activities, supplementing the global surveillance activities 
through the IMF mission of Article IV consultations.
AMRO’s first director, a Chinese national, was appointed in 
May 2011 and leads the organization for one year of a three-
year term. After his tenure, a second director, a Japanese na-
tional, will serve the remaining two years. The first director 
was expected to represent China’s position and to focus on 
the IMF link. For example, China proposed that the CMIM’s 
IMF-delink portion increase to 30-40 percent of its funds from 
the current 20 percent.6 As AMRO becomes effectively opera-
tional, the level of the IMF-linked portion will be reduced.
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AMRO may not be a perfect substitute for the IMF, but 
its role in regional surveillance will complement the work 
being done by the IMF. As part of becoming a solid and 
well-functioning institution, AMRO is expected to introduce 
regional policy conditionality in support of the CMIM, 
contribute to a membership enlargement, and introduce crisis 
a prevention function in the region. 
Introducing regional Crisis Prevention Function
During the global financial crisis, capital flows have shown 
volatile behavior especially in emerging markets. However, 
despite their relatively sound economic fundamentals, Asian 
financial markets are vulnerable to external shocks due to 
increasing capital flows from and to the region. Therefore, it 
is natural to consider a regional crisis prevention function to 
serve as the first firewall against financial risks.7 
In order to design an effective crisis prevention program, 
the following key elements should be considered. First, a 
crisis prevention function needs to be equipped with ex-ante 
qualifications. In making the decision to provide liquidity, 
we need to evaluate a country’s economic status and the 
symptoms of the financial crisis, and to minimize potential 
moral hazard. However, if the ex-ante qualifications were 
excessively strict, it would lower the chances of using 
the crisis prevention facility (CPF), therefore making its 
effectiveness uncertain and eventually eliminating the 
demand. Considering the trade-off between reducing moral 
hazard and creating potential demand for the CPF, the regional 
CPF should strike a balance between ex-ante qualifications 
and ex-post conditionality. Second, once a swap-requesting 
country qualifies for the ex-ante conditions, its drawing rights 
should be guaranteed by an agreement. This automaticity 
of drawing is critical for the CPF to ensure its credible 
activation. Third, a regional surveillance unit should prop-
erly function to support the two elements mentioned above. 
To screen ex-ante qualifications and guarantee automaticity 
of drawing, a surveillance unit should provide appropriate 
analyses on regional economic conditions.
ASEAN+3 can consider a two-track operation of the 
current CMIM as a basic framework for the CPF. Its two-track 
mechanism can be operated as the crisis resolution and crisis 
prevention functions.8 That is, the crisis prevention function 
can be augmented to the current crisis resolution function of 
the CMIM. If this is the case, a country, showing symptoms 
of a financial crisis but qualifying ex-ante conditions, may 
request liquidity support and its drawing rights are 
granted for a designated period of time. According to de las 
Casas and Serra (2008), the use of IMF lending with the actual 
duration of six months or less was only for three cases out of 
290 programs between 1990 and 2006.9 In this regard, the 
six-month arrangement period of the regional CPF would be 
reasonable because the ASEAN+3 CPF is able to meet the 
corresponding demand for short-term precautionary lending. 
In designing the details of the ASEAN+3 CPF, members can 
refer to the IMF lending facilities for crisis prevention, such as 
flexible Credit Line, Precautionary and Liquidity Line, and the 
High-Access Precautionary Arrangements program under the 
Stand-By Arrangement. 
In addition, regional policy conditionality by the CMIM 
framework can be imposed with the aid of AMRO or 
ASEAN+3 ERPD. In order for this scheme to be effective 
some prerequisites should be satisfied. For example, the 
surveillance function will have to be enhanced first before 
reducing the IMF linked portion, and it might be difficult to 
ensure market credibility with a limited amount of resources 
and a lack of reserve pooling. 
Another important thing that ASEAN+3 CPF should consider 
is to characterize exit strategies from the crisis prevention 
function. If a country still requires additional liquidity 
support after exhausting the CPF’s arrangement period, the 
CPF-requesting country could be deemed to have structural 
economic problems, rather than showing crisis symptoms. 
If this is the case, the crisis prevention function can be 
switched to the CMIM’s crisis resolution track or be linked 
with the IMF lending facility. 
Institutional Integration in Asian  
Bond Markets
overview of aBMI and aBFs
After the Asian financial crisis, East Asian countries paid 
attention to reforming domestic financial markets and 
developing regional bond markets. It was widely acknowl-
edged that excessive financial dependence on the bank-based 
system in the region was a cause of the crisis in 1997. The ABMI 
was established in 2003 to develop the Asian bond markets 
under the ASEAN+3 framework, and became fully operational 
that same year. The ABMI aims to develop efficient and liquid 
local currency bond markets in Asia through recycling savings 
and international reserves of East Asian countries. It emphasizes 
the creation of regional bond markets where bonds are denomi-
nated in regional currencies. It was also expected to mitigate 
the chronic double-mismatch problem in East Asia: currency 
and maturity mismatch. In this regard, developing local cur-
rency bond markets constitutes another aspect of ASEAN+3 
financial integration.
The main reason behind the establishment of the ABMI and 
ABFs was the intention to achieve a more efficient recycling of 
Asian savings into investment in the region by developing local 
currency bond markets. The 1997-98 crisis was indeed made 
more severe by the absence of well-developed bond markets, 
which made Asian companies rely on bank loans and borrow 
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foreign ones. International reserves and savings in Asia have 
been largely invested in the U.S. and Europe, and they are then 
re-invested in Asia. It is known that about 80 percent of Asia’s 
portfolio investment tilts toward assets in the U.S. and Europe. 
As of March 2009, ASEAN+3 foreign reserves amount to 52 
percent of the total reserve in the world, but most of them are still 
invested in assets outside of East Asia.
As regional financial authorities realized such weakness in 
their domestic systems, they promoted regional initiatives of 
the ABMI and ABFs to develop local bond markets. In fact, 
the size of bond markets increased from about one-fifth of 
total financial intermediation in East Asian countries in 1995 
to approximately one-third in 2010. During the same period, 
the share of total outstanding local currency bonds issued in 
East Asia in relation to the world’s total increased from about 
2.5% to more than 8%.10 
After the ASEAN+3 endorsement of the ABMI, specific 
actions have been taken on particular issues of the initiative. 
In particular, bonds were issued in local currencies by multi- 
lateral development banks. For example, the ADB issued 
several local currency bonds; in 2004 the ADB undertook five 
market-opening transactions in the region’s local currency 
bonds in Malaysia, China, the Philippines, Thailand, and India. 
As well as issuing bonds, the ADB has launched a new and 
publicly accessible website, Asian Bonds Online, in 2004 to 
share information on regional markets, economies, and compa-
nies. It provides a wide range of information such as taxation, 
regulations, bond indices, credit ratings, settlement systems and 
secondary market trading.
While ASEAN+3 has been involved in developing local curren-
cy bond markets along with the ABMI, the Executive Meetings 
of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) launched the 
first Asian Bond Fund (ABF 1) with a capitalization of $1 billion 
in 2003. ABF 1 was mandated to invest in dollar-denominated 
sovereign bonds issued by eight EMEAP countries.11 Howev-
er, due to its small size, ABF 1 was expected to have little ef-
fect on the market for dollar-denominated sovereign bonds in 
East Asia. 
ABF 2, introduced in 2004 with a capital of $2 billion, was 
implemented to purchase local currency bonds from Asian 
countries. It consists of both a Pan-Asian Bond Index 
Fund (PAIF) and a Fund of Bond Funds (FoBF). PAIF is a 
single bond fund index investing in local currency sovereign 
bonds issued in eight EMEAP countries. FoBF has a two- 
layered investment structure in eight single-market funds, 
each of which invests in local currency bonds issued in their 
own markets. 
The ABMI and ABFs have helped the development of 
bond markets in East Asia and have reduced the currency 
and maturity mismatch problem. Accordingly, East Asian 
economies were able to withstand the global financial crisis 
showing relatively stronger resilience than the U.S. and 
Europe. A lot still remains to be done, however, to harmonize 
rules across the region, strengthen market infrastructure, 
overcome remaining market impediments, and tighten legal 
and regulatory frameworks. While Asian authorities need to 
promote their growth to attract more investment in the 
region, domestic reforms and regional cooperation initiatives 
are especially needed to improve accounting standards, mar-
ket infrastructure, and legal systems.
Credit Guarantee Investment Facility
To develop local currency bond markets in Asia, it is essen-
tial to facilitate issuers’ access to Asian bond markets. This 
might require guaranteed credit ratings for local currency bond 
investments. Moreover, local capital in Asia is required to 
be invested in medium- and long-term infrastructure projects 
that lead to Asian economic growth.12 Therefore, Asia needs 
to use a large amount of savings and international reserves 
to fill the financial gaps and to overcome constraints in local 
currency financing due to the lack of investor’s confidence in 
Asian bond markets. 
Strengthening and deepening local currency bond markets can 
develop domestic financial markets and ultimately enhance 
regional financial integration and economic growth. Based 
upon this rationale, in 2008 ASEAN+3 agreed to establish 
a Credit Guarantee and Investment Mechanism (CGIM), 
renamed as Credit Guarantee Investment Facility (CGIF) 
in 2009, to provide credit guarantees to local currency bonds 
issued in the region and to enable them to raise medium-and 
long-term financing instruments by improving the conditions 
for issuing bonds. It is expected to facilitate capital market 
development and to make the regional financial system less 
vulnerable to external shocks. The objective of CGIF is to 
support the issuance of local currency denominated bonds 
in Asia, so as to contribute to Asian economic development 
and prosperity through credit guarantee schemes. It is cur-
rently in the process of finalizing its operational policies and 
business plan, and is expected to start its operations before 
the end of 2012. The CGIF will be established as an ADB 
trust fund with an initial capital of $700 million.13 Major is-
sues regarding the establishment of CGIF, such as business 
scope, leverage ratio and country limit, were discussed at 
the ASEAN+3 Finance and Central Bank Deputies Meeting 
in May 2011.
The CGIF is expected to have the following effects. First, 
high-rated issuers can seek to lengthen the maturity of their 
debt issuance and lower-rated issuers can also issue bonds 
with the aid of the credit guarantee scheme. Second, member 
countries’ external borrowing costs can be reduced. Third, 
credit guarantees for local currency bonds would help re-
verse capital outflows and make the regional financial system 
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sound and resilient. Fourth, supports for infrastructure bonds 
can serve to provide regional public goods and ultimately lead 
to regional economic growth.14 In addition to credit guaran-
tees via the CGIF, some issues are currently part of ASEAN+3 
dialogue, including establishing a Regional Settlement 
Intermediary and Asian Bond Standards among others.
asian Bond Markets Forum
At the fourteenth ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers meeting in 
Hanoi in May 2011, ASEAN+3 welcomed the progress of 
the Asian Bond Markets Forum with the aim of standardizing 
market practices and harmonizing cross-border regulations of 
financial transactions. It is a common platform to foster stan-
dardization of market practices and harmonization of regula-
tions relating to cross-border bond transactions in the region. 
Since its onset, it has become an important forum for bond 
market experts from both public and private sectors in the 
region. There also has been progress in the technical working 
group on legal and regulatory feasibility assessment of the 
Regional Settlement Intermediary (RSI). Another possible 
development relates to the enhancement of domestic rating 
agencies through capacity building programs, as credit rating 
agencies of East Asian countries are often relatively small and 
tend to use non-comparable methodologies and benchmarks 
in their rating process, needing therefore some form of 
standardization and harmonization across the region.15 
Challenges of Financial Integration and  
Korea’s Role
To promote Asian financial integration, a key priority would 
be laid on regional financial cooperation. Earlier discussion 
on progress toward financial integration was assessed in terms 
of regional institutional measures. An even stronger degree of 
financial market integration is possible if significant efforts 
are made toward regional institutional integration. Since it is 
not easy to integrate cross-border markets and harmonize 
regulations in the region, regional institutional development 
is necessary to generate benefits from economic integration. 
The recent global financial crisis accelerated ASEAN+3 
financial cooperation. With this momentum, Korea’s role 
for further regional institutional integration is important, 
especially in 2012 as a co-chair country of the ASEAN+3 
framework. In fact, Korea has been deeply involved in 
regional financial cooperation and also shown strong lead-
ership in initiating detailed proposals and cooperative ac-
tions. Many important issues are currently being discussed 
among ASEAN+3 members, including increasing the size of 
CMIM, increasing the IMF-delinked portion of CMIM, 
operational issues of AMRO and surveillance activities, 
members opening bank accounts of CMIM in the central 
bank, introducing new regional crisis prevention facility, 
various issues of Asian bond markets, and regional-global 
cooperation with the IMF among others. 
The ASEAN+3 ERPD aims to identify potential macro- 
economic and financial risks, prevent crises, monitor regional 
capital flows and currency markets, and enhance self-help 
support mechanisms in the region. While the ERPD was not 
sufficient for regional surveillance, a new surveillance unit, 
AMRO, is expected to play an important role towards region-
al financial integration. Even though the ERPD became an 
information exchange mechanism on economic conditions 
and policies, its non-interference principle was an impediment 
to make effective surveillance activities. In general, three 
components of economic surveillance are suggested: infor-
mation sharing, peer review/peer pressure, and due diligence. 
Currently ASEAN+3 surveillance is in transition from the 
information sharing stage to the next stage of a more rigorous 
scrutiny stage, which must involve due diligence in the future. 
The EU’s reform of financial supervisory institutions includes 
the Comply-or-Explain principle for policy recommendations 
which makes it a more binding peer review/peer pressure. In 
the long-run AMRO should focus on providing the regional 
equivalent of IMF multilateral surveillance by moving for-
ward to the effective peer review and pressure stage and due 
diligence. This would make AMRO a well-resourced profes-
sional surveillance unit, and introduce a more effective macro- 
prudential supervisory framework for financial supervision 
and integration.
Korea has taken the lead in dialogue within the ASEAN+3 
framework: for example, it proposed the ABMI in 2002. Korea 
is also expected to exhibit its intellectual leadership in the pro-
cess of establishing a regional crisis prevention mechanism. It 
is particularly important to introduce the regional CPF because, 
given the stigma from the IMF lending facilities, it would be 
politically difficult for any government in the region to seek 
an IMF program. Moreover, Korea’s efforts to coordinate 
member opinion on the current issues mentioned earlier will 
significantly contribute to the outcome of regional financial 
integration and to continuing its momentum in the future. 
In doing so, Korea’s role as the honest broker in the 
ASEAN+3 framework is emphasized. For example, the 
ASEAN+3 negotiation on CMIM contribution shares was 
a fierce diplomatic battle among member countries. In the 
process, Korea proposed the mediated settlement on the mem-
ber’s CMIM contribution shares that became the agreement’s 
final outcome. It also has an important role with regional 
decision-making between China and Japan. For instance, 
the selection process of the first director of AMRO was in-
deed a fierce diplomatic battle, especially between China and 
Japan. While Japan pioneered the institution’s development, 
selecting a Chinese national as the first director may imply 
that China takes the initiative in both establishing AMRO as an 
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international institution and setting up its tone and mandate for 
future institutional developments. In this regard, Korea’s role 
in regional cooperation is important for the development of 
financial integration.
An important factor with Asian financial integration is the fact 
that Asian emerging economies have experienced financial 
instability when domestic markets were opened to foreign 
participation. The global financial crisis affected Asian finan-
cial systems in various ways, including a massive decline in 
capital inflows, currency values and asset prices. Deepening 
regional financial integration will provide more benefits to 
the Asian economy through efficient allocation of financial 
resources and risk diversification. Therefore, ASEAN+3 
member countries have to keep their balance between the net 
benefits derived from financial integration, and the potential 
cost of risk vulnerability and crisis contagion in designing a 
regional financial institutional mechanism.
Dr. Park is assistant professor of Economics, College of Social 
Sciences at Ajou University.
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KOREA AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA:  
THE WAY FORWARD
By Françoise Nicolas
Abstract
It is now a well-established fact that intraregional trade has been expanding quite fast in East Asia in the absence of any 
institutional arrangements to that end. Korea has been a major beneficiary of this organization of the East Asian region. In the wake of 
the recent global financial crisis, however, a number of developments suggest that the region may be at a cross-road, and that 
substantial changes may be expected in the way the region is organized. As a traditional promoter of East Asian regionalism and 
as one of the best-integrated economies in the region, Korea provides an interesting case study. An analysis of Korea’s reactions 
to the recent changes suggests that the importance of vertically-integrated production networks is likely to be shrinking in parallel 
with a rising role of institutional arrangements. Although East Asian economic integration will keep its specificity, the de facto and 
de jure dimensions are likely to be increasingly mutually reinforcing, with Korea as a key player in both areas. 
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Introduction
It is now a well-established fact that intraregional trade has 
been expanding quite fast in East Asia (although this does 
not necessarily mean that the region is getting increasingly 
inward-oriented1) in the absence of any institutional arrange-
ments to that end. Dynamic intraregional trade accounts for 
the strong rate of economic growth in a number of countries 
in the region, with Korea as a case in point. In the wake of 
the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis in particular, the Korean 
economy managed to recover swiftly thanks to its exports to 
rapidly growing China. 
However, a widely-held consensus view claims that East Asia 
has been gradually shifting from a market-led (de facto) to 
an institution-based (de jure) form of regional economic 
integration. Since Korea was among the first economies to 
promote East Asian regional de jure integration through its 
active role in the East Asia Vision Group in particular, and 
since it is one of the best-integrated economies in the region, it 
provides an interesting case study. 
The objective of the paper is to examine the current state of 
play and the future prospects of regional economic integration 
in East Asia from a de facto as well as from a de jure perspec-
tive, focusing on the Korean case. The first section assesses 
Korea’s participation in the regional production networks 
as well as its contribution to the institution-based regional 
cooperative efforts. The second section starts by highlight-
ing several developments which are likely to deeply modify 
the economic environment in East Asia before analyzing their 
impacts on Korea’s regional strategy and on the future organi-
zation of the region as a whole. 
Korea’s Economic Integration in East Asia
Korea is Increasingly Integrated with East asia … 
As is the case with all other East Asian economies (with the 
notable exception of China), Korea has been trading more and 
more intensively with the rest of East Asia since the mid-1990s, 
leading to a sharp decline in the relative importance of its other 
traditional trading partners such as the U.S. and the EU. The 
combined shares of these two partners dropped from close to 
40 percent in 1990 to about 20 percent in 2010. In contrast, the 
share of Korea’s trade with East Asia rose from 33.5 percent to 
48.2 percent over the same period of time. Its exports to the rest 
of the region rose from 33.6 percent to 52 percent, while the 
share of its imports coming from the same partners rose from 
33.5 percent to 44.4 percent over the past twenty years. 
Within the East Asian region, the most dramatic changes are 
the increase in China’s share as an export destination as well 
as a source of imports, and the parallel drop in Japan’s share as 
an export market (but, interestingly, not as an import supplier). 
China is now well ahead of the U.S., Japan and the EU among 
Korea’s top trading partners (Figures 1 and 2).
Trade between China and Korea has been growing at an 
astoundingly average annual rate of close to 19 percent over 
the period 1993-2010, leading to deepening economic inter- 
dependence and the trend is still ongoing, with two-way trade 
between China and Korea crossing the $200 billion line in 
2011. As a result the share of Korea’s exports going to China 
more than doubled, rising from about 10 percent in 2000 to 
close to 25 percent in 2010, while the share of its imports from 
China doubled from 8 to 16.8 percent. Today China is Korea’s 
largest export destination (it has been the case since 2003, when 
China overtook the U.S.) and also its largest import supplier 
(ahead of Japan, since 2007). 
The dynamism in Sino-Korean trade has obviously to do with 
China’s stellar economic growth and hence with its rising im-
portance as a trade powerhouse and as an expanding market. 
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However, the calculation of Korea’s export bias with re-
spect to China2 suggests that exports to this country were 
exceptionally dynamic, at least until recently. Although still 
high, the indicator has been dropping lately after reaching 
a peak in 2005. This suggests that Korea’s exports to China 
are greater than expected but decreasingly so (Figure 3). On 
the import side, the bias indicator is much lower (although 
slightly rising) at about 1.40. These results reflect an asym-
metry in Sino-Koran trade, with greater than expected Kore-
an exports to China, while its imports are more or less in line 
with expectations.
Another way of gauging whether a trade relationship is 
greater than expected is to resort to a gravity equation. The 
estimation helps determine what can be seen as the “poten-
tial” trade between a given pair of countries. As a next step, 
comparing the fitted values with the actual values indicates 
whether there is still an untapped potential or not. The evolu-
tion highlighted earlier is confirmed by the results of a gravity 
equation estimated for Korea’s exports over the period ex-
tending until 2007.3 The estimation suggests that Korea tends 
to over-export to China, while the reverse is not true. These 
various elements suggest that the China-Korea trade relation 
is a major building block of intra-East Asian integration. 
Next to the two Northeast Asian partners, ASEAN countries 
(in particular Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam) have emerged 
as important trading partners. Today ASEAN is Korea’s second 
largest trading partner after China and ahead of Japan and the 
European Union. As in the case of China, the estimation of a 
gravity equation suggests that Korea’s exports to ASEAN are 
greater than expected with very little untapped potential. 
 … through regional Production networks … 
A detailed analysis of the structure of Korean exports to, and 
imports from, East Asia (in particular China) provides a clearer 
picture of the way the various economies are interlinked. 
Using the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification and 
following Gaulier et al. (2005)4 commodities are aggregated by 
stages of production and a distinction is made between i) primary 
goods [food and beverages, primary mainly for industry (111), 
primary industrial supplies (21), primary fuels and lubricants 
(31)], ii) intermediate goods [processed industrial supplies 
(22), processed fuels and lubricants (32), parts and components 
of capital goods excl. transport equipment (42) and of trans-
port equipment (53)] and iii) final goods [capital goods (41), 
and consumption goods: food and beverages (112 and 122), 
passenger motor cars (51), consumer goods (61, 62, 63)].
The bulk of Korea’s exports to China are intermediate 
goods (75 percent in 2010) and primarily for processing. Part 
of these intermediate products may be used to produce goods to 
be sold on the Chinese market, but this share is small. 
Most intermediate products are processed in China and 
exported to other countries as final products. While these 
intermediate goods were initially industrial supplies (22), 
overtime the share of parts and components (categories 42 
and 53) has risen substantially to account for about 35 percent. 
At the same time, the share of capital goods (41) has 
also tended to rise (to account for 25 percent of total Korean 
exports to China). In contrast, consumer goods only account 
for less than 3 percent of Korea’s exports to China.
Korea’s imports from China also had a large portion of 
intermediate goods, but the share of final goods (and in 
particular consumption goods with 12.1 percent) was larger 
than what is observed for Korea’s exports to China. As a result, 
Korea has a deficit in final goods trade with China and a surplus 
in intermediate goods.
Korea’s exports to ASEAN countries such as Malaysia or 
Vietnam in particular are also dominated by intermediate 
products—parts and components of capital goods (42), as 
well as processed industrial supplies (22).5 These exports are 
mainly semiconductors, TV screens, electronic goods, vehi-
cles, steel, chemicals, refined petroleum products, ships and 
machinery, while its imports from Southeast Asia are mainly 
oil and gas, coal, paper, rubber, wood products and garments.
All these observations suggest that Korea, China and a 
number of ASEAN countries belong to regional production 
networks. The existence of a strong correlation between 
Korea’s exports to China and China’s exports to the U.S. 
provides further evidence that Korea and China are parts of 
the same production chain. 
The tight interconnections between Korea and the rest of East 
Asia are also reflected in the active involvement of Korean 
firms in the region. Since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations in 1992, Korea’s FDI to China has grown dramati-
cally. Korea invested massively in China in the early-2000s, 
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making it one of the most important sources of FDI in China. 
However, according to the latest Mofcom statistics, Korea’s 
FDI in China peaked in 2005 (when it reached $5.17 billion, 
accounting for over 10 percent of total foreign inflows) and 
has been shrinking ever since to drop below 3 percent of total 
foreign inflows. Similarly, from Korea’s perspective, while 
China accounted for close to 40 percent of Korea’s total ODI 
outflows in 2003-2004, it  started declining in the follow-
ing years and accounted for merely 14 percent in 2011. In 
terms of stock, Korea lags behind Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, 
Singapore and the United States. These various observa-
tions suggest that Korea may be losing ground in the com-
petition with other economies in the region which are closely 
connected to China, namely Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Next to China, Southeast Asia accounts for a non-negligible 
destination of Korean outward direct investment and ASEAN 
as a whole ranks as the second largest investment destina-
tion (after the U.S.). Korean ODI flows to the region have 
been particularly dynamic over the past few years, making 
Korea ASEAN’s fourth largest investor. Most of Korea’s 
investments are in labor intensive and export-oriented indus-
tries like footwear, garments, electronic and electrical goods 
and chemicals.
… With Institutional arrangements Playing a  
Marginal role 
Interestingly Korea’s dynamic trade with a number of its 
neighbors cannot be accounted for by the existence of prefer-
ential arrangements. As explained, Korea’s trade is particular-
ly dynamic with China but the two partners have not engaged 
in any preferential arrangement. 
In contrast, Korea has an FTA with its second largest trading 
partner, namely ASEAN. However, the Korea-ASEAN FTA 
has only been in effect since 2007 for goods and 2009 for 
services and the sharp rise in bilateral trade predates the signing 
of the agreement and cannot thus be accounted for by the FTA. 
The logic underlying Korea’s FTA strategy is pragmatic. 
The country has chosen to negotiate FTAs with its major 
trading partners, be they neighbors or not. Today, Korea has 
FTAs in force with the EU, the U.S., Chile, the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), Peru, Singapore, ASEAN, 
and India. It has also been trying to reach an agreement with 
Japan for a number of years. Korea may thus be seen as a 
champion of bilateral agreements rather than a champion of 
regional trade agreements. 
So far, there has been a proliferation of FTAs in the region 
but no major attempt at creating a formal trade block. More 
progress may be observed in the financial area (with the 
establishment of the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000 followed 
by the multilateralization of the mechanism in 2011) while the 
opening of negotiations for the establishment of an East Asian 
Free Trade Area for instance is still to take place. 
Looking Ahead: Changing Conditions and 
Their Implications for Korea 
In the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC) a number of 
developments are likely to impact the economic environment 
in East Asia and change the conditions for regional economic 
integration and the way Korea interacts with its regional part-
ners, in particular China. The following section examines three 
such developments in turn: China’s shift in economic strategy, 
the full implementation of the economic partnership agree-
ment between China and Taiwan, and the new project of a 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 
Major Factors of Change
China’s Economic Strategy Shift 
In China, the GFC has led to the conclusion that the devel-
opment strategy followed so far was deeply flawed and that 
it was as a result necessary to reduce the economy’s vulner-
ability to external demand shocks and to move away from too 
exclusive a strategy of export-orientation by rebalancing 
growth, especially through the promotion of domestic 
consumption. Although the awareness of the need to enhance 
the expansion of domestic consumption is nothing new in 
China and although it had already inspired the eleventh 
Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), the much needed structural 
reform has become a more explicit objective of the recently 
issued twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015). As a result, 
the Chinese Government now seeks to deeply reform its 
economic strategy beyond the mere promotion of domestic 
consumption. The major objectives of the twelfth Five-Year 
Plan are first to rebalance the country’s growth strategy by 
moving away from exclusive export-orientation towards 
developing the domestic market, and secondly to move the 
economy up the value chain in the coming years so as to 
enhance its technological independence.6 
As a result of these strategy shifts in China, the existing form of 
cooperation and interconnections between China and the rest of 
East Asia is likely to be deeply modified. As explained by Shim 
(2011), East Asia’s division of labor in manufacturing is based 
on differences in technologies and the labor productivity of the 
various countries. This division of labor will change as China 
continues to develop technologies and improve productivity, 
and Korea and Japan try to gain a comparative advantage by 
developing new technologies and new products. 
Full Implementation of the ECFA between Taiwan and China
From Korea’s perspective, another major recent development 
with potentially important implications pertains to the coming 
into force of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agree-
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ment (ECFA) signed between mainland China and Taiwan in 
June 2010. The objective of the ECFA is to “normalize” trade 
across the straits, in particular by putting an end to the numer-
ous restrictions imposed by Taiwan so far on imports from the 
mainland. As the name indicates the agreement merely provides 
a framework that outlines the main content of the future FTA, 
before individual agreements are signed on specific issues. 
So far, tariffs were lowered for products covered in the Early 
Harvest Product list (EHP) with effect from January 1, 2011 
and they are scheduled to be fully eliminated on January 1, 
2013. Further follow-up talks are expected in the coming 
years. For the time being, the liberalization has been rather 
asymmetrical with higher commitment level on the part of 
mainland China. This agreement is no doubt of importance to 
Korea since Taiwan and Korea share a number of similarities 
in their specialization patterns and in particular in their export 
structures to China. The two countries are export competitors in 
China which is their largest export market. Although the agree-
ment is far from being complete, rising competition may be 
expected from Taiwan, with Taiwanese firms able to export on 
more favorable terms.
TPP Project 
Lastly, a recent initiative, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
is likely to bring about further changes in the way the region 
is economically organized. The TPP is a trade agreement 
currently under negotiation between nine countries in three 
continents, including Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam.8 
In late 2011 three additional countries—Japan, Canada and 
Mexico—announced their intention to join as well. The TPP 
aims to establish an ambitious high-quality trade agreement 
encompassing issues which are not often part of a FTA, such 
as intellectual property rights, government procurement, 
environmental protection regulations, labor issues as well as 
small and medium enterprises.9 
At this stage it remains to be seen whether this project will 
go ahead and whether it may sideline other competing 
schemes. From Korea’s perspective the importance of the 
TPP lies in its being designed to allow further members to 
join. As a result the TPP could very well become the core of a 
future grand Asia Pacific trade agreement. It may thus be 
perceived as a competitor to the Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) or the East Asian Free Trade 
Agreement (EAFTA).
Korea’s renewed Contribution to East asian Integration 
So far regional integration in East Asia has been primarily of 
the de facto kind rather than de jure because the need for trade 
liberalization was not perceived as very high (given the type 
of intraregional trade), but this form of integration seems to 
have reached its limits. China is seeking to develop its own 
market rather than being exclusively a production base. This 
poses a challenge for its trading partners which need to 
adjust their economic strategies accordingly but this may 
also require a change in the institutional setting with better 
structured regional trade liberalization. Korea has to face these 
two challenges. 
Korea’s Approach to China Revisited 
If China manages to reduce its dependence on the export 
manufacturing sector and increase its domestic consumption 
in line with the objectives of the twelfth Five-Year Plan, it 
will provide Korea with an opportunity for more stable growth 
based on China’s final demand. But this is only possible if 
Korea proves able to seize this opportunity. In the wake of 
the GFC, the share of intermediate goods in Korea’s exports 
has tended to decline slightly, while the share of capital goods 
(41) has increased. This may be indicative of Korea’s ability 
to also cater to Chinese needs as a market rather than exclu-
sively as an exporting engine but it may alternatively merely 
reflect that China’s major exportable goods have changed from 
simple and labor-intensive goods to more complicated and 
capital intensive goods. 
For the time being Korea may not be particularly well- 
positioned to take advantage of the Chinese market, compared 
to Taiwan. Already Korea’s apparent loss of competitive-
ness vis-à-vis Taiwan suggests that it is time for a rethink of 
Korea’s expansion strategy in China. The challenge for Korea 
is to find ways of taking advantage of the new conditions 
prevailing in China. As explained by Chung (2011), “South 
Korea should focus its investments in China’s domestic 
market and try to shift its processing trade with China to 
complex (or network) processing trade, which links the 
markets of South Korea, China, and third countries. It should 
also move away from simple manufacturing toward complex 
manufacturing, which offers a combination of manufactur-
ing and services. Moreover, South Korea needs to expand 
its business areas to include logistics, science and technology, 
medical science, education, and other services.”10 All this means 
that substantial domestic reform is needed if Korean firms 
are to make the best of the Chinese market, with a particularly 
important role played by tertiary activities. 
Korea’s Regional FTA Strategy 
In order to enhance the expansion of China, and East Asia as a 
whole, as a market, reducing tariffs on final goods is required. 
Pushing for an East Asia-wide FTA may thus be an appropriate 
step forward. The past few years have seen a renewed interest in 
the establishment of an East Asian FTA, involving ASEAN+3 
countries and possibly some other partners. In August 2009, 
ASEAN and its six major trading partners (China, Japan, South 
Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand) reasserted their 
commitment to establishing an East Asia Free Trade Agree-
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ment (EAFTA) and Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 
East Asia (CEPEA) within the next fifteen years. For the time 
being, opening such an ambitious negotiation still seems to 
be out of the question. However, the aforementioned develop-
ments may help give new momentum to the project. 
The establishment of a trilateral agreement between China, 
Japan and Korea or at least a bilateral agreement between 
Korea and China may contribute to pave the way to a broader 
East Asian FTA but also facilitate Korea’s penetration of the 
expanding Chinese market. Korea may thus emerge as an 
important contributor if not the major driver of further de jure 
economic integration in East Asia. 
In the wake of the GFC, Korea’s attitude toward a Korea-
China FTA has indeed changed and it is seriously considering 
pushing for such an FTA11 in order to move into the Chinese 
domestic market further, improve the trade structure, and 
establish a stable framework for economic cooperation. 
In October 2009, the Ministers of Trade of the two countries 
signed an agreement to increase bilateral economic cooperation, 
and Seoul began to consider serious talks with Beijing about 
negotiating a FTA.12 A major reason for the change in Seoul’s 
position is the need to respond to China’s FTA activism, as 
exemplified by the full entry into force of the China- 
ASEAN FTA (as of January 1st, 2010) and of the Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between China 
and Taiwan (as of January 1, 2011). As explained earlier, Korea 
is in direct competition with Taiwan on the Chinese market; 
with the ECFA likely to improve Taiwan’s competitiveness in 
the China market possibly at Korea’s expense, the case for a 
China-Korea FTA is made more compelling than ever. 
It is worth stressing at this stage that an FTA with China was 
so far not really deemed necessary because the level of tariffs 
imposed on intermediate goods (the most intensively traded 
goods) was quite low, at least much lower than on final goods, 
in particular consumption goods. Going ahead with tariff 
liberalization will thus facilitate the further expansion of 
bilateral trade and the diversification of such trade beyond 
intermediate goods. 
Next to this bilateral move, a potential trilateral FTA (in-
volving China, Japan, and South Korea) is also increasingly 
being envisaged. The three Northeast Asian countries agreed 
in October 2009 to examine the feasibility of a trilateral 
FTA, and committed in May 2010 to conduct a joint study 
on this issue.13 The feasibility study was completed by the 
end of 2011. On May 14, 2012, the three parties concluded 
the Fifth Trilateral Summit meeting in Beijing by signing 
the Trilateral Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and 
Protection of Investment, and agreed to launch negotiations 
for a three-way FTA by the end of the year. China’s deter-
mination to go ahead with this trilateral FTA has no doubt to 
do with Japan’s interest in joining the U.S.-sponsored TPP 
which involves a number of countries on both sides of the 
Pacific, with the exception of China. 
A trilateral agreement is widely believed to be instrumental 
in strengthening trilateral relations, hence contributing to the 
ongoing process of economic integration in East Asia, such as 
ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6. A CJK FTA would be regarded as a 
milestone in regional integration, fostering prosperity not only 
for the region but for the world as a whole. According to some 
estimates, a trilateral deal may be the most promising scenario 
in terms of gains, but as it is certainly not the easiest one to 
negotiate it is not the most likely. 
Whatever the means, Korea can be expected to play a key role 
and contribute to the deepening of economic integration at the 
East Asian level. 
Concluding Remarks 
Until recently, Korea has benefited enormously from China’s 
opening up strategy and this explains to a large extent the 
deepening of its integration with East Asia. Similarly, 
Korea has also benefited by moving part of its production 
capacities to China, also contributing to the tightening of 
regional production networks. Recent developments call for 
changes in this so far successful strategy. The challenge for Ko-
rea is to adjust its policy. 
Korea is probably illustrative of the possible changes in the 
way the whole of East Asia will be integrating in the coming 
years, with a shrinking importance of vertically-integrated 
production networks and a rising role of institutional arrange-
ments. The emergence of East Asia as a market rather than 
as a production base requires substantial changes in the 
specialization and trade patterns of the countries in the region 
but it also requires institutional adjustments, and in particular 
a broader liberalization move. Although East Asian economic 
integration will keep its specificity, the de facto and de jure 
dimensions are likely to be increasingly mutually reinforcing, 
with Korea as a key player in both areas. 
Françoise Nicolas is the Director of the Ifri Center for Asian 
Studies (Paris) and assistant professor, Paris-Est University 
(Marne-la Vallée).
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REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA: 
LESSONS FROM EUROPE  
 
By Kim Heungchong
Abstract
When considering East Asian integration there are valid reasons to examine the history of European integration. First of all, 
regional integration deserves careful consideration, as it can contribute to extricating economies from worldwide recession, 
while holding the promise of creating a bigger market and leading an economic recovery. Europe remains a model for regional 
integration in spite of revealed defects in the monetary integration mechanism. Second, the history of European integration 
tells us that creating blueprints and taking another step for regional integration even in the worst of situations is very important 
in making continued progress. Third, the European integration process provides ample examples of the roles players in the 
negotiation process have played for integration. These can provide good lessons for East Asian countries in a time of growing 
international tension and conflicts as well as difficulties in the integration process itself. The lessons from the European inte-
gration process can be grouped into the following categories: (1) the development of a regional identity; (2) a high degree of 
economic integration and maturity of consumption within the region; (3) the emergence of avowed Euro-federalists; (4) the 
intra-regional movement of people; (5) the development of an advanced blueprint or vision for regional integration; (6) the need 
for exposure to binding negotiation on regional issues; (7) the need to compensate those disadvantaged by integration; and (8) 
the need for a core group to drive the integration process.
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The world economy is still shrouded in a fog of uncertainty, 
even after governments of the major economies have conduct-
ed an unprecedented cooperative financial easing since 2008. 
The world economy has shown neither a conspicuous rebound, 
nor cleared out the many chronic problems in banking sectors, 
government budgets, and household sectors of the respective 
economies. Furthermore, the 2008 crisis seems to have devel-
oped into another recession just as sluggish growth of China, 
incipient recovery in the U.S., and the catastrophe in Europe 
plague the world economy.
In hard times, it may be absurd, or at least anachronistic, to argue 
for regional integration, as economic recession has always gone 
hand in hand with the emergence of chauvinistic nation-states and 
protectionism in trade. It would be even more out of point to argue 
that we need to think about European integration when Asians 
are earnestly drawing up a map for regional integration. Europe 
is now the center of the global economic crisis and many of the 
current difficulties in Europe are believed to be due to the system 
of European monetary integration, the euro-zone. The European 
case casts a fundamental doubt on regional integration.
Nevertheless, we have valid reasons to think things over re-
garding European integration. First of all, regional integration 
does still deserve careful consideration, as it can contribute to 
extricating economies from worldwide recession, while hold-
ing the promise of creating a bigger market and leading an 
economic recovery. Europe remains a model for regional inte-
gration in spite of revealed defects in the monetary integration 
mechanism. Second, the history of European integration tells 
us that creating blueprints and taking another step for regional 
integration even in the worst of situations is very important 
in making continued progress. Figuratively speaking, as the 
night is always darkest just before dawn, we need to prepare 
ourselves for another heyday instead of bracing for gloom 
and doom. Third, the European integration process provides 
ample examples of the roles players in the negotiation process 
have played for integration. These can provide good lessons 
for East Asian countries in a time of growing international 
tension and conflicts as well as difficulties in the integration 
process itself.
What kind of lessons can East Asia learn from the European 
integration process? Foremost, there is the intangible, creating 
a regional identity. East Asia has to continue its institutional 
efforts to form an East Asian identity. A person’s identity may 
be composed of different layers. We identify ourselves at the 
individual level through our families, friends, and the society 
to which we belong. Cities where we live are another larger 
category which we use to distinguish ourselves from other city 
dwellers. Nation-states and perhaps the global village would 
be the biggest categories with which we identify ourselves. 
The European integration process shows that the formation of 
a supranational layer, beyond the national level, is crucial for 
achieving peace and prosperity in the region. 
I am not sure whether East Asians think of themselves as East 
Asian or Asian. Creating regional perception ahead of visible 
regional integration achievements is the first step towards 
integration. This can provide a buffer for toning down the 
exhausting conflicts and disputes in East Asia, and negate 
chauvinistic behaviour which the political leaders are easily 
tempted to adopt. 
To achieve a formation of a firm East Asian identity, it is very 
important that East Asian countries carry out various programs 
and actions under the banner of the East Asian community, rath-
er than that of individual countries. People may perceive East 
Asia through a ‘regional’ scholarship program from which both 
the present and future generations may benefit. People may ap-
preciate East Asia for its contribution to building bridges, mu-
seums, concert halls, etc., in their hometowns. Disadvantaged 
people in the region would not be easily tempted to be chauvin-
istic if they benefit from development aid programs in the name 
of the East Asian community. Taking the initiative in regional 
integration would assuage the public’s irrational fear of market 
opening and globalization, if a regional identity is to form.
Second, East Asia should notice that there was a relatively high 
degree of economic integration in Europe even at the very first 
stage of integration in the 1950s. East Asia needs to emulate 
Europe in terms of trade and economic integration by encourag-
ing intra-industry trade and building an exchange rate mechanism, 
which seems to be a cliché, as it has been repeated so often. I 
believe, however, more emphasis has to be given to the fact that 
Europe was a community in terms of consumption as well as intra-
regional production. East Asia should move beyond the FTA and 
production network formation, and form a consumption network 
in order to raise its status as a self-sufficient economic entity. It 
may take time, but East Asian countries should concentrate on 
boosting their domestic consumption in spite of adversities within 
the region. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 reveal some striking facts on vulnerability 
of East Asian economies related to consumption. The first impor-
tant finding from the figures is that in spite of dizzying economic 
growth among Asian economies, the U.S. and the EU still domi-
nate other countries as the last destination of final goods. This is 
notably true if we compare the trends of China manifest in two 
figures: China has caught up with the U.S. in terms of interme-
diate goods trade, but never in the final goods market. China 
stood as the second biggest intermediate goods market, but was 
fourth as a final goods market. The second finding that we need 
to pay attention to is that the final goods market is more resilient 
to the economic shock than the intermediate goods market. Fig-
ure 2 shows milder V-shape than Figure 1 in the era of a global 
economic crisis. What the two findings tell us is, therefore, that 
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building intra-industry and intra-regional production networks 
is a major source of Asian countries’ economic miracle, and this 
production network is very vulnerable to external shock. To bor-
row the words of a certain politician; it’s the consumption, stupid, 
not the production!
To complete a consumption network in the region, a rise in 
consumption in the region is vital, but there are limitations for 
developing countries of the region in increasing their spending 
in the short-term. It could be true that the East Asian govern-
ments’ export-driven policy may lead to weakening domestic 
consumption, but it may be the result of widening income 
disparities in the region. Widening income disparity prevents 
consumption growth from keeping pace with income growth, 
and the gap between consumption and income has opened 
up as the income gap increased. Asia has become increasingly 
dependent on exports as a source of economic growth in the 
face of flagging consumption. 
Also, different consumption patterns between generations may 
weaken the region’s consumption as a whole, and the under-
developed financial industry could cause vulnerability among 
consumers in the region. Due to a very rapid change in the 
income level, the generational gap in consumption behavior 
varies much more among Asian countries than in other econo-
mies in the world. Let me explain this with an example. Korea 
reached $20,000 in per capita income in the mid-2000s, twenty 
years after most western European countries. Despite the simi-
lar level of income between contemporary Korea and Europe 
in the 1980s, older generations in Korea consume much less 
than their European counterparts in the 1980s, as they were 
much poorer than the previous European generation when they 
were young. Therefore, old frugal habits die hard. If rapid eco-
nomic growth is the reason for weak consumption, then East 
Asian countries need to develop a policy initiative to strengthen 
financial intermediation, and secure liquidity backed by assets 
in bilateral, regional or multilateral arenas. 
Moreover, we must remember that corruption in the region has 
negative impacts on vulnerable segments of the population. 
While these problems cannot all be resolved in a short period 
of time, East Asia must begin to strengthen its regional efforts 
to expand consumption. This is another lesson that East Asia 
should learn from the European integration process.
Third, we need to pay attention to the emergence of the 
“Europeans,” in the process of European integration. “Europe-
ans,” who, more or less, tend to be avowed Euro-federalists, 
have formed a strong and loyal base of support for the inte-
gration process. As is the case for Europe, how can we, then, 
train or nurture true “East Asians”? Before thinking about 
nurturing, however, we need to pay attention to the Asian 
diaspora living in Asia and other parts of the world. Over-
seas Chinese, minorities in East Asia, Korean-Japanese and 
etc. may not have properly been provided with supranational 
playgrounds or institutional set-up where they could contribute 
to the building of the East Asian community. It may be easier 
for them to accept the East Asian identity that I have just 
mentioned. East Asia needs to make efforts to provide a 
supranational frame to the people of the region for formation 
of multiple nationalities and identities. 
Fourth, after WWII, intra-regional movement of people in 
Europe substantially increased, and this trend has been 
strengthened afterwards. In the case of ASEAN+3, the de-
gree of labor mobility in the region is far lower than that of 
Europe. More importantly, labor mobility, once showing 
steady increase, has stagnated over fifteen years. It is important 
to encourage intra-regional labor mobility through employment 
in foreign countries, but that is not the whole story. Short-term 
visits, study abroad, tours and other types of intra-regional 
movement of people can contribute to making a firm base for 
regional integration. 
Fifth, creating an advanced blueprint or vision report for region-
al integration in East Asia would prove decisive for the entire 
process. The Werner report has influenced the thinking of a lot 
people concerning the integration process, and subsequently, 
Figure 2 Import of Final Goods in  Several Economies
Figure 2 Import of Final Goods in Several Economies
$600,000,000,000
$400,000,000,000
$500,000,000,000
$300,000,000,000
$200,000,000,000
$100,000,000,000
$0
USA ChinaEU
Source: Author’s calculation from BEC dataset
Korea
2001 200920062002 2005 20072003 2004 2008 2010
Japan India
98 - KOREA’S ECONOMY 2012      
the shape of the regional integration in Europe, although it was 
not immediately implemented. Drawing up a future with a pre-
cise plan, communicating the dream to other people, discussing 
the plan with experts in the field around the world, commemo-
rating the date when the blueprint was published, is all very 
important for the work towards future integration. 
Sixth, East Asian countries need exposure to binding nego-
tiation on regional issues, and accumulate ample experience 
in solving the issues. It is important to create various forums 
discussing region-specific, but common issues such as intra-
regional trade, intra-regional investment, environmental issues, 
development, gender issues, human security, etc. within our 
own capacity. It took many years for the European member 
states to acquire negotiation skills, and to reach the stage of 
mutual understanding. 
Seventh, a varied policy mix is required for supporting the pos-
sible losers of regional integration. It is important to compen-
sate losers during the integration process, as it can encourage 
them to keep engaged in the process. The Common Agricul-
tural Policy introduced in the early 1960s, and Structural Funds 
refined in the 1970s played key roles in this regard in Europe, 
although the programs were not originally created for that pur-
pose. On top of those initiatives, East Asia can initiate other 
schemes such as funds for green ODA and women’s develop-
ment. In the process, all countries including LDCs in the region 
should contribute to the creation of such funds, as it leads to 
enhancement of responsibility and self-motivation.
Eighth, it is recommended that a kind of core group be formed 
so as not to lose the momentum for integration. Germany and 
France have maintained a key bilateral relationship during the 
course of the European integration process. In East Asia, Japan 
and China are expected to play such a role, but if the case does 
not hold for the two countries, Korea is advised to initiate a 
type of trilateral relationship. Korea, unique in being a divided 
country, also needs to recognize that it should take the moral 
responsibility to disseminate ideas and action plans for peace-
keeping, and to advocate peace and prosperity in the region. It 
can play an important role in initiating and leading the whole 
process of peace and prosperity through economic and mone-
tary integration. In this sense, the role of Trilateral Cooperation 
Secretariat (TCS), based in Korea, is worthy of note.
The regional integration movement in East Asia has taken a 
long time and faced adversities, but the process is still at a rudi-
mentary stage. We need to recall that the original six countries 
in the European Economic Community (EEC), which we re-
gard as more or less homogeneous economies, were identified 
as genuinely heterogeneous when the EEC started some fifty 
years ago. In those days, they recognized so many differences 
amongst each other that it would have been difficult for them 
to think about integration of these heterogeneous economies. 
Even without focusing on the differences between East Asian 
countries, it would be important to do something immediately 
for regional cooperation in order to bring about solid progress 
in regional integration. An additional implication of the Euro-
pean integration process is to keep the momentum of the pro-
cess for cooperation by creating teams of enthusiastic policy 
entrepreneurs who are eager to make efforts to bring about re-
gional integration in Korea and East Asia. This is the last, but 
not the least point that I would like to raise.
Dr. Kim Heungchong is the Director for Planning and 
Research Coordination for the Korea Institute for Interna-
tional Economic Policy. The views reproduced here are the 
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Institute for International Economic Policy.
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THE SUNSHINE POLICY WAS NOT,  
AND IS NOT, A FAILED POLICY
By Moon Chung-in
President Kim Dae-jung (KDJ) and his successor Roh Moo-hyun undertook a bold peace offensive labeled as the sunshine, or 
engagement, policy to induce incremental and voluntary changes in North Korea for peace, opening, and reforms through a patient 
pursuit of reconciliation, exchanges, and cooperation. Despite initial setbacks and a stalemate, the policy yielded some positive out-
comes such as the first historic Korean summit in June 2000 and the adoption of the June 15 Joint Declaration, as well as the second 
Korean summit and the October 4 Joint Summit Declaration of 2007. Such developments signified a revolutionary change in inter-
Korean relations. Nevertheless, the sunshine policy has confronted an array of criticism: unilateral concessions to the North without 
reciprocal gain, failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, compromise of the South’s national security posture, and neglect 
of human rights conditions in the North. The engagement initiative of the progressive decade was regarded as an outright failure. 
My new book, The Sunshine Policy - In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea, attempts to refute these critiques 
and to suggest a new North Korean policy outlook. It argues from the outset that the sunshine policy has been grossly distorted 
and wrongly politicized. It was not the policy of appeasement, but a calculated strategic offensive to foster voluntary changes in 
the North. The sunshine policy did not compromise national security posture because its first principle is non-tolerance of military 
threat or armed provocation by North Korea. In return, President Kim officially abandoned the idea of unification by absorption 
and the negation of any other measures to undermine or threaten North Korea. While satisfying the two conditions, the sunshine 
policy attempted to achieve de facto, as opposed to de jure, unification through the promotion of exchanges and cooperation, trust-
building, and peaceful co-existence. The underlying ideals were the absolute rejection of any war or major military conflicts on the 
Korean Peninsula, the formation of a union of North-South Korean states, the transformation of the North into a normal state, and 
the centrality of South Korea in managing the Korean problem and the external security environment.
ProsPECts For north KorEan  
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The volume further claims that the sunshine policy was short 
of achieving intended policy goals not because of its inher-
ent drawbacks, but because of unexpected events unfolding 
internally, externally, and within the peninsula. It places on 
North Korea the lion’s share of blame for the ongoing mili-
tary tensions and strained relations, citing its brinkmanship, 
habitual intimidations and belligerence. Nevertheless, the U.S. 
deserves blame as well for failing to manage the second 
North Korean nuclear crisis by preoccupying itself with neo- 
conservative rhetoric and practices during the Bush administra-
tion, which not only deteriorated North Korea-U.S. relations, 
but also made Pyongyang more reclusive and hesitant to seek 
inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. The MB government’s 
North Korean policy also reversed many of the gains of the 
prior ten years. Founded on the renunciation of the previous 
engagement policy, its policy towards North Korea held an 
adherence to rigid principle over pragmatism, a hard line 
security stance, a failure to recognize North Korean identity, 
and a hope for a collapse of the regime in Pyongyang. Along 
with this, an unfailing arms race between the two Koreas 
continued to remain a challenge to the sunshine policy. 
In the book, a Korean unification based on mutual consul-
tation and consensus is singled out as the most plausible 
and desirable option. Neither the German model of unifica-
tion by absorption nor the Vietnamese model of unification 
by force are considered optional. The volume contends that 
the sunshine policy is still relevant in realizing the unifica-
tion through mutual consensus. It also argues and produces 
evidence that the sunshine policy was not, and is not, a failed 
policy. It is undue politicization of the policy that has left that 
impression. In fact, despite its unexpectedly short lifespan, 
it produced impressive results for reconciliation, coopera-
tion, change and peace. Two Korean summits, the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex, the Mt. Geumgang tourist project, a large 
number of family reunions and South Korean visits to North 
Korea as well as visible changes in the North toward opening 
all underscore the power and relevance of the sunshine pol-
icy. Conversely, when dialogue, cooperation, exchanges and 
trust-building—all central to the sunshine policy—were 
suspended, inter-Korean relations were strained and military 
tension heightened. Thus, engagement is an irreversible 
historical trend and a mandate for Koreans. 
It is all the more so given the new beginning that North 
Korea has recently experienced. After 17 years in power, 
Chairman Kim Jong-il died on December 17, 2011, and his 
son Kim Jung-un emerged as North Korea’s new leader. He 
was only 29-years-old and inexperienced when he stepped 
up, with no concrete evidence of his performance or achieve-
ments. But the succession process since late December 2011 
has been smoother than many observers had expected, as 
demonstrated by a lack of near-term political crisis or confusion 
as to the new hierarchy, as well as no immediately visible signs 
of factional struggles, popular revolt or systemic breakdown.
The smooth transition can be ascribed to several factors. First, 
Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy is impeccable due to his bloodline. 
North Korea is a country rooted in the monolithic Suryong 
system, founded by his grandfather Kim Il-sung and refined 
by his father Kim Jong-il. No one would question his legiti-
macy in the Kim dynasty. Second, his power base seems un-
assailable as he is surrounded, and protected, by three inner 
circles. The first circle is the ruling family. The second circle 
is the Korean Workers’ Party itself, which has undergone 
a period of revival in recent years. The third circle is the 
military, the Korean People’s Army, of which Kim is now 
Supreme Commander and to whom it has apparently pledged 
its unfailing loyalty. A third factor in the smooth transition 
is the rapid conclusion of institutional arrangements for his 
succession. Immediately following his father’s state funeral 
on December 28, he was declared the new Supreme Leader, 
and has assumed the pivotal position of First Secretary of the 
Korean Workers’ Party, and through this the chairmanship of 
the party’s Central Military Committee. He was also appoint-
ed as First Chairman of National Defense Commission. Less 
than four months after Kim Jong-il’s death, his son was able to 
control the party, the military and the state.
So in the near term, any political crisis in Pyongyang, let 
alone regime collapse, appears remote. But in the medium 
to longer term, the new Kim Jong-un leadership is likely 
to face a dilemma, and this should be the focal point of 
international responses to the transition process. The dilemma 
is created by two mutually conflicting goals that the regime 
has set for itself. Pyongyang has been loudly promising its 
citizens that 2012 marks the year of North Korea’s emergence 
as a “strong and prosperous nation” (Gangsung Gukga). If 
Kim Jong-il could claim nothing else, he did achieve at 
least one thing for North Korea—the ultimate “strength” of 
nuclear deterrence, which the North Korean state media 
calls his “revolutionary legacy.” Now, it is up to his son to 
achieve the other half of the equation: prosperity. Over the 
past few years, there have been unmistakable signs of a 
push to improve the national economy—from growing trade 
with and investment from China, revived plans for special 
economic zones and official propaganda promising to im-
prove people’s welfare. But the issue at stake is whether 
Kim Jong-un can enhance North Korea’s prosperity with-
out being forced to undermine the source of its strength—
its nuclear weapons program. But there has been a clear 
signal of a renewed readiness by the new regime in Pyongyang 
to seek international help for easing its economic difficulties. 
The outside world should use the new beginning in North 
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Korea to embark on a coordinated, constructive engagement 
policy to normalize, and denuclearize, the Korean Peninsula. 
China has taken a bold initiative in this regard by seeking a 
wide range of economic cooperation with the North. Accord-
ing to a recent Reuters report, Russia has also followed a simi-
lar suit by “writing off 90 percent of North Korea’s $11 billion 
debt and reinvesting the balance in the reclusive Asian state, in 
a sign of closer engagement with Pyongyang under new lead-
er Kim Jong-un.” It is the time for South Korea, the U.S., and 
Japan to seek an engagement policy with North Korea in the 
letter and spirit of the sunshine policy. 
Chung-in Moon is a Professor in the Department of Political 
Science at Yonsei University.
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THE CURRENT STATE OF THE  
NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY1 
 
By Marcus Noland
Abstract
The North Korean economy today is characterized by macroeconomic instability, widening inequality and growing corruption. 
Estimates of contemporary growth rates diverge significantly, but suggest that the economy has yet to re-attain its peak level of 
output achieved roughly two decades earlier. Inflation remains a significant issue, especially for those without access to foreign 
currency. The growing affluence of Pyongyang contrasts with chronic food insecurity in the hinterland. Recent months have 
witnessed a spate of legal and organization changes but the effectiveness of these moves remains to be seen. Given its location 
in dynamic Northeast Asia, North Korea’s economic performance could change quite dramatically with reform. But whether the 
current leadership has the vision or capacity to initiate such a process is far from obvious.
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The year 2012, the centennial of the birth of founding leader 
Kim Il-sung, is an auspicious date on the North Korean cal-
endar. It is supposed to mark the country’s passage through 
the gate to prosperity, but assessing the country’s progress 
toward this goal presents significant challenges, starting with 
the dearth of conventional economic data. The North Korean 
government regards the most commonplace figures—such as 
the magnitude and composition of international trade—as state 
secrets. The data that do exist are largely produced by South 
Korea or international public agencies working under both se-
vere informational constraints as well as institutional contexts 
that lend themselves to politicization and/or excessive credulity 
with respect to what data the North Korean government does 
release. So take what follows with a large grain of salt.
To preview the conclusions of this paper, the North Korean 
economy today is characterized by macroeconomic instability, 
widening inequality and growing corruption. Given its location 
in dynamic Northeast Asia, the situation could change quite 
dramatically with reform. But the policy preferences and ca-
pacity of the new leadership are hard to ascertain.
Macroeconomic Performance and Stability
According to the official South Korean government estimates 
released by the Bank of Korea (BOK), the North Korean 
economy shrank in 2010, marking the second consecutive year 
of negative growth. Based on South Korean reckoning, per 
capita income in North Korea remains 25 percent below its 
1990 peak (Figure 1). This conclusion stands in contrast to 
numerous anecdotal reports of improved living standards 
in Pyongyang, though is consistent with the less numerous 
reports of grim conditions in provincial cities. Stephan Haggard 
has called this phenomenon “Pyongyang illusion” and believes 
that it may well go beyond typical urban- or capital-bias in 
governance and represents an attempt by an insecure regime to 
forestall any Tahrir Square type activity in the capital city.2
It is unclear how the South Korean government calculates these 
figures. The estimate is apparently constructed by applying 
estimated North Korean value-added weights of unknown 
derivation to estimates of North Korean output obtained through 
classified methods such as satellite imagery and possibly human 
intelligence. Ergo, this estimate may differ significantly from the 
true underlying figure due to the inadequacy of the calculation 
method, and in any event, it is not subject to any verification by 
outside analysts. The BOK figure is then subject to interagency 
discussion and it is widely acknowledged that at times it has been 
subject to a high degree of politicization. Once a consensus is 
reached, it is announced to the public via the BOK. 
In March 2012, the Hyundai Research Institute (HRI) released 
a study that came to a quite different conclusion, estimating that 
the economy grew by 4.7 percent in 2011 (Figure 1). Careful 
examination of the HRI methodology gives one pause, however. 
Kim Chun-gu estimated a panel cross-country regression of per 
capita income levels on infant mortality data, and then combined 
the estimated regression coefficients with the North Korean 
figures to derive a counterfactual projection. Since the United 
Nations only publishes the infant mortality data at five-year 
intervals, the HRI researcher used grain harvest data, which has 
a correlation with infant mortality of -0.69 to interpolate the 
missing data. As one can see from Figure 1, this technique 
generates an oddly smooth per capita income series.
Whatever the particulars of recent growth performance, if one 
steps back, what is really striking about Figure 1 is that all of the 
sources estimate that North Korean per capita income today is 
lower than it was twenty years ago. Indeed, according to the HRI 
estimate, North Korean per capita income first reached the level 
it attained last year in 1974! 
Figure 1 Per Capita Income Estimates 1970-2011  (in U.S. Dollars)
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In short, these estimates of growth performance are highly 
uncertain and in any event, the aggregate figures may obscure 
very different developments in different parts of the country or 
among different socio-economic groups.
Our grasp of the situation may be a little better with respect 
to inflation. Figure 2 reproduces data on prices for rice, corn, 
and the black market exchange rate for the U.S. dollar since 
January 2010 (i.e. after the huge step-jump in real prices in 
December 2009 following the currency reform). A simple 
regression of the prices (technically their logarithmic values) 
against time suggests that since the beginning of 2010, 
inflation on an annualized basis has averaged 131 percent for 
rice and 138 percent for corn. The won has depreciated against 
the dollar at a 136 percent annualized rate. A monthly 
breakdown of price movements suggests that while remaining 
high, the rate of inflation has attenuated, declining in 2011 
relative to 2010.
The co-movement of the black market exchange rate and grain 
prices would be consistent with a small, open economy in which 
prices are roughly constant in hard currency terms, but are 
skyrocketing in terms of the rapidly depreciating domestic 
currency. In the extreme this could depict an economy that was 
effectively becoming dollarized.
The rise in the relative price of corn to rice would be consistent 
with a deteriorating situation in which households are shifting 
demand away from the preferred staple (rice) toward the 
cheaper, less preferred grain, corn. This pattern could signal 
belt-tightening by households, which would be consistent 
with recent FAO-WFP and U.S. government assessments 
documenting continuing food availability problems.
Most worrisome, however, are recent post-harvest observations. 
Unlike 2010 when, as would be expected, the price of rice fell 
after the harvest, the rice price has been rising continuously 
since the harvest. Corn prices, which tend to fall even more 
dramatically after the harvest, for example by nearly 50 percent 
in the three months following the harvest in 2010, have also 
continued to rise since the harvest.
These trends—sustained inflation, the rise in the relative price 
of a less preferred grain, and continued food price increase 
immediately following the harvest—do not augur well for North 
Koreans without access to hard currency.
These conclusions are reinforced by examination of the quantita-
tive grain balances (Figure 3). Both estimates produced by the 
UN system, as well as an alternative series that I constructed with 
Stephan Haggard, indicate that North Korea is below the mini-
mum human needs line. Indeed, our estimate of the shortfall is 
quite similar to the U.S. government’s 240,000 metric ton assess-
ment of North Korean needs. From this perspective, the apparent 
failure of the “Leap Day Deal” to resume humanitarian aid in 
return for concessions on the nuclear front does not bode well for 
chronically food-insecure North Korean communities.
These trends of growing scarcity do not appear to be confined 
to staples. During the winter, the press reported growing anxiety 
over rising coal prices (used for winter home heating), although 
these reports are impossible to substantiate. Some observers 
attribute the scarcity of coal in local markets to the diversion 
of domestic coal supplies to the Chinese export market, and it 
was reported that North Korea had suspended anthracite coal 
exports to China precisely over concerns about spreading 
internal shortages.3 
There have also been reports of increased irregularity in the 
supply of electricity and water in Pyongyang, though the 
interpretation of these stories is problematic. Under condi-
tions of significant excess demand, outages are a function 
of both the level of production (and efficiency in distribu-
tion) as well as rationing among alternative users. These 
allocation choices are subject to at least a certain degree 
of political control. Factories may go without power if the 
needs of Pyongyang residents are considered more essential. 
Similarly, outages in Pyongyang may imply that other user 
needs are being prioritized. The same story can play out at 
the local level, and such conflicts over distribution report-
edly occur among local actors and with the central authori-
ties. Moreover, conditions tend to deteriorate in winter, when 
some communities, which have detached from the unreliable 
national grid by relying on local mini-dams to generate 
hydropower, re-attach themselves to the grid as local rivers 
and streams freeze rendering the dams unusable. However, 
one source suggests that power shortages reduced the regime’s 
capacity to jam foreign radio broadcasts—even stations 
operated by the South Korean intelligence service and the 
Ministry of National Defense, as well as keep their own 
foreign radio service on the air.4 Of course these reports of 
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deteriorating conditions have to be set against the claim that 
Orascom now has one million cell phone subscribers, and 
anecdotal reports of traffic jams in Pyongyang. 
In sum, while there is considerable uncertainty regarding macro-
economic performance, it does not appear to be particularly 
strong. What can be established with greater confidence is that 
inequality is on the rise, and a considerable share of the North 
Korean population is economically insecure regardless of the 
headline growth number.
Policy Changes
North Korean economic policy is not unchanging, though there 
are questions as to its aims and effectiveness, deepened by the 
recent leadership transition and uncertainty regarding both the 
policy process and the regime’s underlying preferences. 
The new corporation law, which apparently does not apply within 
the special zones or with respect to foreign-invested companies, 
retains vestiges of central planning.5 In Article 21 it specifies 
corporate hierarchy, defining the roles of manager, chief engineer, 
and assistant manager, and indicates that the assistant manager is 
to report to the manager and the chief engineer, while the chief 
engineer reports to the manager. Articles 29 and 30 indicate that 
written plans must be submitted to the authorities annually, and 
this plan must be followed on a daily, monthly, quarterly, and 
index basis. Article 44 states that “the appropriate amount of 
labor is scientifically determined and managed based on social-
ist distribution principles and a precise socialist wage system 
must be implemented.” Sales must be based on supply plans and 
contracts. “Those sales that do not follow the plan and contract 
cannot be sold” (Article 42). Ultimately, the state is in charge: 
“the managing organization has the jurisdiction to close down 
corporations for unreasonable or lack of prospects that does 
not meet the standards and demands of the national policy and 
reality” (Article 18).
In 2010, North Korea published revised regulations regarding 
the existing Rason special zone, and last year released new ones 
for the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Island special economic 
zones under development. There has long been a compelling 
case to develop Rason, primarily as a port serving Northeastern 
China (Noland and Flake 1997). After languishing for years, 
it now appears that the zone is on the verge of meeting at 
least some of its promise. The Chinese are surfacing the 
dirt road linking Hunchun with Rason and the Russians are 
refurbishing the rail link. The next priority would be to dredge 
the harbor. North Korea also claims that China will build a 
600,000 kilowatt coal-fired power plant, but corroboratory 
evidence regarding that claim is elusive. In the meantime, 
transmissions lines are being built to bring electricity in from 
China (Abrahamian 2012). 
So progress is evident; the deeper question is whether this 
initiative will be a catalyst for broader development. One 
simple leading indicator would be if off-ramps are built on the 
road between the port and China. If they are, the road could 
become the main artery of a growth corridor in that part of 
North Korea. If not, the highway would be a metaphorical 
tunnel from China to the sea. North Korea will make money 
off the port, but the project will effectively be an enclave, and 
not a catalyst for broader development.
But as a recent review of the uneven history of special economic 
zones around the world released by the World Bank conclud-
ed, it is important to distinguish between political support and 
the primacy of political objectives in the design of such proj-
ects which must have a clear commercial rationale to succeed 
(Farole 2011). Successful zones embody clear and transparent 
rules and regulations administered by a capable management 
authority, and are integrated into the broader national econo-
my. In the case of Rason, the law gives extraordinary power 
and discretion to the Rason City People’s Committee, though 
relative to the previous rules, which gave more authority to the 
central government, the localization of decision-making may 
encourage greater pragmatism. Backwards and forwards link-
ages to the rest of the economy have been slight, but this could 
change if the development of the refurbished transportation 
links are managed properly.
With regard to the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Island 
zone, China reportedly rejected the initially decreed rules, 
complaining about problems relating to taxation, accounting, 
the security of investment, management autonomy, and the 
remittance of profits, despite the fact that the terms under 
discussion for Chinese activities in the zones (the right to 
use Chinese currency and cell phones; the establishment of 
independent banks; internet access; and the right to lend and 
sub-lease leased land) compared favorably to either those 
that exist at the South Korea-oriented Kaesong Industrial 
Complex (KIC) or at Rason. Indeed, a comparison of the 
Rason and the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Island zone rules 
implicitly reveal China’s influence on the latter. The Hwang-
gumpyong and Wihwa Island regulations are far more detailed, 
more clearly delineating the responsibility of the zone’s man-
agement committee, the provincial People’s Committee, and 
the central government, as well as affording foreign investors 
greater investor rights. 
KIC enjoys broad political support in South Korea and has 
remained relatively insulated from the downturn in North-
South relations. It has expanded steadily and approximately 
50,000 North Koreans are now employed in the zone.
In 2000 North and South Korea reached an agreement on 
double taxation (as well as pacts on account settlement, 
repatriation of profits, and dispute settlement), and the North 
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has concluded double taxation treaties with a number of oth-
er countries including Egypt, home to its biggest foreign 
investor, Orascom Telecom, but apparently it has not reached 
a similar agreement with its largest trade and investment 
partner, China. Given the country’s demonstrated ability to 
reach such agreements with other countries, presumably it is 
just a matter of time. That said, an unprecedented survey of 
Chinese enterprises found that fear of expropriation does in 
fact deter investment in North Korea (Haggard, Lee, and 
Noland 2012).
In parallel to these legal changes, there have been shake-ups 
in some of the bodies that intermediate North Korea’s foreign 
economic relations. In late 2011, the government announced 
a decision to initiate a “10-Year State Strategy Plan for Eco-
nomic Development” and to set up a new agency called the 
State General Bureau for Economic Development, out of the 
state price bureau. The government also designated a supra-
cabinet body to oversee foreign direct investment under the 
10-year plan. The Taepung Group is effectively a holding 
company for joint ventures and other initiatives outside the 
central plan. It has been headed by a Chinese-Korean business-
man with ties to the North Korean military and has a board 
consisting of regime heavyweights. This decision put this 
group effectively into competition with the Joint Venture and 
Investment Commission (JVIC), something akin to a conven-
tional inward investment promotion agency. Now rumors are 
circulating that the two organizations will be merged as part 
of an economic development plan to be announced during the 
Kim Il-sung centenary.6 If this does in fact take place, the 
implications are unclear. The positive interpretation is that it 
would establish a one-stop shop for investment approval. The 
more cynical view is that it would further consolidate the gate-
keeping role of the Taepung Group and enhance that body’s 
capacity for the extraction of rents from foreign investors. 
Corruption
The preceding possibility leads quite naturally into a 
consideration of corruption more broadly. Surveys of North 
Korean refugees and Chinese enterprises operating in North 
Korea depict it as an increasingly corrupt place, and in the most 
recent Transparency International survey, North Korea placed 
dead last, tied with Somalia in 182nd place (Haggard 
and Noland 2011, Haggard, Lee, and Noland 2012).7 
The situation not only represents a drag on growth, but could 
impair the regime’s capacity to govern, as the parochial inter-
ests of corrupt officials diverge from the policy preferences 
of Pyongyang.
The situation is exacerbated by the macroeconomic imbal-
ances discussed at the outset of the paper. In the two years 
since the November 2009 currency reform, North Korea has 
experienced high and sustained inflation. One implication is 
the ever-widening gap between the official and black market 
exchange rates, and understandable reluctance of foreign 
exchange earners to convert their revenues into North Korean 
won at the official rate. One press report claimed that the 
Chosun Trade Bank was offering the carrot of better-than- 
official rates to obtain foreign currency deposits, while the 
regime was also brandishing the stick of special inspections of 
units suspected of hoarding foreign exchange. One response 
by enterprise managers has been to stash foreign exchange 
earnings into local trade banks where bank officials are bribed 
to disguise the magnitude of the deposits and to maintain 
access to foreign exchange loans. The reputed consensus among 
market participants was that deposits in banks controlled by the 
central government were subject to seizure in the run-up to the 
Kim Il-sung centenary.
Uncertainty following the death of Kim Jong-il seems to have 
intensified these contradictions. IFES reports that “the DPRK 
government is forcing businesses and trading companies 
to deposit all foreign currency earned in the trade bank. 
However, most companies prefer to hold on to their foreign 
reserves to avoid complex deposit and withdrawal processes.”8 
IFES continues, “They also seem to be using private money 
brokers to exchange money…Recognizing this, North Korean 
authorities have been cracking down on such illegal ‘private 
money exchangers’ every year.” In other words, the North 
Korean banking system is being drained of reserves as fearful 
depositors hoard foreign exchange.
According to more recent reporting, this pressure to hoover 
up hard currency has now extended to households. Authorities 
have allegedly banned foreign currency transactions, though 
Pyongyang banks are now issuing foreign currency denomi-
nated debt cards which can be used, creating an incentive for 
people to turn in their foreign exchange. 
While the scheme might work at the retail level, it is harder to 
imagine it working at the wholesale level, especially in so far as 
the actual wholesale purchases of consumer goods are largely 
done in China and there is no particular reason to expect that 
Chinese merchants would readily accept this form of payment. 
The net result is likely to be disrupted supply and worse finan-
cial terms for the North Korean importers. Previously, a similar 
attempt to ban the use of foreign exchange in the aftermath of 
the 2009 currency reform was quietly shelved. 
Conclusion
Today’s North Korean economy is characterized by macro-
economic instability, an uneven track record on policy change, 
and growing inequality and corruption. Given North Korea’s 
location in one of the most dynamic regions in the world, 
the economy could potentially respond quite dramatically to 
reform. Whether the current leadership has the vision or 
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capacity to initiate such a process is far from obvious. Some 
of the policies described in the previous section have allegedly 
been ascribed to Kim Jong-il’s “dying wish” and it would not 
be at all surprising if more policies in the future were legiti-
mated in this way. But at some point Kim Jong-un and the new 
leadership will have to take ownership of policy. That transition 
may well have begun on April of this year, the centennial of the 
birth of Kim Il-sung.
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Leading Economic Indicators for Korea
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Growth Rate of Real GDP (%)
Annual change at Chained 2005  
Constant Prices
4.6 4 5.2 5.1 2.3 0.3 6.3 3.6
GDP
Current US$ billions
722.4 844.7 951.1 1,049.3 930.9 834.4 1,014.7 1,116.4
GNI Per Capita
US$
15,082 17,531 19,691 21,632 19,161 17,041 20,562 22,489
Current Account
US$ billions, BOP basis
32.3 18.6 14.1 21.8 3.2 32.8 29.4 26.5
Consumer Prices (%)
Annual Change at 2005 = 100  
Constant Prices
3.6 2.8 2.2 2.5 4.7 2.8 3.0 4.0
Unemployment Rate (%) 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.7 3.4
Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
US$ billions, actual basis
9.0 7.1 4.9 2.6 8.4 7.5 8.5 4.7
Stock Price Index 
Average
833 1074 1352 1713 1530 1429 1765 1983
Exchange Rate 
Average Won/US$
1,144 1,024 955 929 1,103 1,276 1,156 1,107
Bank of Korea
National Statistical Office
Ministry of Knowledge Economy
UNCTADSTat
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